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ABSTRACT 
 
Megan Prince Goodwin: Good Fences: American Sexual Exceptionalism and Minority Religions 
(Under the direction of Randall Styers) 
 
This dissertation is about the ways sexual difference complicates contemporary American 
religious pluralism, particularly since 1980.  Suspicions of sexual deviance frequently haunt minority 
religions, regardless of their communities’ mores or practices.  To explore this issue, I engage a set of 
popular narratives that portray minority religions (Islam, Mormonism, and witchcraft) as predatory, 
coercing or duping vulnerable American women and children into religious nonconformity and 
sexual transgression.  Federal agents, law enforcement officials, foreign policymakers, and others 
have used such narratives—and a desire to liberate their alleged victims—to justify restraining these 
“dangerous” forms of religious difference.  
Books like Under the Banner of Heaven, Not Without My Daughter, and Michelle Remembers are part 
of a broad and persistent public discourse about the appropriate role and regulation of religious and 
sexual difference.  My case studies indicate a persistent and troubling pattern of responses toward 
religious and sexual difference within the American public sphere.  These narratives of contact with 
American religious minority communities provided significant material consequences and are 
symptomatic of a broader trend in American public discourse – one that simultaneously vaunts 
American religious tolerance and discourages religious and sexual difference.  I present these stories 
and their public reception as contributions to an ongoing public negotiation of the kinds of beliefs 
and practices mainstream Americans will and will not tolerate.   
Media pundits, law enforcement officials, and Congress members have sanctioned 
interference into religious minority communities as efforts to liberate vulnerable American women 
and children.  These polemics encourage attempts to rescue community members who are assumed 
 iv 
to be too weak mentally or physically to resist presumably dangerous beliefs and practices.  My case 
studies identify minority religious communities as especially given to gendered and sexual 
exploitation of American women and children.   
By locating the abuse of women and children in America’s religious margins, these rhetorics 
of “liberation” encourage normative religious and sexual practices without violating a professed 
national commitment to religious freedom.   Paradoxically, such liberatory rhetorics often work to 
constrain Americans’ religious and sexual freedoms while doing little to prevent violence against 
women and children.   
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The Wall Between Us:  
American Sexual Exceptionalism and Minority Religions 
 
April 2008 
 
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services escorts more than four hundred Mormon 
fundamentalist children aboard buses borrowed from local school districts and the Eldorado First 
Baptist Church.  These are the children of Yearning for Zion, a large community of Fundamentalist 
Latter-day Saints who practice plural marriage, or theologically mandated polygyny.  Tearful women 
in elaborate pompadour braids and high-necked prairie dresses look on before boarding buses 
themselves.1  Without a court order, Texas’ Department of Family and Protective Services 
commences the single largest protective custody seizure in the history of the United States.2   
January 1997 
 
In a Michigan child custody suit between a European American mother and an Arab American 
father, the presiding judge allows the mother’s attorney to screen the film Not Without My Daughter as 
evidence.  The film portrays an Iranian man, a devout Muslim, as an abusive, controlling husband 
and kidnapping father.3  In November 2001, President George W. Bush will justify attacking 
Muslim-majority nations by insisting that Muslim terrorists wish to deny women education, health 
                                                          
1 Martha Bradley Evans, “The Past as Prologue: A Comparison of the Short Creek and Eldorado Polygamy Raids,” 
in Saints Under Siege: The Texas State Raid on the Fundamentalist Latter-day Saints, ed. Stuart Wright and James T. 
Richardson (New York: NYU Press, 2011), 35. 
 
2 Linda F. Smith, “Child Protection Law and the FLDS Raid in Texas,” in Modern Polygamy in the United States: 
Historical, Cultural, and Legal Issues, ed. Cardell Jacobson and Lara Burton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
304.   
 
3 American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 1996-97 Report on Hate Crimes & Discrimination Against Arab 
Americans (Washington, DC: American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 1997), 33.  On this point, see also 
Jack G. Shaheen, “Hollywood’s Muslim Arabs,” The Muslim World 90, no. 1–2 (2000): 36. 
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care, and social mobility.4 That same month, First Lady Laura Bush will accuse Afghan Muslim men 
of “deliberate human cruelty” toward women and children.5  “The fight against terrorism is also a 
fight for the rights and dignity of women,” she insists.6 
February 1984  
 
Specialists on satanic ritual abuse arrive in California to consult on the McMartin Daycare Trial, 
which charges seven current and former employees of the award-winning school with 52 counts of 
felony child abuse.  Swayed by these experts, police officers, social workers, and mental health 
professionals elicit from child witnesses shocking testimony of ritualized torture and sexual 
defilement.   More than a hundred similar cases will emerge in the next five years.  When the trial is 
dismissed and its defendants acquitted, the McMartin Daycare Trial will stand as the longest and 
most expensive criminal trial in US history of its time.7   
* * *  
 
Each of these incidents began with a story: a story of women and children duped or forced into 
sexual depravity under the auspices of minority religious practice.  Jon Krakauer told a tale of 
women and children ruthlessly exploited by the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints in his 2003 Under the Banner of Heaven: A Story of Violent Faith.  Betty Mahmoody chronicled her 
daring escape from Iran and from her tyrannical and sexually controlling Muslim husband in her 
1987 Not Without My Daughter.  Michelle Smith, with her psychiatrist-turned-spouse, shared her 
recovered memories of ritualized abuse at the hands of insidious Satanists in her 1980 memoir, 
Michelle Remembers. 
                                                          
4 “President George W. Bush Addresses the Nation” (World Congress Center, Atlanta, GA, November 8, 2001), 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html. 
 
5 “Radio Address by Mrs. Bush” (Crawford, TX, November 17, 2001), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011117.html. 
 
6 Ibid. 
 
7 Bill Ellis, Raising the Devil: Satanism, New Religions, and the Media (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), 
117.  
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More than merely stories, however, these texts were voices crying out in the wilderness – 
witness borne to the exploitation of American women and children, actions against the abuse and 
coercion of the innocent and helpless at the hands of American religious outsiders.  The publication 
of these texts and the broader dissemination of these stories—often by the authors themselves—
were calls to action.  Law enforcement agencies at all levels, mental health professionals, news 
outlets, and the United States federal government responded to these calls.  Despite a professed 
national commitment to religious freedom, Americans would not allow minority religious 
communities to sexually and psychologically manipulate the nation’s women and children.  Even 
religious tolerance must have its limits: these incidents show that sexual impropriety often marks the 
limits of that tolerance.  
Except… 
Except that Krakauer’s account of plural marriage and “violent faith” fails to accounts for 
the hundreds of Mormon fundamentalists—men, women, and children alike—who do not feel 
exploited by or coerced into their religious or sexual practices.  Indeed, Krakauer allows very few 
practicing Mormon fundamentalists a voice in his book.  The Texas Department of Family and 
Protective Services’ intervention, swayed in part by Krakauer’s testimony that polygyny is inherently 
abusive, alienated and terrified the women and children it sought to help without detaining a single 
male member of the community.8   
Similarly, Betty Mahmoody’s tale portrayed all Muslim men as monsters, even those who 
profess to love America and their wives.  Her story is one of hundreds of such memoirs, a 
                                                          
8 TX House of Representatives, 79th Legislature (R), H.B. 3006, A BILL TO BE ENTITLED AN ACT Relating to 
Certain Requirements and Limitations Relating to a Person’s Age, Marital Status, Residency, and Relations by Consanguinity and 
Affinity; Providing Criminal Penalties., 2005; Cardell K. Jacobson and Lara Burton, “Prologue: The Incident at 
Eldorado, Texas,” in Modern Polygamy in the United States: Historical, Cultural, and Legal Issues (Oxford University Press, 
2011),  xviii.   On women’s agency and networking in Mormon fundamentalist communities, see also Janet Bennion, 
Women of Principle: Female Networking in Contemporary Mormon Polygyny (Oxford University Press, 1998).  
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cacophony of voices that essentializes Islam as inherently and especially injurious toward women.9  
This narrative, echoed by influential US foreign policy-makers, continues to justify American 
intervention into Muslim majority nation-states – often to the detriment of the women and children 
in those countries.10 
And the abuses Michelle Smith remembered with the help of her psychiatrist directly 
contradict the testimony of her siblings (absent from the memoir) and local police records of the 
times and places in question. Repressed/recovered memory syndrome remains a hotly contested 
psychological diagnosis.11  More to the point, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s ten year inquiry 
into the phenomenon yielded no credible evidence to corroborate any allegation of satanic ritual 
abuse.12 
These stories are by no means unique: they lay within a well-established genealogy of 
narratives about contact with outsiders.  Such stories articulate anxieties about other-ness, often 
                                                          
9 Farzaneh Milani, Words, Not Swords: Iranian Women Writers and the Freedom of Movement (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 2011), 232-3.  Lila Abu-Lughod and Anupama Rao, “New Texts Out Now: Lila Abu-Lughod and Anupama 
Rao, Women’s Rights, Muslim Family Law, and the Politics of Consent,” Jadaliyya, February 16, 2012, 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4337/new-texts-out-now_lila-abu-lughod-and-anupama-rao-. 
 
10 Charles Hirschkind and Saba Mahmood, “Feminism, the Taliban, and Politics of Counter-Insurgency,” 
Anthropological Quarterly 75, no. 2 (2002): 340-1.  Ibid., 344, where Hirschkind and Mahmood state that “the widely 
respected Afghan women’s organization, Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, put out a 
statement saying ‘The people of the world need to know that in terms of widespread raping of girls and women 
from seven to 70, the track record of the Taliban can no way stand up against that of these very same [United 
States-led] Northern Alliance associates.’” See also Lila Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? 
Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others,” American Anthropologist 104, no. 3 (2002): 784; 
and John Corrigan and Lynn S. Neal, Religious Intolerance in America: a Documentary History (Chapel Hill: UNC Press 
Books, 2010), 11: “the contemporary media, from CNN sound bites to television’s 24, depict Islam as a religion 
infused with violence and antithetical to the American way of life.  Films such as Not Without My Daughter…have 
shaped and reinforced this interpretation.” 
 
11 James T. Richardson, Jenny Reichert, and Valerie Lykes, “Satanism in America: An Update,” Social Compass 56, 
no. 4 (December 1, 2009): 566.  See also Richard Ofshe and Ethan Watters, Making Monsters: False Memories, 
Psychotherapy, And Sexual Hysteria, Updated with a New Final Chapter (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); 
and Richard J. Ofshe and Margaret Thaler Singer, “Recovered-Memory Therapy and Robust Repression: Influence 
and Pseudomemories,” International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis 42, no. 4 (1994): 391–410. 
 
12 U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Satanic Ritual Abuse, by Kenneth V. Lanning, Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office (1992). 
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expressed as suspicions about sexual impropriety.  The purpose of this dissertation is to identify a 
pattern within these narratives and explore their material consequences.  
This dissertation is about the ways sexual difference complicates contemporary American 
religious pluralism, particularly since 1980.  Suspicions of sexual deviance frequently haunt minority 
religions, regardless of their communities’ mores or practices.  To explore this issue, I engage a set of 
popular narratives that portray minority religions (Islam, Mormonism, and witchcraft) as predatory, 
coercing or duping vulnerable American women and children into religious nonconformity and 
sexual transgression.  Federal agents, law enforcement officials, foreign policymakers, and others 
have used such narratives—and a desire to liberate their alleged victims—to justify restraining these 
“dangerous” forms of religious difference.  
Let me state clearly from the beginning: I have no wish to dismiss or diminish the very real 
damage and trauma resulting from sexual exploitation and coercion within minority religious 
communities.  Without a doubt, such abuses absolutely do occur.13  There can be no excuse for such 
actions.  Scholars of American religions must attend, however, to the staggering discrepancy between 
the size and influence of controversial American minority religious communities and the public 
outcry against them.14  We must also note that the fervor of this public outcry is deafening compared 
to the relative public silence regarding the all-too-common abuse of women and children in 
mainstream American households.15  
                                                          
13 Most pertinent to my analysis is the conviction of former FLDS leader Warren Jeffs of child sexual assault and 
aggravated child sexual assault.  But see also incidents reported among David Koresh’s Branch Davidians, the 
Children of God, and other new religious movements.  Susan J. Palmer, “Rescuing Children?  Government Raids 
and Child Abuse Allegations in Historical and Cross-Cultural Perspective,” in Saints Under Siege: The Texas State Raid 
on the Fundamentalist Latter-day Saints, ed. Stuart Wright and James Richardson (New York: NYU Press, 2011), 51–79. 
 
14 Terryl Givens, The Viper on the Hearth: Mormons, Myths, and the Construction of Heresy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), 5, 114.  See also Gayle Rubin, “Blood Under the Bridge: Reflections on ‘thinking Sex’,” GLQ: A 
Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 17, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 33-4: “Zealotry and unprincipled behavior were 
acceptable in the service of ‘protecting’ women.” 
 
15 Rubin, “Blood Under the Bridge,” 38: “Despite the facts that most sex abuse is perpetrated at home and by 
family members [and] most murdered children are killed by their parents…the family is depicted as a place of safety 
threatened by dangerous strangers” (38).  See also Steven Mintz, “Placing Childhood Sexual Abuse in Historical 
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Books like Under the Banner of Heaven, Not Without My Daughter, and Michelle Remembers are part 
of a broad and persistent public discourse about the appropriate role and regulation of religious and 
sexual difference.  These books are perhaps not significant as individual works of popular nonfiction; 
indeed, scholars have dismissed these works as trite, racist, ahistorical, and incomplete.  Even the 
public responses to each individual publication in efforts to discourage and control sexual and 
religious difference might be dismissed as isolated moral panics – brief aberrations in an otherwise 
rational and secular American public sphere.16  But taken as a whole, these texts do not indicate rare 
overreactions to unfamiliar beliefs and practices; rather, my case studies indicate a persistent and 
troubling pattern of responses toward religious and sexual difference within the American public 
sphere.17   
These narratives of contact with American religious minority communities provided 
significant material consequences and, I contend, are symptomatic of a broader trend in American 
public discourse – one that simultaneously vaunts American religious tolerance and discourages 
religious and sexual difference.  I present these stories and their public reception as contributions to 
an ongoing public negotiation of the kinds of beliefs and practices mainstream Americans will and 
will not tolerate.   
Perhaps most troubling is the role “liberation” plays in this rhetoric: media pundits, law 
enforcement officials, and Congress members have sanctioned interference into religious minority 
communities as efforts to liberate vulnerable American women and children.  (Rhetorical distinctions 
                                                          
Perspective,” The Immanent Frame: Secularism, Religion, and the Public Sphere, July 13, 2012, 
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2012/07/13/placing-childhood-sexual-abuse-in-historical-perspective/. 
 
16 “Moral panic’ refers to an intense public reaction to an issue or group perceived to threat a culture’s social order.  
On this issue, see in particular Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers 
(Oxford: Taylor & Francis, 2011). 
 
17 These responses are comparable though not reducible to the “performed outrages” Jason Bivins theorizes in his  
“Embattled Majority: Religion and Its Despisers in America (Or: The Long-Lurching Wreck of American Public 
Life),” Religion in American History, 2012, http://usreligion.blogspot.com/2012/11/embattled-majority-religion-and-
its.html. 
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between women and children in such discourse are often vague.)  Public rhetoric regarding 
mainstream American values—articulated by police officers, judges, reporters, popular press authors, 
and others—adopts a paternalistic tone toward religious minorities.  Such polemics encourage 
attempts to rescue community members who are assumed to be too weak mentally or physically to 
resist presumably dangerous beliefs and practices.18  My case studies and similar public discourses 
thus identify minority religious communities as especially given to gendered and sexual exploitation 
of American women and children.  
By locating the abuse of women and children in America’s religious margins, these rhetorics 
of “liberation” encourage normative practices without violating a professed national commitment to 
religious freedom.   Paradoxically, such liberatory rhetorics often work to constrain Americans’ 
religious and sexual freedoms while doing little to prevent violence against women and children.19   
This introduction outlines the theoretical premises of my project.  In the first section, I 
discuss the significance of my case studies’ narrative genealogy.  I suggest that works like Under the 
Banner of Heaven, Not Without My Daughter, and Michelle Remembers are performative texts.  Narratives 
of captivity and abuse at the hands of outsiders are never merely stories – they are texts that foster 
anxieties within the body politic and encourage action to resolve those anxieties.  As such, the 
genre’s ability to persuade readers and incite action far exceeds the significance the texts alone.  I 
introduce and contextualize each of my case studies within this literary genealogy.  I provide 
background on the authors and briefly summarize each book’s topic, argument, and conclusions.  I 
                                                          
18 See Burlein on the “action-adventure heroism” inherent to the “romance of masculine protectionism.”  Ann 
Burlein, Lift High the Cross: Where White Supremacy and the Christian Right Converge (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2002), 26-7. 
 
19 Hirschkind and Mahmood, “Feminism, the Taliban, and Politics of Counter-Insurgency,” 340-1, cites the 
increased incidence of sexual assault after US-led military incursion into Afghanistan.  Tamatha Schreiner and James 
Richardson note that the largest state custodial seizure of children in American history resulted in very few 
convictions for sexual abuse but subjected FLDS mothers to “the devastating emotional impact of the raid, the 
forced removal of their children, the threat of extended or permanent state custody, allegations of sexual abuse, and 
the intrusive public scrutiny of their lives.”  Tamatha L. Schreinert and James T. Richardson, “Pyrrhic Victory?  An 
Analysis of the Appeal Court Opinions Concerning the FLDS Children,” in Saints Under Siege: The Texas State Raid on 
the Fundamentalist Latter-day Saints, ed. Stuart Wright and James Richardson (New York: NYU Press, 2011), 259.   
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then discuss the material consequences of each publication, paying specific attention to the ways 
these narratives have worked to constrain the religious and sexual freedoms of Americans in general 
and American women in particular.  
The introduction’s second section provides a more detailed theorization of American sexual 
normativity.  I note the historical peculiarities of the American mainstream in the closing decades of 
the 20th century – a confluence of unprecedented religious diversity, gendered and sexual activism, 
and public anxiety about moral (read: sexual) decay and depravity.  While anxieties regarding 
marginal groups’ sexual improprieties are prevalent throughout American history, I show that the 
United States after 1980 is an especially rich context in which to consider the co-constitutive 
relationship between religious intolerance and normative sexuality.  In particular, I emphasize the 
fraught relationship between “good sex” and minority religions deemed in/tolerable by the 
American public.  I employ and expand on Jasbir Puar’s theory of sexual exceptionalism to consider 
a demonstrable national investment in protecting normative American sexual practices.    
The final section contextualizes my case studies within a broader impulse in national public 
rhetoric: the popular articulation of America’s commitment to religious freedom and moral rectitude.  
Rhetoric extolling America as exceptionally religiously tolerant and diverse often dismisses or 
disregards the extent to which a specific, limited, and religiously informed sexual ethic informs 
normative American sexuality.  A conservative Christian ethic thus shapes the popular 
understanding—our intuitive sense—of tolerable sexuality; conformity to American sexual norms 
constrains the public’s tolerance of minority religions.  The introduction concludes with an overview 
of subsequent chapters and a brief discussion of the work’s significance. 
  
 9  
Narrating American Religion(s) 
 
 
There is nothing political in American literature. 
 
Laura Bush 
“Laura Bush’s Literary Salon,” The New York Times (10 October 2002) 
 
 
 
This section argues for the performativity of the texts that comprise my dissertation’s case 
studies.   In identifying these narratives as performative, I suggest the stories do more than they say.20  
Specifically, these kinds of stories articulate mainstream anxieties about contact with America’s 
religious margins and authorize actions to constrain and discourage religious and sexual difference.  
Such narratives thus justify attempts to regulate the practices of religious outsiders on the grounds of 
sexual decency, despite America’s professed national commitment to religious freedom.  And like 
America’s founding narrative that Sacvan Bercovitch identifies as “Pilgrims, Puritans, and the Quest 
for Religious Freedom,” the narrative of the duplicitous and sexually vile religious outsider has 
shown, as Bercovitch says, “astonishing tenacity.”21 
My analysis of this dissertation’s case studies includes not only close readings of the texts 
themselves, but also considerations of the material consequences of the text’s publication and 
publicization.22  To this end, I refer to each case study not as a text, but rather as a narrativization.  
In his 1981 “The Narrativization of Real Events,” historian and literary scholar Hayden White argues 
that the translation of lived experience into narrative lends consequence and coherence to the 
                                                          
20 On the capacity of language to act or effect action, see in particular J. L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975). 
 
21 Sacvan Bercovitch, The Puritan Origins of the American Self (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 186. 
 
22 As White reminds us, the significance of narrativization depends upon both making available the text available to 
the public and the public’s insistence upon the text’s importance.   That is, “it is the ‘publicity’ that makes the 
difference.” Hayden White, “The Narrativization of Real Events,” Critical Inquiry 7, no. 4 (July 1, 1981): 798.  On the 
“strange materiality of discourse, see also Burlein, Lift High the Cross, xii. 
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“virtual chaos of ‘events.’”23  White emphasizes the inherently moralistic nature of narrativization.  
The turning of events and experiences into a story does not merely relate those events and 
experiences.  As White insists: “story forms not only permit us to judge the moral significance of 
human projects, they also provide the means by which to judge them, even while we pretend to be 
merely describing them.”24  This is to say that narrativizations both provide moral guidance for their 
readers and instruct those readers in how to gauge the morality embedded within the narrative.   
In the context of my case studies, the transformation of personal experiences and historical 
events into “stories” translates complex and often poorly understood beliefs and practices into 
straightforward and proximate formulas for mainstream Americans.25  Readers identify protagonists 
based on the characters’ familiarity (their “same-as-me-ness”)26 and antagonists on their strangeness 
and inscrutability.  These narrativizations evoke a sentimental and dramatic emotional response to 
the sufferings of the protagonists, who are always the characters most closely identified with the 
American religious mainstream.27  Likewise, these narrativizations collapse the lived complexities of 
unfamiliar religious beliefs and practices, consolidating undigested difference into a more 
recognizable and vilifiable Other.28   
                                                          
23 White, “The Narrativization of Real Events,” 795, in conversation with Louis Mink regarding the purpose and 
significance of narrative. 
 
24 Ibid., 797. 
 
25 See Robert Orsi on the simultaneous attraction and repulsion of extreme or disturbing religious persons or 
groups: “Americans want to be protected from these religious actors, but at the same time they want access to some 
of their power, an unstable mix of desire and prohibition.” Robert A. Orsi, “Snakes Alive!  Religious Studies 
Between Heaven and Earth,” in Between Heaven and Earth: The Religious Worlds People Make and the Scholars Who Study 
Them (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 182. 
 
26 See Burlein, Lift High the Cross, 11 (emphasis added):  “Everyday practices that predicate bonding on ‘same-as-me-ness’ 
produce our very perceptions of intimacy and connection as threatened by difference rather than strengthened by it.”  
 
27 On the cultural currency of sentimentality, see ibid., 14. 
 
28 Ibid., 7: in religiously intolerant discourse, “names and places might change, but the plots and conclusions remain 
numbingly the same.”  See also David Brion Davis, “Some Themes of Counter-Subversion: An Analysis of Anti-
Masonic, Anti-Catholic, and Anti-Mormon Literature,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 47, no. 2 (1960): 208; 
and Robert Neelly Bellah and Frederick E. Greenspahn, Uncivil Religion: Interreligious Hostility in America (New York: 
Crossroad, 1987) 256.  
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In the case of Jon Krakauer’s Under the Banner of Heaven: A Story of Violent Faith, the marginal 
group is the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.   Krakauer is an American 
mountaineer and the author of several works of popular non-fiction; he is best known for his 
accounts of out-of-doors derring-do, including Into Thin Air and Into the Wild.  Under the Banner of 
Heaven interweaves two narratives:  an informal history of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints and an account of murders committed by Dan and Ron Lafferty, two former members of a 
Mormon fundamentalist extremist sect.  Throughout the book, Krakauer implies that Mormonism—
not the Lafferty brothers’ splinter sect, but all Mormonism—is inherently violent and sexually 
suspect. Despite being condemned by LDS spokespeople and dismissed by religious studies scholars, 
Banner ignited a media firestorm and sold thousands of copies.  In direct response to his research for 
Banner, Krakauer dedicated significant time and personal resources toward the capture and 
imprisonment of former FLDS leader Warren Steed Jeffs.  The author also testified before the Texas 
Juvenile Justice and Family Issues Committee in support of a bill that directly targeted the FLDS 
community in Eldorado, Texas as sexually suspect “fringe religious community.”29  Following these 
proceedings and a false report of sexual violence within the community, the Texas Department of 
Family and Protective Services initiated the largest government detention of American children in 
the nation’s history, an episode that ultimately alienated the very FLDS women and children the 
Department was attempting to save. 
Betty Mahmoody describes Muslim men as suspect religious Others in Not Without My 
Daughter.  The 1987 international best-seller chronicles the harrowing escape of Betty Mahmoody 
and her daughter Mahtob from captivity and abuse in post-revolutionary Iran.   The author narrates 
her husband’s rapid deterioration (or reversion?) from an industrious and thoroughly Americanized 
medical doctor into an abusive, impotent lunatic shortly after their family’s arrival in Tehran.  
                                                          
29 TX House of Representatives, 79th Legislature (R), H.B. 3006, House Research Bill Analysis, May 12, 2005.  
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Mahmoody’s tale of captivity and liberation sold 15 million copies internationally and has been 
translated into 20 languages; Sally Field played Mahmoody in a 1991 film adaptation.30 It is no 
exaggeration to say that Not Without My Daughter made Betty Mahmoody an international feminist 
icon, poster girl for women’s liberation from oppressive—and notably religious—patriarchal abuse.  
Daughter is one of dozens of such memoirs, a genre that has proved exceedingly popular among 
American audiences.31  More significantly, Mahmoody’s anti-Muslim rhetoric, which emphasizes 
women’s vulnerability in the face of a monstrously masculinized Islam, foreshadows justifications of 
United States’ military action against Muslim majority countries throughout the early 2000s. 
Under the therapeutic ministrations of Dr. Lawrence Pazder, Michelle Smith recovered 
memories of years-long abuse at the hands of unknown captors.  Smith and Pazder published these 
recollections in a “lurid, disturbing, and unforgettable” 1980 pulp nonfiction volume entitled Michelle 
Remembers, which records startling accounts of psychological and physical trauma identified by Pazder 
as satanic.32  Though now widely discredited, the book served as evidence in police seminars on 
alleged occult activity, in United States Senate testimony on the growing presence of “evil” in the 
United States, and in the longest and most expensive United States’ criminal trial of its time.  Michelle 
Remembers and its authors had a direct and lasting impact on American law enforcement, juridical 
proceedings, psychological and psychiatric treatments, and news reporting during the 1980s and early 
1990s – including Smith and Pazder’s direct influence on the psychologists and law enforcement 
officials gathering evidence for the McMartin Daycare Trial and on the popularization of 
psychological diagnoses of repressed/recovered memories and Multiple Personality Disorder related 
to satanic ritual abuse (MPD-SRA).  New religious movement scholars have gone so far as to 
                                                          
30 Milani, Words, Not Swords, 215. 
 
31 Such narratives do not enjoy the same popularity among the Middle Eastern and Central Asian populations the 
books portray. 
 
32 Gareth Medway, Lure of the Sinister: The Unnatural History of Satanism (New York: New York University Press, 
2001), 176.  
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identify Michelle Remembers as the catalyst for a decade-long, transnational period of moral anxiety 
commonly referred to as the “Satanic Panic,” a widespread national episode that vilified childcare 
professionals, working mothers, and religious witches alike.33 
That the basic approaches and conclusions (dare we say morals?) of these stories are 
strikingly similar is no coincidence.  Throughout my case studies, and in a number of other highly 
public formulations of religious intolerance, a strikingly similar villain emerges.34  As American 
religious historian David Brion Davis notes: “When  the  images  of  different  enemies  conform  to  
a similar  pattern,  it  is  highly  probable  that  this  pattern  reflects  important  tensions  within  a 
given  culture.”35  With regard to my case studies, I will show that the confluence of marginal 
religiosity and normative sexuality is just such an “important tension” within late 20th and early 21st 
century American culture.  It is important to recognize these rhetorical consistencies as persistent 
precisely because they reflect ongoing concerns within the body public – and because to fail to do so 
fuels indifference toward larger efforts to promote religious tolerance.36  Rhetorical constructions of 
religious outsiders as sexually predatory facilitate Americans’ self-perception as simultaneously 
religiously tolerant and morally upright.37 
The efficacy of these kinds of narrativizations lies in the powerful affective responses these 
stories evoke from their audiences.  As Anne Burlein notes in her 2002 Lift High the Cross: Where 
White Supremacy and the Christian Right Converge, articulations of religious intolerance appeal to 
                                                          
33 Jeffrey S. Victor, Satanic Panic: The Creation of a Contemporary Legend (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 1993), 68. 
 
34 Burlein, Lift High the Cross, 7, as well as Corrigan and Neal, Religious Intolerance in America, 262. 
 
35 Davis, “Some Themes of Counter-Subversion,” 213.  At ibid., 216-7, Davis notes sexuality and gender roles as 
among these central tensions. 
 
36 Corrigan and Neal, Religious Intolerance in America, 8.  
 
37 See Givens, The Viper on the Hearth, 23 (emphasis added): “On examining the uses to which such representations of 
Mormonism have been put, it becomes clear that America’s ongoing process of self-definition has been facilitated by the 
appropriation of images of a handy, ready-made Other.  The Mormon Villain, it turns out, is integrally related to an 
evolving American self-definition.  Not only must the mode of representation be consistent with the image of Pilgrims, 
Puritans, and the Quest for Religious Freedom, but so must the enemy represented be conducive to America’s self-concept.” 
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American audiences not only by engendering fear, “but also, and more powerfully, by playing on 
how vulnerable (and violent) people can be when they are trying to do ‘what’s best.’”38  Burlein 
argues that American understandings of “what’s best” follow intimate domestic disciplines—lessons 
learned in the context of the home, and from women in particular—that construct difference as 
inherently threatening.39  Sociologists Robert Bellah and Robert Greenspahn concurred with Burlein: 
“diverse forms of religious hostility… share certain characteristics.  Although expressed in 
theological language, they reflect a sense of fear, fear that the others are not just wrong, but dangerous.”40  
Such stories, then, appeal to an understanding presumed shared among Americans regarding what 
religious practice should look like.  At the same time, these narrativizations present American 
religious outsiders as threatening examples of religion done wrong. 
With Burlein, American religions scholars John Corrigan and Lynn Neal identify the appeal 
to normative gender roles and sexual practices as a common strategy in discrediting minority 
communities and justifying intolerance.41  Burlein calls these “gut issues,”42 reductions of complex 
issues to personal affective responses.  The issues themselves, Burlein claims, are of less import than 
the paternalistic protectionism mobilized in response to the pursuant moral panic(s).  For Burlein, 
then, the construction of sexual difference as threatening “remasculinizes the national body 
politic.”43  Corrigan and Neal further insist that religiously intolerant invocations of “proper” 
                                                          
38 Burlein, Lift High the Cross, 9. 
 
39 Ibid., 11. 
 
40 Bellah and Greenspahn, Uncivil Religion, ix (emphasis added). 
 
41 Burlein, Lift High the Cross, 12, as well as Corrigan and Neal, Religious Intolerance in America, 257-8. 
 
42 Burlein, Lift High the Cross, 28. 
 
43 Ibid.  On this point, see also Rubin, “Blood Under the Bridge,” 37: “The rhetoric of child protection has 
anchored many conservative agendas with respect to intensifying women’s subordinate status [and] reinforcing 
hierarchical family structures.”  See also Emily S. Rosenberg, “Rescuing Women and Children,” The Journal of 
American History 89, no. 2 (2002): 460: “‘Historians have recognized that the rescue theme often works to display 
and reinforce notions of the superior manliness of the rescuer nation, indeed to cast the nation itself in a manly role. 
The nation itself is summoned to provide protection to women or to a country—emblematically feminized—that 
rival men are violating.” 
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gendered and sexual behaviors specifically function to undermine minority religions’ legitimacy in 
either reason or morality.44  The centrality of normative gender and sexuality to American national 
identity makes accusations of sexual depravity particularly effective, often despite the absence of 
evidence to support such accusations.  Narrativizations that portray religious outsiders as 
dangerous—and in particular, as threatening “proper” gender roles and “normal” sexuality—confirm 
fears, authorize disciplinary actions, and justify the privilege enjoyed by mainstream beliefs and 
practices.  Thus minority religious groups emerge in the American public sphere not only as 
aberrant, but as a threat to mainstream cultural values, specifically values about gender and 
sexuality.45   
My case studies and their narratological kindred constrain both mainstream American 
religiosity and normative American sexuality.  This is to say that religious intolerance does not exist 
in a vacuum: it exploits other systemic inequalities.  Texts like Banner, Daughter, and Michelle evoke 
readers’ intimate sentimental commitments while confirming deep-seated and often unconsidered 
anxieties about the dangers of religious and sexual difference.  At the same time, this discourse and 
its material effects reaffirm paternalistic assumptions about hierarchical binary gender roles by 
insisting that women in minority religious communities require saving.46   
In this way, my case studies—narrativizations of allegedly real events—participate in the 
public negotiation of normative sexuality and tolerable religiosity.  These texts, accounts of largely 
private and individual experiences, might signify little in isolation.  But through their public 
reception, dissemination, and incitement of action, these narratives help serves as arbiters of 
“common sense” and “public morality.”47  
                                                          
44 Corrigan and Neal, Religious Intolerance in America, 258. 
 
45 Ibid., 258. 
 
46 On the “romance of masculine protectionism,” see Burlein, Lift High the Cross, 26.  At ibid., 13, Burlein asserts 
that “in proportion to the height of a culture’s hopes in femininity stand its fears” (13). 
 
47 White, “The Narrativization of Real Events,” 795.  
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Thinking American Sex 
 
 
Most people cannot quite rid themselves of the sense that controlling the sex of others,  
far from being unethical, is where morality begins. 
 
Michael Warner 
The Trouble With Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life 
 
 
 
This section examines the role public discourse plays in shaping and constraining American 
normative sexuality.  I suggest such discourse relies on assumptions of a national consensus about 
acceptable (that is, tolerable) sexual identities and practices.  This assumed consensus invokes an 
imagined—which is to say symbolic, impossible, and yet materially consequential—link among all 
Americans.  I emphasize three elements characteristic of public discourse on “normal” American 
sexuality: the co-constitutive nature of heterosexuality and binary, hierarchical organization of gender 
roles; the cultural validation of certain sexual practices and identities as universal and innate; and the 
ways in which persons or groups overtly identified with sex often face public condemnation.  I note 
the contributions of queer theorists Judith Butler, Gayle Rubin, and Michael Warner to my 
understanding of American sexual discourse and outline ways in which each theorist informs my 
research. 
I next propose that several intertwined historical factors in post-1970s America make this 
period particularly rich for investigations into the confluence of sexuality and religion in public 
discourse.  While public critique and regulation of sexual difference obviously has a long history, I 
suggest that a range of factors—a resurgence of radical religious innovation; second wave feminism’s 
emphasis on women’s sexual autonomy; gay activists’ insistence on the visibility and legitimacy of 
sexual difference; and the emergence of a  new Christian alliance, promoting a conservative sexual 
agenda—contributed to an elision of conservative sexuality with “morality per se” in American 
public discourse. 
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The result of this elision is a popular understanding of “normal” American sexuality that is at 
once informed by conservative Christian sexual ethics and often unaware of its own religiously-
informed assumptions.  Such presumably secular discourse, as I will show, may function to 
discourage both religious and sexual difference while appearing to conform to a professed national 
commitment to religious freedom.  I propose that public discourse about acceptable religiosity and 
sexuality gives shape to a form of American sexual exceptionalism – an understanding of normative 
American sexuality as both universalizable and distinctive, in need of protection and defense.  I 
engage Jasbir Puar’s concept of American exceptionalism from her 2007 Terrorist Assemblages: 
Homonationalism in Queer Times to analyze my case studies’ rhetorical investments in protecting 
American normative sexuality and particularly the sexual respectability of American white women.  
These case studies make visible particular national commitments, rhetorical strategies, and cultural 
assumptions about the “acceptable” boundaries of sex and religion in contemporary American 
society.   
 
“Normal” Sex and “Shared” Values  
 
The confluence of religion and sexuality in American public discourse presents a curious paradox: 
many politicians, news pundits, law enforcement officials, and judicial authorities seem comfortable 
publicly examining our presumably most private activity – that is, sex.  And despite a professed 
national commitment to religious freedom, public figures frequently use suspicions of indecent or 
improper sexuality to justify intervening in minority religious communities.  While judges, police 
officers, reporters, and other public figures seldom overtly criticize minority religions, many cast 
aspersions on the real or suspected sexual proclivities of religious outsiders.   
Public accusations of sexual impropriety often allude to shared American values, a set of 
common priorities regarding what constitutes proper, moral, acceptable (one might say orthodox) 
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sexual practice.48  As Mary Jo Neitz and Marion Goldman note in the introduction to Sex, Lies, and 
Sanctity: Religion and Deviance in Contemporary North America (1995), “In the dominant [American] 
culture religion continues to articulate norms regulating sexuality… Religions perform this function 
even for those who do not subscribe to the specified rules.”49  For this reason, Neitz and Goldman 
explain, “people are apprehensive when religions appear to deviate from what are believed to be 
common values.”50  An assumed consensus among Americans about their “common values” lends 
weight to accusations of improper sexual practice.  That a consensus among hundreds of millions of 
people is perhaps impossible does not rob appeals to shared values of their weight.  Benedict 
Anderson referred to this symbolic, yet materially consequential, unity as an imagined community – a 
group of people who do not physically interact, but consider themselves a coherent social entity 
based on a presumption of shared commitments.51   
Social theorist Michael Warner’s concept of a public is perhaps more apt with regard to my 
case studies.  To consider post-1970s America as a public in Warner’s sense is to say that the 
American body politic includes and excludes certain kinds of people, who have at their disposal 
certain media and genres, whose communications operate within certain linguistic conventions.52  
Warner understands a public as a social entity shaped by the circulation of discourses.  As a 
                                                          
48 On the consequences of “heretical sex,” see Gayle Rubin, “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the 
Politics of Sexuality,” in The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, ed. Henry Abelove, Michele Aina Barale, and David M. 
Halperin (New York: Psychology Press, 1993), 11. 
 
49 Mary Jo Neitz and Marion S. Goldman, eds., Sex, Lies, and Sanctity: Religion and Deviance in Contemporary North 
America, vol. 5, Religion and the Social Order (Bradford: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 1995), 6.  
 
50 Ibid. 
 
51 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006), 6: 
“I propose the following definition of the nation: it is an imagined political community… It is imagined because the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of 
them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”  See also Lauren Gail Berlant and Elizabeth 
Freeman, “Queer Nationality,” in Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory, ed. Michael Warner (U of 
Minnesota Press, 1993), 214: “America” is “understood not as a geographic but as a symbolic locus in which 
individuals experience their fundamental link to 250,000,000 other individuals.”  
 
52 Michael Warner, The Trouble With Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2000), 10. 
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Warnerian public, the American body politic acts as a “space of collective improvisation” in which 
an impossible but nevertheless material unity among millions of people takes shape.  American 
public discourse (in the form of laws, news broadcasts, popular books, etc.) contributes to an 
“intuitive sense” of who “we” are and what is important to “us.”53  Warner, with social theorists 
Lauren Berlant and Elizabeth Freeman as well as religious studies scholars Ann Burlein, Anne 
Pellegrini, and Janet Jakobsen, has argued that appeals to American identity also serves to compel 
certain kinds of sexual performances – sexual acts and identities deemed “normal” within the 
American public sphere.54   
My analysis of normative American sexual morality—“shared values”—utilizes three key 
propositions from critical theories of sexuality.  First, American normative sexuality creates 
expectations and compels performances of binary, hierarchical gender roles.  This first idea follows 
from heteronormativity, the naturalization of heterosexuality as universal and innate.  Queer theorist 
Judith Butler suggests that heteronormativity creates gender by requiring binary roles. Butler calls this 
the “heterosexual matrix,” which “assumes that for bodies to make sense there must be a stable sex 
expressed through a stable gender (masculine expresses male, feminine expresses female) that is 
oppositionally and hierarchically defined through the compulsory practice of heterosexuality.”55 That 
is, heteronormativity makes sense of bodies in hierarchical, binary, reproductive terms.    
For the purposes of this project, the hierarchical binary reproductive organization of human 
gender matters because articulations of religious intolerance invoke and reinforce gendered inequality 
through appeals to the innocence and helplessness of American women.  To adapt Burlein, the 
bodies of American women lend “physical embodiment to the national body politic that is a 
                                                          
53 Ibid., 11. 
 
54 Ibid., 21-3; Berlant and Freeman, “Queer Nationality,” 48; Burlein, Lift High the Cross, 12; Janet Jakobsen and Ann 
Pellegrini, Love the Sin: Sexual Regulation and the Limits of Religious Tolerance (Beacon Press, 2004), 21.  On the exclusion 
of sexual difference as a strategy of nation-building, see Matti Bunzl, “Between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: 
Some Thoughts on the New Europe,” American Ethnologist 32, no. 4 (2005): 499–508.  
 
55 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Abingdon: Psychology Press, 1990), 151. 
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community we imagine rather than live concretely.”56  The paternalistic, protectionist tone adopted 
throughout my case studies makes much of the (presumed) physical and sexual vulnerability of 
American women, often grouping female adults with children of both genders as a singularly 
vulnerable sub-class of citizen: women-and-children.  Through such discourses, the American body 
politic both justifies intervening into religious minority communities and reassures itself of the 
necessity of saving and protecting “innocents.”57   
Second, American public discourse both lends sexual acts “an excess of significance” and 
identifies some sexual practices and identities as more moral, or normal, or healthy than other 
kinds.58 I addressed heteronormativity above, but the cultural validation of certain kinds of sex over 
other kinds extends well beyond either heteronormativity or a hierarchical homo/hetero binary.  In 
her seminal “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,” Gayle Rubin 
maps this cultural divide as a caste system or “charmed circle” of “Good, Normal, Natural, Blessed 
Sexualit[ies]” and “Bad, Abnormal, Unnatural, Damned Sexualit[ies].”59 “Sexuality that is 'good,' 
'normal,' and 'natural,'” she suggests, “should ideally be heterosexual, marital, monogamous, 
reproductive, and non-commercial. It should be coupled, relational, within the same generation, and 
occur at home. It should not involve pornography, fetish objects, sex toys of any sort, or roles other 
than male and female.”60 Bad sex 
may be homosexual, unmarried, promiscuous, non-procreative, or commercial. It may be 
masturbatory or take place at orgies, may be casual, may cross generational lines, and may 
                                                          
56 Burlein, Lift High the Cross, 15. 
 
57 On the function of innocence in religiously intolerant discourse, see Ibid., 15-6.  Warner, The Trouble With Normal, 
1 further notes that the American public frequently congratulates itself for being sexually exclusive.  See also 
Corrigan and Neal, Religious Intolerance in America, 258: public discourse frequently describes the religiously intolerable 
as “go[ing] against gender, sexual, and family norms, which represents [sic] a threat to both religious (Protestant) 
and American life.  There can be no ‘real’ religious reason for such threatening actions.  Further, the supposed 
sexual deviance of these Others corrupts the ‘innocent,’ in most cases defined as white Protestant women.” 
 
58 Rubin, “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,” 11. 
 
59 Ibid., 13. 
 
60 Ibid., 13-14. 
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take place in 'public,' or at least in the bushes or in the baths. It may involve the use of 
pornography, fetish objects, sex toys, or unusual roles.61  
 
This sexual dichotomy is demonstrably hierarchical. Those who engage in good/blessed sex receive 
“certified mental health, respectability, legality, social and physical mobility, institutional support, and 
marital benefits.”62 Unrepentant sexual transgressors may be accused of mental illness, 
disrespectability, and criminality, as well as restricted social and physical mobility, loss of institutional 
support, and economic sanctions.63  This is to say that engaging in good or normative sexual practice 
confers privilege within contemporary American culture, while engaging in bad or transgressive sex 
garners social stigma and often negative material consequences.  
Several important aspects of Rubin’s theorization of good and bad sex shape my 
understanding of normative American sexuality.  First and perhaps most importantly, I note the 
confluence of “good sex” and “good religion” – that is, those acts and identities deemed good by the 
American public coincide with those deemed moral by mainstream American religious doctrine (a 
point to which I shall return in more detail shortly).64  Next, as Rubin herself notes in her reflections 
on “Thinking Sex,” critics of nontraditional sexuality frequently assume that those who engage in 
transgressive sexual practices must be “uninformed, duped, or coerced” into doing so.65  My case 
studies reflect a similar assumption about the religious minorities—particularly women members of 
minority religious communities—depicted in each narrative.  This is to say that American public 
discourse frequently identifies participants in marginal practices as irrational, trapped, or misled.   
                                                          
61 Ibid. 
 
62 Ibid., 12. 
 
63 Ibid. 
 
64 I take the theorization of “good religion” from Orsi’s “Snakes Alive!  Religious Studies Between Heaven and 
Earth.”  I explore this category and its connection to normative American sexuality in the third section of this 
introduction.   
 
65 Rubin, “Blood Under the Bridge,” 29.  Rubin is critiquing a feminist analysis of a pornographic film, but her point 
extends to her broader theorizations. 
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Also significant is the extent to which public disapproval of sexual difference passes for sexual ethics 
– even in the absence of evidence for accusations of abuse or coercion.66  In the case studies I 
explore throughout this dissertation, public distaste for sexual difference often authorizes 
interference into religious minority practice, even absent evidence that transgressive sexuality has 
taken place.67    
The third important proposition of critical sex theory I engage in this dissertation is the 
fraught nature of what Michael Warner calls “sex in public.”  In his 1999 The Trouble With Normal: 
Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life, Warner notes that despite a public culture saturated with sexual 
imagery, the American public “still fear[s] and despise[s] those whom they identify with sex.”68  
While mass media facilitates unprecedented public discussions about sex, Warner argues, anyone 
associated with “actual sex” can be “spectacularly demonized.”69   Warner insists that anxieties about 
public identification with sex (and particularly with sexual difference)—which he calls 
“erotophobia”—can and do “coexist with and even feed on commercial titillation, desperate 
fascination, therapeutic celebration, and repression.”70  My case studies demonstrate the extent to 
which religious minorities—when they are identified publicly with sex—can be “spectacularly 
demonized.”  Moreover, the public discussion of these minority communities often pairs anxieties 
about sexual difference with titillating descriptions of sexual abuse, attending to the details of these 
harrowing tales with “desperate fascination.”  Though public officials bemoan the alleged abuses, 
these same officials frequently linger over shocking particulars while excoriating religious minorities 
                                                          
66 Ibid., 29.  On this point, see also Warner, The Trouble With Normal, 32. 
 
67 Here again, see the FBI findings that discredited all allegations of satanic ritual abuse (Lanning, Satanic Ritual 
Abuse), as well as the false reports that led to the raid on Yearning for Zion (Jacobson and Burton, “Prologue: The 
Incident at Eldorado, Texas,” xvii). 
 
68 Warner, The Trouble With Normal, 21, 33. 
 
69 Ibid., 23. 
 
70 Ibid. 
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for their supposed prurience.71   Sex in public—as both public identification with “actual sex” and 
public rhetoric about those acts and identities—can thus be understood as a key element in shaping 
normative American sexuality.   While both Rubin and Warner have noted the influence of 
conservative religious opinions on late 20th century American sexual morality, only Warner attends to 
the role religion played in collapsing sexuality into morality in the American public sphere. 72   
This linkage between religion and sex in the American public sphere is at once a broad trend 
and a historically contingent phenomenon.  Social theorist Charles Taylor identifies a post-
Reformation sexual ethic as the root of American morality, in which marital sex stands in for and 
sometimes overshadows other forms of ethical concerns.73  Tracy Fessenden notes the seminal role 
sex and sexuality play in the formation of coherent national identity, as well as the construction of 
certain bodies and practices as “symbolic threat[s]” to that identity.74  David Brion Davis likewise 
observes the prevalence of sexual deviance accusations leveled against religious outsiders.75  Corrigan 
and Neal emphasize the ways assertions of religious intolerance “raise fears about gender and 
sexuality to persecute other religions.”76  The construction of religious outsiders as sexually suspect 
has been a historically prevalent trope in American public discourse.77   
                                                          
71 Marie Anne Pagliarini, “The Pure American Woman and the Wicked Catholic Priest: An Analysis of Anti-
Catholic Literature in Antebellum America,” Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation 9, no. 1 (January 
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72 Rubin, “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,” 11; and Rubin, “Blood Under the 
Bridge,” 32. 
 
73 Charles Taylor, “Sex & Christianity: How Has the Moral Landscape Changed?,” Commonweal, September 28, 2007, 
http://commonwealmagazine.org/sex-christianity-0. 
 
74 Tracy Fessenden, Nicholas F Radel, and Magdalena J Zaborowska, eds., The Puritan Origins of American Sex: 
Religion, Sexuality,and National Identity in American Literature (New York: Routledge, 2001), 6. 
 
75 Davis, “Some Themes of Counter-Subversion,” 216-17, 219-21. 
 
76 Corrigan and Neal, Religious Intolerance in America, 258. 
 
77 On the construction of social outsiders as necessarily sexually deviant or suspect, see also Gayle Rubin’s concept 
of “sex negativity.”  Rubin, “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,” 11. 
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Yet American public discourse about sexuality has also changed dramatically in the last forty 
years.  Several factors have contributed to an elision of “sexuality” with “morality” in American 
public sphere discourse after the 1970s: new religious movements’ facilitation of religio-sexual 
innovation78; second wave feminism’s emphasis on women’s sexual autonomy79; gay liberation 
activists’ insistence on the visibility and legitimacy of sexual difference80; and perhaps most 
influentially, the emergence and politicization of a new Christian alliance, promoting a conservative 
sexual agenda. 
In his 2008 “The Ruse of Secular Humanism,” Warner describes the mobilization of an 
unprecedented “pan-Christian alliance” against the modern perils of teen pregnancy, gay rights 
activism, and similar sexual and gendered “threats.”81  Warner notes that the regulation of 
sex―debates over abortion, contraception, and other transgressions―rallied a confederation of 
                                                          
78 On religio-sexual innovation during the late twentieth century, see Elizabeth Puttick, Women in New Religions: In 
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sexual acts and identities in American history.  Ibid., 28.   
 
81 Michael Warner, “The Ruse of ‘Secular Humanism’,” The Immanent Frame: Secularism, Religion, and the Public Sphere, 
September 22, 2008, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2008/09/22/the-ruse-of-secular-humanism/.  On the construction 
and consolidation of evangelical identity around an embattled identity and an erotics of fear, see Jason Bivins, 
Religion of Fear: The Politics of Horror in Conservative Evangelicalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).  
 
 25  
disparate Protestant communities (and even some Roman Catholics) in the late 1970s.82  “These 
Christians needed sex to exist as a movement,” Warner notes.83  This conservative Christian alliance 
formed around—indeed, required— a conservative sexual consensus that condemned 
homosexuality, abortion, contraception, pornography, and other symptoms of “moral decline.”84  
“The New Christian Right” launched a massive and influential political and popular campaign 
against “moral decline” and threats on “the family” throughout the 1970s and 1980s.85  The New 
Christian Right’s attempts to protect “the family” from the dangers of transgressive sex—and, more 
broadly, the consolidation of public Christian morality around issues of sexual morality—set the 
stage for couching patriotic concern in the language of sexual regulation.  This consolidation around 
and politicization of non-normative sexuality as symptomatic of a national moral atrophy directly 
contributed to the elision of morality, values, and normative sexuality in American public discourse.86 
Since the 1970s, then, American public discourse about “shared values” and morality often 
invokes an assumed consensus regarding normative sexuality.  I argue that such rhetoric has been 
deeply shaped by conservative Christian sexual ethics, but it is neither reducible to particular 
denominational perspectives nor even necessarily discernible as religious sentiment per se.  Indeed, as 
I will argue, these religio-sexual ethics “have become so institutionalized… that they can be taken for 
good old American values.”87  This conflation marks the religious origins of commonsense and 
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American values, at once reinforcing and obscuring religious influences on notions of normative 
sexuality operant in the American public sphere. 
 
“Good Sex” and American Minority Religions 
 
Several scholars have proposed that sexual ethics often unmarked as Christian inform popular 
understandings of normal (or “good”) American sexuality.88  In their 2004 Love the Sin: Sexual 
Regulation and the Limits of Religious Tolerance, Ann Pellegrini and Janet Jakobsen emphasize that 
“religion—specifically Christianity—shapes legislation, public policy, and even jurisprudence around 
sex… [T]he assumptions that underlie sexual regulation are so deeply embedded that people no 
longer recognize them as being derived from religious thought.”89  Jakobsen and Pellegrini note that 
Christian sexual ethics—which delimit “good” sex in terms of binary, monogamous, heterosexual, 
moderately procreative, marital intercourse—have been normalized as “good old American values.”90  
Through an analysis of United States Supreme Court decisions, Pellegrini and Jakobsen 
argue that American assumptions about religion, values, and public interest are “crucially connected” 
to sexuality and its regulation.91 Indeed, they suggest that “the secular state's regulation of the sexual 
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life of its citizens is actually religion by other means.”92  The authors challenge the rhetoric of both 
religious and sexual tolerance, suggesting that tolerance is an inherently hierarchical model (‘‘we’’ in 
power tolerate ‘‘them,’’ those who do religion and ⁄ or sex differently). 
American public discourse draws on an imagined consensus regarding appropriate sexuality; 
the boundaries of sexual propriety are, as Pellegrini and Jakobsen argue, directly informed by a sexual 
ethic derived from conservative Christianity.  It follows, then, that religious groups and people who 
engage in non-normative sexual behaviors often meet with suspicion, ridicule, and hostility.  The 
sexual mores and practices of minority religions have historically been targets of popular suspicion 
and anxiety in the American public sphere.93  Those beyond the bounds of good sex—who engage in 
multiple-partnered, same-gendered, casual, or recreational sex, who have too many children, or 
foreswear sex altogether—are often assumed to be not merely transgressive, but anti-American.94  
Those who engage in bad sex for religious reasons or with religious justification often meet with a 
peculiar form of social censure:  the religious sex scandal, a public and often vituperative expulsion 
of transgressive forms of religion and sexuality from the American body politic.95   
It is true that some minority religions—including a significant number of new religious 
movements—do condone or even encourage non-normative sexual behaviors for their adherents.96  
Yet the public response to such doctrines or practices is massively disproportionate to the number of 
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citizens persuaded by or engaged in them.97  More: minority religions are frequently suspected and 
accused of sexual deviance and even coercion regardless of their communities’ mores or practices.98   
It is this intersection—American minority religions and notions of normative sexuality—that 
forms the core research focus of this project.  Why are religious minorities so frequently accused of 
sexual transgression?  Why do we, the presumably secular American public, assume we know what’s 
“really going on” in minority religious communities?99  Why is the burden of proof so often laid on 
defendants, rather than on prosecutors, in cases of suspected religiously motivated sexual abuse?100  
Why, when sexual abuse of women and children is so prevalent in American society, do we so 
commonly locate it within religious minority communities?101  In short, why do we so often suspect 
religious outsiders of sexual predation or coercion, and why does sex work so well as a tool for 
marginalizing suspect religiosities?  This confluence marks my project’s primary focus, the tendency 
of American public discourse to identify minority religious communities as especially prone to sexual 
transgression, duplicity, and violence.   
It is fair to say that sex marks the limits of religious tolerance.  We the people will allow 
religious difference only insofar as it does not violate our intuitive sense of sexual morality (as I 
noted above, “sex” and “morality” are often deployed interchangeably in recent American public 
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discourse).  American religious studies scholars David Campbell and Robert Putnam note in their 
2010 America’s Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us that disagreements involving “such intimate 
matters as sex and the family” often denote a fracture point in public discourse on religion.102  
Several American religious studies scholars have noted the efficacy of sexual suspicion as a method 
of discrediting minority beliefs and practices throughout the nation’s history.  Mormon studies 
scholars’ Terryl Givens and Sarah Barringer Gordon provide insightful analysis of Mormon 
disenfranchisement on the grounds of sexual indecency during the nineteenth century; Tracy 
Fessenden and Marie Anne Pagliarini demonstrate the prevalence of anxieties about Catholic 
celibacy during that same period.103  Neal and Corrigan likewise insist that “the intertwining of 
religious differences with other forms of divergence—[specifically] the meaning of family, sexuality, 
and reproduction—continues to be central to the issue of intolerance generally.”104  Yet observing 
the frequency with which allegations of “bad” sex work to defame religious minorities provides a 
limited and ultimately unsatisfying theorization of American religious intolerance.   
As discussed above, American public discourse frequently invokes a presumed consensus 
regarding normative sexuality, and that presumed consensus informs the American body politic’s 
stance toward acceptable religion.  But it is not enough to say that good sex marks the limits of 
Americans’ religious tolerance.  Rather, I suggest that a shared American sense of “good sex” has 
been shaped by and reinforces a shared sense of “good religion,” and vice versa.  This is to say that 
in American public discourse, religion and sex are co-constitutive terms.  Certain beliefs, practices, 
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people, groups, sentiments, or experiences are excluded from the category of “American religion” 
even by purportedly secular logics.  Such exclusions are not always or only intentional.   
Thus to understand American religious intolerance, we must account for more than 
intentional condemnations and deliberate rejections of religious difference.  Intolerance is at once 
larger and more pernicious than hate speech and physical assault.  We must instead frankly 
acknowledge the violence of systemic exclusions of minority groups from national identity 
formation, the intimate violence of knowledge-production.105  Epistemic violence can act through 
ignoring, silencing, and obscuring divergent forms of religious belief and practice, thus constraining 
the conditions of possibility for religious pluralism.   
An imagined consensus regarding of good religion and normal sex authorizes and 
perpetuates these exclusions in American public discourse.  As I noted above, it follows that 
religious people or groups who engage in non-normative sexuality would meet with public suspicion.  
But how to account for the prevalent assumption that minority religions are inherently sexually 
suspect?  I propose that anxieties regarding bad sex do not merely mark the boundaries of American 
religious tolerance.  Rather, such anxieties and the accusations of deviance that follow from them 
also work to promote normative religious and sexual practices.  By conflating normative sexuality 
with good old American values, public rhetoric about American religion constructs American 
sexuality as necessarily moral and exemplary – that is to say, exceptional. 
 
American Sexual Exceptionalism 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, “American sexual exceptionalism” refers to an understanding 
of American sexuality as distinct from and superior to the presumed religio-sexual perversity of the 
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religious or non-native outsider.106  American sexual exceptionalism functions as a distinctive yet 
universalized sexual normativity.  Queer theorist Jasbir Puar’s understanding of the role sexuality 
plays in promoting American exceptionalism directly informs my own.  In her 2007 Terrorist 
Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times, Puar argues that exceptionalism “paradoxically signals 
distinction from (to be unlike, dissimilar) as well as excellence (imminence, superiority).”107  She 
maintains that discourses of sexual exceptionalism configure the United States as “an exceptional 
nation-state,” one whose policies and moralities manifest as somehow unique and universalizable.108   
Suspicions of sexual misconduct have a special ability to discredit people in American public 
discourse, never more so than when such accusations occur under the auspices of religion.109  Such 
anxieties frequently occasion well-intentioned liberatory discourse that nevertheless polices the 
boundaries of what counts as real/true/good American religion: we (insiders) need to save them 
(outsiders).  As I noted above, though, the public response to such doctrines or practices is often 
massively disproportionate to the number of citizens who engage in them.110  Indeed, minority 
religions are frequently suspected and accused of sexual deviance and coercion regardless of their 
communities’ mores or practices.111   
Discourses of American sexual exceptionalism produce and require an “other,” what 
sociologists of moral panics call a “folk demon,” an individual or group that emerges as predatory 
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and perverse, particularly toward women and children.112  Rhetorics of American sexual 
exceptionalism (“good” sex) foster condemnation of the folk demon’s imagined predatory perversity.  
American sexual exceptionalism at once condemns and marginalizes these imagined sexual 
transgressions, insisting that sexual misdeeds are horrifying but also (and more importantly) 
fundamentally other-than American.   
American sexual exceptionalism bolsters intolerant rhetoric and actions on the grounds of 
protecting vulnerable Americans from the (presumed) sexual predation of religious outsiders.  
American sexual exceptionalism accuses religious outsiders of sexual deviancy in the process of 
“discerning, othering, and quarantining” folk demons; these religiously and sexually perverse figures 
also “labor in the service of disciplining and normalizing subjects worthy of rehabilitation away from 
these bodies.”113  Such exceptionalist rhetoric further disciplines and normalizes American sexuality 
as something distinct and precious, in need of protection from the perverse sexuality of imagined 
religious predators.   
Thus in this dissertation, I argue that public rhetoric about minority religions demonstrates 
the extent to which particular notions of normative sexuality have shaped and constrained popular 
understandings of real American religion since the early 1980s.  I engage several popular narratives 
that portray minority religions (Islam, Mormonism, and witchcraft) as predatory, coercing or duping 
vulnerable American women and children into religious nonconformity and sexual transgression.  In 
these narratives, normative sexuality—understood as binary, marital, moderately procreative, and 
heterosexual—marks the boundary of acceptable American religiosity and the limit of American 
religious tolerance.  At the same time, a shared popular sense of good sex authorizes the surveillance 
and regulation of minority religious practices without overtly seeming to violate America’s professed 
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commitment to religious pluralism and freedom.  In this way, public rhetoric discourages religious 
nonconformity even as it promotes normative sexual practices.  This strategy’s efficacy lies in its 
claim to protect America’s most vulnerable citizens, women and children.   
Narratives like Under the Banner of Heaven, Not Without My Daughter, and Michelle Remembers 
identify the people and problems of religious minorities as somehow outside contemporary 
American culture – as though women and children were not abused in other contexts, as though 
such abuse were the product of peculiar theologies rather than broader systemic inequalities.  This 
kind of intolerant rhetoric authorizes real Americans, in their common sense and shared values, to police 
the sexual transgressions (real or imagined) of religious outsiders while looking away from the sexual 
crimes happening in their own homes and families.  Authors like Jon Krakauer, Betty Mahmoody, 
and Michelle Smith and Lawrence Pazder identify minority religions as the proper targets of 
intolerance—and the women and children of marginal religions as especially vulnerable 
populations—while drawing attention away from the prevalence of mainstream, presumably secular 
abuses.   
The narratives that constitute my case studies simultaneously condemn the abuse of women 
and children while doing little, if anything, to prevent or disrupt such violence.  The authors 
consistently recount tales of horrific sexual violence against women to demonstrate the barbarity of 
their abusers, and ostensibly the need for commonsense Americans to intervene.   But as sociologist 
Mary de Young notes, “sexual trauma tales can sustain the status quo by simply reiterating, without 
critique, the dominant cultural discourse about sex and gender.”114   As she explains:  
For all their horror, [these stories] are conservative and preservative.  Their depiction of 
female victimization and helplessness so resoundingly resonates with dominant cultural 
ideologies that the stories, themselves, are pitiable yet provocative tales about the 
inevitability of sexual violence in the lives of females.  As hegemonic tales, they offer no 
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solutions, map out no trajectory for social change.  They can only be listened to, not acted 
upon.115 
 
I would qualify de Young’s assessment here, as I will argue throughout this dissertation that stories 
like Banner, Daughter, and Michelle can be and have been acted upon.  However, de Young’s basic 
assertion is correct.  Public responses to such narrativizations protect and maintain normative 
American sexuality as exceptional, while reinforcing hierarchical gendered assumptions about 
women’s inherent vulnerability, capitalizing on the titillating details of the abuses they chronicle, and 
ultimately doing little if anything to prevent the kinds of abuses the authors purport to condemn.  
These exotic and damning portrayals of minority religions effectively limit the conditions of religious 
possibility in contemporary America.  And, as I will discuss in the following section, public discourse 
that singles out minority religions as particularly prone to sexual abuse promotes intolerance toward 
religious minorities while appearing to conform to the perception of the United States as a nation 
exceptionally committed to both religious tolerance and diversity.   
 
Complicating American Religious Pluralism 
 
America peacefully combines a high degree of religious devotion with tremendous religious diversity 
– including growing ranks of the nonreligious.  Americans have a high degree of tolerance for those 
of (most) other religions, including those without any religion in their lives… 
 
How has America solved the puzzle of religious pluralism – the coexistence of religious diversity and 
devotion?  And how has it done so in the wake of growing religious polarization?  By creating a web 
of interlocking personal relationships among people of many different faiths.  This is America’s 
grace. 
 
Robert Putnam and David Campbell 
America’s Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us 
 
 
This section examines historians’ emphasis on America’s exceptional religious diversity and seeming 
ambivalence toward the prevalence of religious intolerance.116  I propose that many such historical 
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accounts reflect the “intuitive sense” of legitimate religiosity described in David Campbell and 
Robert Putnam’s American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us.  Similar to the “shared values” I 
explored in the previous section, a bias toward mainstream Christianity informs this “intuitive sense” 
apparent in irenic accounts of American religious history.   Robert Orsi theorizes the mainstream 
Christian bias visible in such accounts as “good religion.”  Orsi also notes the role normative 
sexuality has played in shaping popular culture and scholarly understandings of good religion, and 
Corrigan and Neal likewise comment on the prevalence of sexual suspicion in religiously intolerant 
discourse.  But there is currently no extended analysis of the role notions of normative sexuality 
plays in complicating American religious pluralism.   
 
Narrating Pluralism 
 
Contemporary Americans tend to think of pluralism and religious freedom as fait accompli.  Political 
scientist Wendy Brown notes that the “nation-states of the West are presumed always already 
tolerant,” particularly of religious difference.117   This presumption holds especially true in the 
context of the contemporary United States.  There is a deep and abiding national investment in 
Americans’ self-perception as remarkably, unprecedentedly—indeed, exceptionally—tolerant of 
religious diversity.118  The “founding myth” of America’s grand democratic experiment takes root in 
the assumption of an always already fulfilled promise of unparalleled religious freedom.119 
The grand narrative of American religious history goes something like this:  the American 
experiment offered protection from religious oppression and religious strife following the centuries 
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of religious violence that ravaged central and western Europe.120  Though the colonies might have 
struggled to accommodate religious difference—Catholics barred from public office, Quakers 
executed, indigenous “heathens” forcibly converted or massacred—American democracy enshrined 
religious freedom in its Constitution.  Americans “thr[ew] themselves into the intellectual embrace of 
[religious liberty] as a cardinal principle of nationhood.”121  Though isolated religious conflicts might 
have arisen, these United States nevertheless provided more tolerance of religious diversity than 
anywhere in the world.  By the nineteenth century, religious freedom had emerged as “a realized 
goal, and a remarkable one at that.”122  A shared moral code, irrespective of creed, bound the nation 
together in spite, or perhaps because, of our differences; this founding myth of already-achieved 
religious freedom “culminates in the twenty-first century with a United States that prides itself on 
being the most religious diverse nation in the world.”123  American public discourse is rife with such 
self-congratulatory conviction. 
Narratives of U.S. religious history have schooled present-day Americans in the catechism of 
our unmatched religious diversity and commitment to the protection of religious liberty.124  
Textbooks and numerous well-received American religious historiographies have contributed to this 
irenic account of American pluralism. As Corrigan and Neal note, American religious history “often 
reads something like a Garrison Keillor story where the religion is nice, its practitioners are 
upstanding, and the nation is above average.”125 
                                                          
120 On America’s founding myth centered on “Pilgrims, Puritans, and the Quest for Religious Freedom,” see 
Bercovitch as quoted in Givens, The Viper on the Hearth, 23.   
 
121 Corrigan and Neal, Religious Intolerance in America, 4.  See also ibid., 5: “it is hard to overestimate Americans’ 
emotional embrace of the First Amendment as the perceived solution to the problem of religious intolerance.” 
 
122 Ibid., 6 
 
123 Corrigan and Neal, Religious Intolerance in America, 3. 
 
124 Ibid. 
 
125 Ibid., 8. 
 
 37  
A number of scholars have recently produced surveys of American religious diversity in this 
conciliatory vein.126  Diana Eck’s 1997 A New Religious America: How a Christian Country Became the 
World’s Most Religiously Diverse Nation celebrates the triumphant emergence of religious multiplicity 
from humble Christian origins.  Even in the text’s revised preface, which frankly acknowledges 
violent attacks on American Muslims, Sikhs, and Coptic Christians after September 11, 2001, Eck 
insists that “the multireligious and multicultural fabric” of the United States is “too strong to rend by 
random violence.”127  Amanda Porterfield’s 2001 The Transformation of American Religion: The Story of a 
Late Twentieth-Century Awakening posits a “post-Protestant culture,” an American social arrangement 
that results from a “variety of factors working together to loosen the dominance of Protestant 
institutions over the larger culture while at the same time allowing beliefs and activities rooted in 
Protestant tradition to interact more freely than ever before with beliefs and attitudes from other 
traditions.”128 Chris Beneke’s work, both in his 2006 Beyond Toleration and in the 2010 The First 
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own position of privilege as a mainline American Protestant while celebrating the “Protestant origins of religious 
freedom” and the unqualified “universality” of religion.  Ibid., 209, 230. 
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Prejudice (co-written with Christopher Grenda), insists that the basic premise of religious pluralism 
was “with us from the beginning,” though he notes that “if religious pluralism represents one of the 
most laudable features of the modern world, it also ranks among the most difficult to achieve and 
maintain.”129 Beneke’s work with Grenda does attempt to complicate the notion of religious 
in/tolerance, but again concludes that while “religion was the United States’ first prejudice – an early 
and frequently inveterate source of bigotry,” Americans ultimately made religion “the locus of the 
first sustained efforts to mitigate bigotry’s efforts.”130 Stephen Prothero’s introduction to his 2006 
edited volume, A Nation of Religions: The Politics of Pluralism in Multireligious America, insists that an 
influx of Catholic immigrants in the 1830s and 1840s permanently shifted the overtly Protestant 
character of American religion; he explains that the volume’s authors approach “U.S. religious 
diversity not as a proposition to be proved but as the truism it has become” and “acknowledg[e] 
religious diversity as an undeniable fact.”131  Each of these authors approach American religious 
pluralism as a challenge met and promise fulfilled.  
None of these authors assumes so assured and triumphant a tone as that of Robert Putnam 
and David Campbell in their 2010 American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us (again, see the 
epigraph to this introduction).  In this nearly 700-page survey of American religions, the authors 
reassure us that America has “solved the puzzle of religious pluralism” by “peacefully combin[ing] a 
high degree of religious devotion with tremendous religious diversity.”132  Campbell and Putnam 
                                                          
129 Chris Beneke and Christopher S. Grenda, The First Prejudice: Religious Tolerance and Intolerance in Early America 
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locate “America’s grace” in a reconciliation between Americans’ religious devotion and American 
religious difference.  In doing so, the authors exemplify the irenic tone of many scholarly treatises on 
American religious pluralism.133   
In explaining the methodology used to interpret their survey data, Putnam and Campbell 
suggest that an informal but “convincing” way of “empirically measuring religiosity” lies in “ask[ing] 
whether it [presumably the person, group, belief, sentiment, experience, or practice in question] 
matches our intuitive sense of what it means to describe someone as religious.”134  The authors’ 
phrasing here is telling.  The use of the first person collective pronoun, “our,” includes the reader in 
the authors’ assumptions (their intuitive sense) about what does and does not count as “religion.”   
Campbell and Putnam dismiss concerns about “parochialism” unintentionally informing their 
“religiosity index,” insisting that their methods “includ[e] only terms that could apply to all religious 
traditions.”135  The characteristics that “we” presumably associate with religion include a person who: 
 Attends religious services frequently 
 Prays often 
 Has a strong belief in God 
 Holds religion important 
 Believes that religion defines her identity 
 Says she strongly believes in her religion136 
 
This religiosity index betrays a definitive Christian bias, despite its pretentions to inclusivity.137  Note 
the emphasis on attending religious services (excluding religious people who practice privately, 
                                                          
133 See in particular Putnam and Campbell’s discussion of religious multiplicity as benign variation or “flavors.”  
Ibid., 21. 
 
134 Ibid., 20 (emphasis added).   
 
135 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
 
136 Putnam and Campbell, American Grace, 20 
 
137 The scope and application of the term “religion” is contested in non-western contexts, though conversations 
about religion and post-colonial theory exceed the scope of this inquiry.   It is worth noting, however, that 
Campbell and Putnam’s omissions in the formulation of this index include the epistemic violence done by imposing 
the category “religion” on non-western cultures.  On the imperialist implications of “religion,” see Talal Asad, 
Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1993), Russell McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia 
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ranging from Muslim women who pray in their homes to solitary Wiccans), on prayer as the primary 
votive practice, on singular language for the divine (excluding polytheists, animists, those who reject 
the personification of the divine, and those whose votive practices exclude a deity or deities), on 
understanding of religion as an individual matter (marginalizing those whose religious identity is 
primarily communal), and the concluding accent on religion-as-faith.   
Setting aside for a moment the Christian coloring (flavoring?) of this index, I am struck by 
the presumption of consensus in the authors’ rhetoric.  “If you know someone” who exemplifies the 
above characteristics, Campbell and Putnam inquire, “would you not describe her as highly religious?  
And, likewise, would you describe someone who does not do or believe these same things as not 
being religious?”138  (Again, note the use of second person to encourage the reader’s complicity with 
these assertions.)  The authors emphasize that this—presumably shared—“intuitive sense” of the 
essential characteristics of religion is “the most convincing test of all.”139  Obviously, any attempt to 
quantify American religiosity requires a delimitation of the study’s terms and scope.  Yet I am 
troubled by the authors’ reliance on in the validity of their (and perhaps more significantly, their 
audience’s) “intuitive sense” of American religion. 
I emphasize these terms—“intuitive sense”—because the phrase presupposes an affective 
approach to recognizing American religion even as it disregards the cultural forces that shape and 
constrain such an approach.  This is to say that relying on an “intuitive sense” to locate and measure 
“American religion” reduces the undertaking to a feeling that certain things do or do not count as 
American religion, while discounting the biases, fears, affinities, and ignorances that might make us 
feel better about some forms of religion than others – more inclined to recognize certain beliefs and 
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practices as really religious or to dismiss other beliefs and practices as false or bad or not religious at 
all.140 
Reliance on an intuitive sense, an appeal to a presumed shared morality or common values, 
is of course not unique to Campbell and Putnam.  Indeed, like appeals to Americans’ presumably 
shared sexual morality, public rhetoric about American religion frequently invokes an imagined 
consensus.  The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate whom such discourse excludes, and on 
what terms those individuals or groups are excluded. 
 
“Good Religion” and “Normal Sex” 
 
Though public discourse frequently appeals to Americans’ shared values, the boundaries of 
acceptable American religion are often vague.  Terryl Givens calls this lack of definition an 
“unarticulated orthodoxy,” the weight of which, Givens asserts, is “considerable.”141  But 
understanding American religious belonging or exclusion in terms of orthodoxy or heresy adopts a 
Christian taxonomy while implying a cogent if tacit code underlying public expressions of acceptance 
or rejection.142  I am not convinced that Americans’ sense of tolerable religiosity is so coherent. 
Rather, public discourse seems to deploy what I think of as definitions of American religion 
similar to the vague consensus on pornography: we know it when we see it.143   I intend the 
invocation of Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart to be neither flippant nor incidental.  The 
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142 Givens’ argument is, ultimately, that the American public initially rejected and condemned 19th century 
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143 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).  See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), in which Justice 
Brennan defined linguistic obscenity as “‘to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the 
dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest' and which is 'utterly without redeeming 
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challenge of a diverse culture is precisely that of what we as a society are and are not prepared to live 
with, to allow, to tolerate.  We determine the tolerable according to “contemporary community 
standards” and deem intolerable that “without redeeming social importance.”144  The limits of 
tolerance, then, are not laws, but feelings (dare one say intuitions?) based on assumptions of shared 
values and common sense.   
Robert Orsi suggests as much in his oft-cited “Snakes Alive!  Religious Studies Between 
Heaven and Earth.”145  The vagaries of “American religion” do not prevent the establishment of a 
religious hierarchy: “we may not know what religion is but at least we can say with certainty what bad 
religion is or what religion is not.  The mother of all religious dichotomies—us/them—has regularly 
been constituted as a moral distinction—good/bad religion.”146 
As Orsi explains, public distinctions between good/real/true religion and bad/fake/false 
religion are informed by a “denominationally neutral” sedimentation of American Protestant ethics 
and aesthetics “recast as an ethical system.”147  American popular culture draws heavily on political 
ideas and cultural practices that understand religion as “private, voluntary, individual, textual, and 
believed.”148  Such ethics also deeply value notions of progress and ever-increasing or already-
achieved tolerance of religious diversity.149  These mainline Christian notions have been seminal in 
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the formation of American identity; mainline Christian ethics and aesthetics have emerged as a 
largely unmarked category in the public sphere.150  Indeed, this falsely coherent morality is often 
presumed to be “good, even necessary for democracy.”151 
Many Americans fail to recognize the extent to which their shared values and common sense 
have been shaped by this “domesticated modern civic Protestantism”; American public discourse 
often obscures or denies the religious forces that have shaped (and continue to shape) our 
presumably common sense and shared values.152  Orsi suggests that “in contemporary American 
popular culture” good religion is (among other things) “rational, respectful of persons, noncoercive, 
…agreeable to democracy” and “a reality of mind and spirit not body and matter.”153  Thus “bad 
religion,” we can infer, is irrational, disrespectful of persons, coercive, hostile to democracy, 
enthusiastic or emotionally uncontrolled, and embodied or material. 154  Bad religion might be—or 
seem—“ugly, violent, or troublesome;” and, as Orsi briefly mentions, bad religion often challenges 
traditional gender roles and sexual norms. 155   
If the qualities Orsi highlights inform Americans’ understandings of real or “good” religion, 
it is perhaps not surprising that religious people and groups who emphasize practice over belief, 
community over individualism, obedience over autonomy, and embodied experience over intellectual 
conviction have met with suspicion in the American public sphere.  This is not to minimize or 
excuse the marginalization of religious minorities, but only to emphasize the often-unremarked 
Christian underpinnings of Americans’ intuitive sense of “real” religion.  It is worth noting, however, 
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that an American religious minority need not veer dramatically from mainstream beliefs and practices 
to be suspected or accused of having done religion “wrong.”156  Such suspicions, as I established 
above, are particularly pronounced with regard to minority religions’ sexual practices. 
 
Chapter Outline 
 
This project engages three best-selling popular nonfiction narratives published between 1980 and 
2003.  These three narratives— Jon Krakauer’s Under the Banner of Heaven (2003), Betty Mahmoody’s 
Not Without My Daughter (1987), and Michelle Smith and Lawrence Pazder’s Michelle Remembers 
(1980)—are rich and illuminating examples of American public discourse concerning normative 
sexuality and tolerable religion.  Each of these narratives portrays a minority religion as intolerable by 
providing “evidence” of that religion’s sexual exploitation of American women and children.  I focus 
on these narrativizations because of their remarkable popularity among American readers, but also 
because each book has been used as evidence in public actions against the minority religion it 
describes.  The minority religions in question—Mormonism, Islam, and witchcraft—have, as I will 
show, been the target of mainstream American suspicion and intolerance.   
Taken as a whole, these books and the public’s reaction to them reveal a persistent and 
troubling pattern of response toward religious and sexual difference within the American public 
sphere.  The public has responded to these books (and books like them) by attempting to liberate 
women and children from minority religions.  As I explore in subsequent chapters, such attempts at 
liberation have alienated fundamentalist Mormon women from social services intended to help them, 
have discounted women’s desire to become or remain Muslim and worsened conditions for women 
in Muslim-majority countries, and have led to the imprisonment of childcare givers on specious and 
unsubstantiated accusations of satanic child abuse.   
                                                          
156 Givens, The Viper on the Hearth, 78. 
 45  
The first chapter, “The Trouble with Tolerance,” reviews pertinent literature on the subject 
of American religious intolerance and underscores the role normative sexuality plays in constructing 
and constraining American religion.  I argue that popular understandings of American religion have 
been shaped by normalized or secularized mainline Christianity, and normalized Christian sexual 
ethics in particular.  Religious intolerance in contemporary America mobilizes popular anxieties 
about sexual bodies and sexual practices to marginalize minority religions.  Such intolerance is not 
always explicit. I propose that ostensibly secular scholarly assumptions about what does and does not 
constitute American religion have been informed by normalized Christian sexual ethics.  I present 
these three popular pulp nonfiction narratives—Under the Banner of Heaven, Not Without My Daughter, 
and Michelle Remembers—as texts that promote intolerance of marginal American religions based in 
suspicions of non-normative sexuality. 
The second chapter, “An Unusual Place: Do Mormon Fundamentalists Really Need 
Saving?,” argues that public discourse about liberating Mormon fundamentalist women and children 
constrains Americans’ religious and sexual freedoms while impeding abuse victims’ access to support 
and assistance.  I first examine Jon Krakauer’s Under the Banner of Heaven: A Story of Violent Faith 
(2003).  Krakauer’s work portrays Mormon fundamentalist identity as defined by the practice of 
polygamy; his hypersexualized and sensationalized portrayal of Mormon fundamentalism relies on a 
normalized Christian sexual ethic to marginalize this religious minority.  Next, I examine public 
responses to Banner’s publication.  I pay particular attention to the legislative hearings preceding the 
2008 raid on the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints’ Yearning for Zion 
ranch, during which Krakauer testified as an expert witness on Mormonism and Mormon 
fundamentalism.  Finally, I examine the protectionist discourse surrounding Mormon 
fundamentalism – public declarations that Mormon fundamentalist women are necessarily forced or 
duped into plural marriage and thus are in need of rescue and protection by the American body 
politic.  This rhetoric positions Mormon fundamentalism outside contemporary American culture 
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and ignores the complexity of these Mormon fundamentalist women’s religious and sexual agency. 
Reporters, lawmakers, and social workers involved all consistently discounted the possibility that 
some Mormon fundamentalist women had deliberately chosen to remain in their minority religious 
community and in their unconventional marriages.  Most significantly, this case study demonstrates 
that attempts to rescue religious minorities may actually hinder the ability of abuse victims to seek 
assistance while failing to prevent systemic abuses of women and children. 
The third chapter, “‘Daddy, Do I Hate Americans?’  Domestic Terrorism and American 
Exceptionalism after the Iran Hostage Crisis,” argues that Betty Mahmoody’s Not Without My 
Daughter (1987) essentializes Muslim masculinity as a frustrated lasciviousness that necessarily 
oppresses and abuses women, thus authorizing public anti-Muslim sentiment.  I first examine the 
extent to which the book and film versions of Not Without My Daughter characterize Muslim men as 
domestic terrorists, racially, sexually, and religiously perverse.  Next, I show that the author’s self-
characterization exemplifies an American sexual exceptionalism, simultaneously authorizing anti-
Islamic sentiment and demonstrating the perils of marriage outside the American mainstream.  
Finally, I consider the ways in which the dual discourses of domestic terrorism and American sexual 
exceptionalism preoccupied the American public sphere in the wake of the Iran hostage crisis.  The 
discursive construction of Muslim masculinity as racially, sexually, and religiously perverse ignores 
the theological and practical complexities of lived Islam, occludes significant evidence of American 
domestic abuse absent of supposed religious motivation, and (as with the previous case study) 
disregards the possibility of women’s willing participation in minority religions.   
The final chapter, “Play Me Backwards: Feminist Complicity in the Satanic Panic,” argues 
that feminist activism during the 1980s through the mid-1990s surrounding satanic ritual abuse both 
reinforced American sexual exceptionalism and restricted American women’s religious and sexual 
freedoms.  I present Michelle Smith and Lawrence Pazder’s Michelle Remembers (1980) as the catalyst 
for widespread accusations of satanic ritual abuse in the United States.  I emphasize that the text 
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shaped later portrayals of satanic ritual abuse, particularly with regard to the text’s infantilization of 
the victim, the construction of child abuse as a distinctly religious phenomenon, and the link 
established between Satanism and child sexual abuse.  Finally, I examine the feminist complicity in 
promoting satanic ritual abuse accusations, which I argue reinforced American sexual exceptionalism 
and restricted American women’s religious and sexual freedoms by discouraging American mothers 
from working outside the home and Americans in general from participating in a demonstrably 
feminist mode of religiosity, modern witchcraft. 
The conclusion considers the significance and problematic nature of American sexual 
exceptionalism, particularly in relation to minority religions.  Public rhetoric that constructs minority 
religions as necessarily dangerous, irrational, and perverse neither reflects the lived experience of 
many members of these minority religions nor protects survivors of domestic and sexual abuses.  
Drawing on the work of political scientist Sarah Song and social critic Teju Cole, I propose 
constructive approaches to helping vulnerable members of American minority religions.  These 
include paying attention to the consequences of narrativizing contact with social outsiders and, 
perhaps most importantly, taking seriously the expressed desires, needs, and recounted experiences 
of minority religions’ members themselves.  
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The Trouble With Tolerance 
 
Violence most often is located in the cultural spaces between violent deeds and free thought, 
inciteful speech and loaded silence, agency and submission, reality and fantasy. 
 
Ann Burlein, Lift High the Cross 
 
 
 
In her 2002 Lift High the Cross: Where White Supremacy and the Christian Right Converge, Ann Burlein 
notes that “whereas power relations can be overtly articulated”—such as those evident in the Klan 
demonstrations described in Burlein’s introduction—“more often [these relations] form a silent 
curriculum: those lessons teachers inculcate without needing to save a special day on the syllabus.”1  
I propose that more common if less discernible forms of religious intolerance comprise such a silent 
curriculum: that religious intolerance is not something only Klansmen and Islamophobes perpetrate; 
that we learn what does and does not “count” as American religion more through unremarked or 
unintentional exclusions and assumptions than through hate speech or violent assaults.2 
In seeking to analyze religious intolerance, I consider not only hate speech and violence, but 
also tacit exclusion and more subtle maneuvers to police the boundaries of real/true American 
religion.  Definitions of religious intolerance must also include the silences and unconscious 
exclusions of certain forms of religiosity from the category of American religion.  Religious 
intolerance is not reducible to “religious hatred” or “religion as a weapon,” though the category 
absolutely includes religiously motivated violence, hatred, and hate speech.  Reducing religious 
intolerance to violence or hatred codifies “the myth of religious violence,” the assumption that all 
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religion is inherently violent and thus requires regulation by a secular state.3  More importantly, 
locating religious intolerance solely in explicit intent makes intolerance something extremists do – 
rather than actions and attitudes endemic to mainstream understandings of American religion.4  The 
violence resulting from religious intolerance is neither necessarily visible nor intentional; we must 
also consider the lasting damage of epistemic violence resulting from interreligious hostility.  The 
normalization of American identity as religious in a particular (Christian) way has rendered all but the 
most explicit forms of intolerance invisible, making intolerance simultaneously harder to pinpoint 
and more pernicious.5 
In this chapter, I will survey pertinent literature on the subject of American religious 
intolerance and underscores the role normative sexuality plays in constructing and constraining 
American religion.  I argue that popular understandings of American religion have been shaped by 
normalized or secularized mainline Christianity, and normalized Christian sexual ethics in particular.  
Religious intolerance in contemporary America mobilizes popular anxieties about sexual bodies and 
sexual practices to marginalize minority religions.  Such intolerance is not always explicit. I propose 
that ostensibly secular scholarly assumptions about what does and does not constitute American 
religion have been informed by normalized Christian sexual ethics.  I present three popular pulp 
nonfiction narratives—Under the Banner of Heaven, Not Without My Daughter, and Michelle Remembers—as 
texts that articulate and authorize intolerance of marginal American religions based in suspicions of 
non-normative sexuality. 
 
  
                                                          
3 William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict (Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
 
4 Lynn S. Neal, “Intolerance and American Religious History,” Religion Compass 4, no. 2 (2010): 114–123. 
 
5 Janet Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini, Love the Sin: Sexual Regulation and the Limits of Religious Tolerance (Beacon Press, 
2004), 56. 
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Klansmen and Countersubversives: Considering Religious Intolerance 
 
Surprisingly few American religions scholars have directly engaged the category of religious 
intolerance.  American religious historian American historian David Brion Davis’s analysis of 
nineteenth century nativist literature is one of the field’s earliest considerations of similarities among 
anti-religious minority rhetoric.6   His 1960 essay, “Some Themes of Counter-Subversion: An 
Analysis of Anti-Masonic, Anti-Catholic, and Anti-Mormon Literature,” demonstrates “important 
tensions” among nativist attempts to suppress and cast suspicion on Mormonism, Masonry, and 
Roman Catholicism.7 Davis notes that while Mormons, Catholics, and Masons differed significantly 
on theological terms, as “imagined enemies,” public rhetoric regarding these groups “merged [them] 
into a nearly common stereotype.”8  Nineteenth century expressions of religious intolerance were 
marked by fear and fascination with religious outsiders; Masons, Catholics, and Mormons “were seen 
to embody those traits that were precise antitheses of American ideals.”9  Rejection of these groups, 
then, was understood as an articulation of patriotism and piety.10 
Davis’ concept of counter-subversion, or nativists’ rhetorical attempts to suppress minority 
religions, relies on an assumption of common American values and shared American ideals.  
Nativists emphasized the necessity of “a common loyalty and a fundamental unity among the 
people,” insisting that true Americans “freely subordinat[ed] themselves to the higher and more 
abstract demands of the Constitution, [mainstream Protestant] Christianity, and American public 
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opinion.”11  This religiously intolerant rhetoric subordinated denominational and institutional 
specificities to the presumed primacy of common Protestant American values.  This insistence on 
the necessity for a shared public American morality encouraged a marked suspicion of the seemingly 
occult workings of American Catholicism, Masonry, and Mormonism, Davis suggests. “Most 
Americans of the Jacksonian era appeared willing to tolerate  diversity and even eccentricity,” he 
notes, “but when they saw themselves excluded and even barred from witnessing certain 
proceedings, they imagined a ‘mystic power’ conspiring to enslave them.”12  Suspicion and anxiety 
concerning non-public religious practices led counter-subversives to accuse religions outside the 
Protestant mainstream of treason, mind-control, religious zealotry, inherent dishonesty, and sexual 
perversions.13   
While the public sphere of Davis’ nineteenth century nativists is not equivalent to that of late 
20th century, the author’s work has bearing on contemporary considerations of religious intolerance.    
His work provides evidence both for religious intolerance’s historical precedent and for accusations 
similar to those made against contemporary intolerable religions (such as immoderate piety and 
sexual perversion).  The characteristics Davis found common to nativist rhetoric—most importantly 
for my purposes, the persistent accusations or insinuations of sexual perversion—are absolutely 
endemic to more contemporary instances of religious intolerance.  Thus Davis’ understanding of 
nineteenth century rhetorical attempts to police American religion by excluding Mormons, Masons, 
and Catholics demonstrates important similarities among different rhetorics of religious 
intolerance.14  The counter-subversive rhetoric Davis examines is rooted in convictions that marginal 
religions are not simply theologically wrong, but dangerous.  Thus rejections and even persecutions 
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 52  
of the “imagined enemies” of American religion constitute attempts to correct and police dangerous 
religiosities; and religious intolerance becomes patriotism and piety.   
Robert Bellah and Frederick Greenspahn produced the first edited volume of note on 
American interreligious conflict.  In their 1987 collection, Uncivil Religion: Interreligious Hostility in 
America, sociologist Bellah and Judaic Studies scholar Greenspahn noted the contradictory 
prevalence of a rhetoric of tolerance and interreligious conflict throughout American history.  “The 
facts of American life have not always been as benign as the United States’ official policy of tolerant 
religious pluralism,” the authors insisted.15  “Intergroup hostility has been as real a fact of American 
life as the rhetoric of tolerance.”16  Greenspahn and Bellah attributed this tradition of religious 
conflict to the historical influence of an American Protestant mainstream and anxieties about 
religious difference, as well as the necessity for “tight-bounded” understandings of appropriate 
religious belief and practice.   
Uncivil Religion demonstrates that America’s Protestant mainstream has been historically 
anxious about religious difference.  Bellah and Greenspahn noted that “America originated as a 
predominantly Protestant culture” and that “a perceived threat to the ‘American way of life,’ 
however that is understood,” underlies much religious conflict.17  The authors suggested “the sheer 
emotion” underlying much interreligious hostility demonstrates underlying suspicions of religiosities 
outside the Protestant mainstream.18  “These diverse forms of religious hostility…reflect a sense of 
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fear, fear that the other groups are not just wrong, but dangerous,” they insisted.19  Greenspahn and 
Bellah located this fear in “religious uncertainty, with deep-seated social and psychological concerns 
masked by theological language.”20  The authors proposed that fear and suspicion of religious beliefs 
and practices outside the Protestant mainstream inform much religious conflict.   
Bellah’s conclusion to the volume attributed these anxieties about religious difference to 
tensions between “loose” and “tight-boundedness” in modes of American religiosity, concepts 
Bellah mapped roughly onto American political liberalism and conservatism.21  “Tight-bounded” (i.e. 
conservative) understandings of American religion claim exclusive access to America’s “fundamental 
values,” while “loose-boundedness” (i.e. liberalism) resists definitions and prizes consensus.22  Thus 
Bellah located religious conflict in desires to maintain group identities and boundaries.23   
Bellah and Greenspahn ultimately insisted not only on the reality of interreligious conflict, 
but also on its relative rarity.  “Despite the passion that often accompanies interreligious relations, it 
is probably fair to say that religious persecution has caused fewer deaths in America than in most 
Western countries over a comparable period,” the authors maintained.  “We must, therefore, not 
only note the reality of religious hostility, but also explain its relatively small proportions.”24  The 
authors attributed the “relatively small proportions” of religious intolerance to patterns of increased 
secularization among Americans.  “Bluntly put, many Americans do not regard religion as important 
enough to fight for,” Bellah and Greenspahn concluded.25   
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Uncivil Religion highlights the importance of the lived realities of interreligious conflict to the 
study of American religious history.   Bellah and Greenspahn suggested such hostilities originate in a 
shared sense of fundamental American values – values that require defense against “loose-bounded” 
non-Protestant-mainstream religions.  Whereas minority religions might display intolerant 
tendencies, they lack the cultural influence to normalize their intolerance or meaningfully 
discriminate against mainstream religions. The historical Protestant dominance in America’s religious 
sphere renders “other” religions suspect and, as Greenspahn and Bellah proposed, dangerous.  
However persistent interreligious conflict has been throughout American history, the authors 
concluded by insisting that interreligious conflict has been rare in comparison to the conflicts 
experienced by other modern nation-states.  
Several Christian theologians also have contributed to scholarly considerations of American 
religious intolerance.  Dorothee Sölle detected religious intolerance in what she perceived as the 
inherent normativizing absolutism of all religion.  “Religious groups…lay claim to absolute and 
universal validity for their theological propositions,” Sölle explained in her 1984 “Christianity and 
Intolerance.”  “Because of this claim to universal validity, [religious] knowledge is imperative and 
authoritative in character [and]…communication with other groups is severely limited.”26  Susan 
Thistlethwaite’s 1994 “Settled Issues and Neglected Questions: How Is Religion to Be Studied?” 
likewise defines religion itself in universalizing and intolerant terms.  “Religion is by definition value-
laden and poses universal claims,” Thistlethwaite insists.  “Thus, even societies that have a history of 
religious tolerance have resident within them the fundamental intolerance and its accompanying tendency 
to social instability that is characteristic of religion.”27  Both Sölle and Thistlethwaite attempt to 
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27 Susan Thistlethwaite, “Settled Issues and Neglected Questions: How Is Religion to Be Studied?,” Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 62, no. 4 (December 1994): 1042-3 (emphasis added); see also Nussbaum on this point. 
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problematize what they see as the universalizing tendencies of all religion and emphasize the 
potential of religious diversity to combat intolerance.   
 American Jewish historian Jonathan Sarna was among the first American religions scholars 
to consider interreligious conflict from the perspective of minority religions.  Sarna’s 1998 Minority 
Faiths and the American Protestant Mainstream emphasizes the historical diversity of American religion, 
as well as the contributions of minority religious communities to “American life.”28  At the same 
time, though, Sarna argues that the historiography of American religious has largely obscured 
important tensions between marginal religions and the American Protestant mainstream.  The 
“dynamic encounter” between minority religions and the Protestant mainstream—between 
“minority outsiders and majority insiders”—is “central to the religious experience of millions of 
Americans,” Sarna insists.29  He detects these outsider/insider tensions “between pressures [on 
minority religions] to conform to the religious patterns of the mainstream; and countervailing 
pressures…to resist them and remain apart.”30  Sarna emphasizes minority religions’ desire to be 
recognized as legitimate American religion.  At the same time, Sarna underscores the distance between 
these minority religions and the American Protestant mainstream.   
These “arenas of conflict” have forced minority religions to develop “survival strategies” 
under the Protestant mainstream’s “shadow,” Sarna suggests.31  Despite the inescapable influence of 
Protestantism, Sarna emphasizes the necessity of “treating minority group members as historical 
actors in their own right rather than just as victims of history acted upon by the majority.”32  Sarna 
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insists on taking seriously the agency of minority religions in the analysis of interreligious conflict, as 
well as the potential for such conflict to present not only “contention and pain,” but also “stimulus 
for wondrous creativity.”33 
Minority Faiths makes several key contributions to defining religious intolerance.  Sarna argues 
for the importance of considering American religion from perspective of minority religions, as well 
as for the significance of recognizing the agency and creativity of religious outsiders.  The author 
notes that members of minority religious communities often negotiate desires to be recognized as 
American religions while remaining distinct from the American Protestant mainstream. Minority 
religions negotiate their identities under the “shadow” of the Protestant mainstream; they strive for 
recognition as American religions while attempting to retain their theological and practical 
specificities.  In sum, Minority Faiths underscores the contentious dynamism of interreligious 
encounters while insisting that such conflicts also provide opportunities to expand popular 
understandings of American religion.  Sarna’s work is particularly significant for its emphasis on the 
agency of religious minorities, particularly minority religions’ negotiations of their place in the 
American public sphere.   
American religious historians John Corrigan and Lynn Neal provide a recent and significant 
consideration of religious intolerance in their 2010 Religious Intolerance in America: A Documentary 
History.34  This volume represents a major contribution in demonstrating importance and persistence 
of intolerance throughout American religious history.  In their introduction, Neal and Corrigan note 
that religious intolerance is “seemingly more generic than the term religious violence yet more 
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specific than either bigotry or prejudice,” and thus “does not lend itself easily to definition.”35  The 
authors note the appeal of what we might call a definition of intolerance analogous to the definition 
of pornography, which is to say we (scholars and citizens alike) know religious intolerance when we 
see it.36  But Corrigan and Neal also note that the assumptions that underlie this assessment—the 
presumptions of shared values and cultural “common” sense—are the very building blocks that 
often shape religious intolerance itself.37  “Religious intolerance often occurs precisely because a 
religious group challenges or seeks to defend an assumed cultural morality,” Neal and Corrigan 
insist.38  Thus the authors demonstrate the limitations of a definition that relies on a presumed 
common American morality. 
Corrigan and Neal’s efforts to define religious intolerance further highlight the Protestant 
biases that inform many expressions of intolerance.  “A definition [of religious intolerance] that takes 
its cues from understandings of right and wrong shared by a certain group tends to privilege majority 
religious views, namely Protestant Christianity, and thereby fails to adequately define or recognize 
religious intolerance.”39  The authors and other contributors to this volume thus attempt more 
precise definitions of the phenomenon.  The volume foregrounds the ways “perceptions of religious 
difference” instigate “disrespect, intimidation, or violence toward others.”40  The authors propose a 
causal link between “religious beliefs and attitudes”—specifically beliefs or attitudes informed by 
particular Protestant notions of common American values—and “actions against or interactions with 
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those who are perceived as religiously different.”41 Thus Corrigan and Neal’s definition indicates the 
ways in which the perception of shared Protestant values informs and instigates episodes of religious 
intolerance. 
Religious Intolerance in America’s definition of religious intolerance is also notable for its 
understanding of the phenomenon in emphatically violent and overt terms.  Intolerance “use[s] 
religion as a weapon;” indeed, the authors “define intolerance as a type of violence.”42  Corrigan and 
Neal suggest that scholars often confine intolerant rhetoric to “the realm of the imagined, the 
symbolic,” while religious violence is better understood as “actual, real, and enacted.”43  In contrast, 
the volume broadens its definition of violence to include rhetoric and affect, insisting that “hateful 
ideas, words, and acts are related to violent practices.”44  Thus “cross burning, vandalism, hate 
speech, public protests, threatening notes, written treatises, and the propagation of false allegations 
can also be viewed as religiously violent acts.”45  By locating intolerance in rhetoric and prejudice as 
well as in violent action, Neal and Corrigan highlight the complex and multiple locations of religious 
intolerance.     
Corrigan and Neal’s definition takes seriously the role played by intent and experience in 
considerations of religious intolerance, specifically the intent to “intimidate and inhibit” religious 
practice, which might be experienced as violent by targets of those actions.  “A court decision that 
denies the legitimacy of one’s religious practice or a stereotypical portrayal and of one’s faith in a film 
may…[be] experienced as an ‘attack,’ as violent,” the authors propose.  “[This experience] is not the 
same as being tarred and feathered, raped, or lynched, but these [intolerant] acts may still intimidate 
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and inhibit the practice of one’s faith and be defined by victims as violent.”46  Neal and Corrigan’s 
definition highlights the roles of intentionality and experience in the volume’s understanding of 
religious intolerance. 
Thus Religious Intolerance in America’s definition of religious intolerance is a valuable 
contribution to American religious studies in its insistence on the complexity of the category.  
Corrigan and Neal insist upon the term’s breadth and elusiveness.  They note the dangers of 
presuming common values or morality, gesturing toward the mainstream Protestant bias that often 
undergirds such a presumption.  The volume demonstrates the prevalence of religious intolerance in 
the lived experience of American religion by illustrating intolerance’s historical prevalence and 
contemporary instantiations.  The authors define intolerance in emphatically violent terms, and they 
insist upon the connections between intolerant rhetoric and violent actions.  In addition, Neal and 
Corrigan take seriously the affective consequences of religious intolerance, insisting that the targets 
of religious prejudice might experience broader cultural interactions as a form of violence.  The 
volume presents complex and multiple locations for religious intolerance as an analytical lens in 
American religious studies, in which the authors ultimately define religious intolerance as a violent 
and intentional rejection of religious difference. 
Taken as a whole, the scholars I discussed above demonstrate several common elements in 
episodes of religious intolerance.  All note the influence of mainstream Protestant theology, praxis, 
and aesthetics on the understanding of “American religion” while noting that the effects and 
boundaries of an American Protestant majority resist definition.  Most of these authors note the 
simultaneous appeal and danger of relying on assumed shared or common values in defining 
religious intolerance.  Many point out the contradiction between popularly expressed allegiance to a 
uniquely American religious tolerance and the material realities of religious conflict.  Several insist 
note the efficacy of intolerant rhetoric in justifying and inciting action against religions perceived as 
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intolerable.  All suggest that fear, suspicion, and a sense of “other” religions as dangerous undergird 
interreligious hostilities and propose significant ties between religious intolerance and nationalist 
ideals.  All conceptualize religious intolerance as intentional; most understand interreligious conflict 
in violent terms.  Ultimately, the authors concur on the importance of religious intolerance as an 
analytical lens in American religious scholarship. 
All of the authors I have explored above ultimately conceptualize religious intolerance in 
terms of deliberate or overt acts.  These acts include assault, hate speech, and the production of 
material culture hostile to religious difference.  In all of the definitions offered above, this hostility is 
motivated by a deliberate (if irrational, cf. Davis) rejection of religious difference.  In Neal and 
Corrigan’s estimation, the religiously intolerant are “purveyors of hatred respond[ing] to perceived 
and real challenges to their religious, political, and social worlds with intolerance and violence.”47  
Theorists of intolerance have commonly located these “purveyors of hatred” either in America’s 
distant past, in extremist groups, or both.  The religiously intolerant are always intentionally so, 
according to the definitions provided. 
More, the authors locate the religiously intolerant as a quantifiable (if elusive) entity: the 
cartoons of Thomas Nast; the Ku Klux Klan; the bigot shouting religiously hostile epithets.  Neal 
and Corrigan note that the definitions of religious intolerance provided in their volume stress “how 
religious beliefs and attitudes shape negative interactions between persons and groups…linkage between the 
perception of religious difference and the enactment of disrespect, intimidation, or violence toward 
others.”48  These definitions offer a distinctive understanding of religious intolerance: that of 
negative and deliberate interactions between persons and groups.   
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Most commonly, the authors define religious intolerance in violent terms.  Neal and 
Corrigan do so explicitly: they suggest religious intolerance uses “religion as a weapon.”49  
Contributors to their documentary history all “define intolerance as a type of violence.”50 Davis, 
Bellah and Greenspahn, and Sarna all incorporate physical violence as a major component in their 
definitions of intolerance.  Bellah and Greenspahn go so far as to insist on the “relatively small 
proportions” of religious hostility throughout American history, because “despite the passion that 
often accompanies interreligious relations…religious persecution has caused fewer deaths in America 
than in most Western countries over a comparable period.”51  Corrigan and Neal provide a more 
complex understanding of violence, insisting that “cross burning, vandalism, hate speech, public 
protests, threatening notes, written treatises, and the propagation of false allegations can also be 
viewed as religiously violent acts.”52  But even these modes of violence are all still visible and 
intentional.   
While my thinking builds on this scholarship, I argue that a comprehensive definition of 
religious intolerance requires a more nuanced engagement with the topic.  That is, religious 
intolerance is at once broader and more endemic than these definitions indicate.  I am concerned 
with a recurrent tendency to downplay the severity of interreligious hostility and propose that a more 
comprehensive definition of religious intolerance must complicate these assumptions.   
As an analytical lens, “religious intolerance” must render visible not only physical violence 
and hate speech, but also tacit exclusion and more subtle maneuvers to police the boundaries of 
real/true American religion.  The violence resulting from religious intolerance is neither necessarily 
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visible nor intentional; we must also consider the lasting damage of epistemic violence resulting from 
interreligious hostility.  Scholars of religious intolerance must engage the silences and unconscious 
exclusions of certain forms of belief and practice from the category of American religion.  More: we 
must not limit our investigations of religious prejudice to ethnographies of extremism.  Our 
interrogations must be at once more thorough and more reflexive.   
The normalization of American identity as Christian—that is, the presumption of common 
“American” values informed by Christian theology, praxis, and aesthetics—often masks more subtle 
forms of religious intolerance.   Religiously motivated or justified hate speech and violence can be 
easily identified as intolerant, but normalized American mainline Christianity informs and 
institutionalizes more subtle and diffuse modes of interreligious hostility.  This hostility is not always 
and everywhere conscious or intentional; its perpetrators are not only zealots.  Indeed, individuals 
and identifiable religious groups are not the only actors responsible for the perpetuation of American 
religious intolerance. 
 
Many Silences: Expanding Definitions of Religious Intolerance 
 
Significantly, the authors I reviewed above have all defined religious intolerance in terms of 
interreligious conflict –a confessionally Protestant mainstream attempting to maintain its privileged 
status by discouraging religious difference.  But this is not the sole or most important manifestation 
of religious intolerance. In this section, I engage authors who consider the influence of mainstream 
Christianity on America’s presumably secular public sphere.  In conversation with these scholars, I 
note the persistence of mainstream Christian sensibilities informing Americans’ shared (secular) 
values as articulated in print culture, legal decisions, and historiographies of American religions. 
A number of scholars have addressed the “the dominance of white, middle-class forms of 
Protestantism” in the formation of American religio-national identity, though none explicitly target 
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such exclusions and assumptions as modes of religious intolerance.53  Ann Burlein, Lawrence Moore, 
and Robert Orsi have all delineated the mainline Protestant bias of both American culture broadly 
and American religious historiography more specifically.  Terryl Givens, Tracy Fessenden, and Sean 
McCloud highlight Protestant assumptions that have influenced American print culture.  In addition, 
Winnifred Sullivan, Ann Pellegrini, and Janet Jakobsen demonstrate the Protestant ethics at work in 
the American legal system.  In each case, a shared if unarticulated understanding of “good” or “true” 
American religion emerges, thus excluding “bad” or “false”—which is to say intolerable—modes of 
religiosity.54  
In her 2001 Lift High the Cross, American religions scholar Burlein gestures towards 
something like religious intolerance in her concept of “ignore-ance.”55 While Burlein’s chief concern 
is the Christian Right’s mobilization of false nostalgia to create religion as a form of protest, her 
“ignore-ance” or “ignorance-power” model has broader applications.  Ignore-ance perpetuates 
intolerant or exclusionary models of power (and particularly religious power) “not just through what 
people say and know, but also and primarily through what people need not say and cannot afford to 
know: the fears and aggressions, silences and desires that circulate through what is best in people, 
their highest ideals and deepest hopes.”56  Rather than address intolerance as something exclusive to 
extremists or reducible to “individual prejudices,” Burlein considers the “structural placement” of 
religious hostility, the ways silence, indifference, and exclusion work to normalize certain modes of 
Protestant Christianity in contemporary America. 
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Ignore-ance operates primarily through the principle of familiarity – we often do not 
recognize rejections or exclusions of difference as such because such omissions are commonplace 
and reinforced by respected institutions.57  “Ignorance haunts culture because it inhabits the 
structures of everyday life so deeply that it need not speak its name in order to take effect,” Burlein 
insists; American Protestant Christian hegemony “is articulated, supported, and produced by 
mainstream structures and relations of power.”58 Burlein’s particular focus is the domestic training 
that occurs within nuclear families: she insists that “everyday [familial/domestic] practices that 
predicate bonding on ‘same-as-me-ness’ produce our very perceptions of intimacy and connection as 
threatened by difference rather than strengthened by it.”59  I do not disagree.  But as I will explore 
more fully below, courts, universities, and print media also contribute to a normalization of certain 
Protestant ethics as inherent to the category of American religion; these institutions reinforce the 
suspicion of difference. 
Like several scholars addressed in the previous section, Burlein locates intolerance in the 
assumption of shared values, but Burlein proposes that religious intolerance is often less explicitly 
articulated and far more prevalent than Davis, Neal, and Corrigan imply.  To listen to ultra-
conservative Christian rejections of difference, Burlein insists, is to hear mainstream America talk to 
itself, interpellate itself, reproduce itself anew: as white, as male, as middle-class, as Protestant, as 
straight, as innocent.60  The broad efficacy of appeals to “gut issues” (like the safety and welfare of 
American children) lies in the Christian Right’s claim to speak for a national majority: “to represent 
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its authoritarianism as populism and thereby portray its politics as innocent, as not ‘politics’ really, 
simply an attempt to protect those specific folkways, commonsense values, and shared-origin 
narratives that constitute ‘Americanness.’”61  Thus the intolerance, or ignore-ance, Burlein targets 
does not express itself as nativism or even politics, but merely innocent concern for America’s 
citizens at large.  This type of rhetoric idealizes and normalizes certain modes of Protestant 
Christianity as necessarily American, effectively (even when silently or unintentionally) rendering 
alternate modes of religious belief and practice as abject or intolerable.62 
Burlein argues that the religious mainstream is complicit in acts of exclusion, indifference, 
and discomfort toward (religious) difference.  “Supremacy is articulated, supported, and produced by 
mainstream structures and relations of power,” Burlein contends.  “We are never who we think we 
are.”63 Most Americans would probably not categorize themselves as religiously intolerant, but 
omissions of religious difference “are ordinary and manifold but mostly unremarked on, a string of 
everyday unsaid dispersed across the surface of discourse.”64  Burlein proposes that intolerant 
extremists like the Klan build their hateful rhetoric on such silences.  Moreover, she insists that 
explicit hate speech and violence effectively obscure less intentional, more endemic forms of 
exclusion and indifference.65 
Burlein’s model of ignore-ance adds important nuance to the definitions of religious 
intolerance explored above.  Ignore-ance about religious difference informs not only recognized 
ways of knowing and deliberate speech and action, but also assumptions, indifferences, and 
unintentional exclusions of difference.  Burlein attributes ignore-ance to institutional normalizations 
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of a Protestant Christian hegemony as “American religion,” suggesting that appeals to (presumably) 
shared American values create and reinforce assumptions that to be American is to be straight, 
white, middle-class, and Protestant.  Like Neal and Corrigan, Burlein’s understanding of religious 
conflict accounts for violence and hate speech, but Burlein complicates the intentionality and 
overtness of religious intolerance.  Mainstream institutions—like the nuclear family—unintentionally 
instill and reinforce silences about and exclusions of difference by defining intimacy and security in 
terms of “same-as-me-ness” – making difference something to be feared and avoided.  Burlein 
attributes the efficacy of intolerant rhetoric to mainstream complicity in intolerance: hate speech and 
violence often overshadow the more subtle and pernicious institutional constructions of difference 
as dangerous. 
Lawrence Moore and Robert Orsi have both explored the anxieties about and exclusion of 
difference in American religious historiography.  Moore organized his 1986 Religious Outsiders and the 
Making of Americans around a central question: “why do historians pay attention to some things in the 
past but ignore, or treat as sideshow events, other things that affected just as many people?”66 Moore 
suggested that there were “some odd things about the pronounced and persistent habit of many 
historians to narrow the parameters of what constitutes significant or normal religious behavior in 
America.”67  In spite of America’s marked and rich religious plurality, Moore notes that American 
religious historians and the American public at large have reacted to the realities of this diversity—
“multiplying sects and excessive fervor for seemingly bizarre religious tenets”—with “something 
short of enthusiasm.”68 
Moore attributes the marginalization of non-mainstream Protestant religions by historians to 
a fear of difference and to the desire to maintain dominance that Burlein explores.  “Protestants may 
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have monopolized the writing of religious history, but we are beginning to ask how much of what 
they wrote grew from fear, never entirely suppressed in their books, that they were not in control [i.e. 
of the American religious landscape].”69  In addition, Moore suggests such occlusions of difference 
overlook minority religions’ claims to “outsiderhood” as key ways of re-inventing a marginal group 
as innately American.70    American religious historiography, Moore insists, is grounded in an 
understanding of itself as unique, set apart.71 
   While historians of American religion have become demonstrably more attentive to 
concerns of difference and exclusion, Robert Orsi insists in his 2005 essay “Snakes Alive!  Religious 
Studies between Heaven and Earth” that religious alterity still faces suspicion and derision in 
American religious studies and in American culture more broadly.72  “It is true that over the past 
twenty years in response to criticism from various quarters the discipline has intermittently made 
room for less socially tolerable forms of religious behavior within the scope of its inquiries,” Orsi 
allows.73  “But the social and intellectual pressures against this are great and the odd inclusion of an 
anxiety-provoking ritual or vision has not fundamentally changed the meaning of ‘religion’ in 
religious studies.”74 
The “religion” in religious studies, Orsi explains, is directly informed by “domesticated 
Christianity tailored ‘for use in public life.’”75  Scholars of American religions have primarily 
concerned themselves with religion in the singular, identified as beliefs and practices of a 
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“denominationally neutral version of Christianity recast as an ethical system.”76  These beliefs and 
practices constitute what Orsi terms good or true American religion, cast as “good, even necessary 
for democracy.”77  He notes that  
It seems to be virtually impossible to study religion without attempting to distinguish 
between its good and bad expressions, without working to establish both a normative 
hierarchy of religious idioms…and a methodological justification for it.  These resilient 
impulses take on a special significance in light of the well-known inability of the field to 
agree on what religion is: we may not know what religion is but at least we can say with certainty what 
bad religion is or what religion is not.  The mother of all religious dichotomies—us/them—has 
regularly been constituted as a moral distinction—good/bad religion.78 
 
This is to say that religious studies, and American religious studies in particular, is never merely 
descriptive.  Orsi contends that scholarly and popular efforts to define religion are essentially 
prescriptive and deeply invested in a hierarchical good religion/bad religion dichotomy.79 
Popular and scholarly understandings of “good” or “true” American religion emphasize 
belief, coherence, emotional reserve (if not remove), rationality, and voluntarism: 
In contemporary American popular culture…[good religion] is epistemologically and 
ethically singular.  It is rational, respectful of persons, noncoercive, mature, 
nonanthropomorphic in its higher forms, mystical (as opposed to ritualistic), unmediated 
and agreeable to democracy…monotheistic (no angels, saints, demons, ancestors), 
emotionally controlled, a reality of mind and spirit not body and matter.80  
 
By extension, then, bad religion is (or is perceived to be) multiple or mutable, irrational, disrespectful 
of persons, coercive, contrary to democracy, enthusiastic or emotionally uncontrolled, and embodied 
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or material.  Bad religion might be “ugly, violent, or troublesome,” ambivalent or ambiguous; it blurs 
boundaries among races, genders, time periods, and/or states of existence. 81    
Orsi indicts the field of religious studies for routinely “otherizing” bad religion, those beliefs 
or practices its scholars find “disturbing, dangerous, or even morally repugnant.”82  But Orsi 
maintains that the field does not merely ignore “troublesome” modes of religiosity:  
The point here is not simply that the normative account of real religion that took shape 
within the academy or at the anxious intersection of the academy with the extravagance of 
American religious life excluded from the study of religion ugly, violent, or troublesome 
matters (although it certainly does this).  Rather the entire notion of “religion” has been 
carefully demarcated to preserve it from ambivalence and ambiguity, from anything not in 
accordance with certain sanctioned notions of self and society.83 
 
Orsi stresses that religious studies has been shaped and maintained by the exclusion of such 
troublesome modes as something other than religious.  Religion, Orsi contends, “is a disciplinary 
word, built out of and for exclusion.”84  He numbers Roman Catholics, Mormons, ghost dancers, 
“frenzied preachers and gullible masses” among those excluded, insisting that “‘religion’ as it took 
shape in the academy was explicitly imagined in relation to these others and as a prophylactic against 
them.”85  Orsi thus identifies the primary conceptual strategy of religious studies as “otherizing.”86 
Recent scholarship on “alternative” modes of religion is not innocent of this “otherizing.”  
While earlier American religious historiography largely ignored or marginalized non-mainstream 
Protestant religions, Orsi notes that scholars and American culture have increasingly attended to 
troublesome modes of religiosity.  Orsi terms this the “compulsive attraction of otherness,” noting 
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that “Americans have long been deeply fascinated by such powerfully complex religious figures, who 
blur gender or racial categories, for example, or do forbidden and dangerous things with their bodies 
or with others’ bodies.”87  Such complex religious figures simultaneously attract and repel: 
“Americans want to be protected from these [extreme or disturbing] religious actors, but at the same 
time they want access to some of their power, an unstable mix of desire and prohibition.”88  
“Snakes Alive!” engages Dennis Covington’s ethnography of Appalachian Pentecostal “signs 
following” congregations, in which Covington narrates the allure of the ecstatic (and extreme, in the 
form of snake-handling and poison-swallowing) worship.  Though his experiences with these 
congregations inspire Covington to consider abandoning journalism in favor of itinerant ministry, 
the (allegedly) jarring revelation of the congregations’ misogyny forces Covington’s last-minute 
apostasy.  Orsi applauds the ways in which Covington presents his interlocutors as complex actors, 
worthy of scholarly attention.  
But Orsi chastises Covington in the end for using those interlocutors to reinforce, rather 
than challenge, the good/bad religion dichotomy.  “The religious figure” here, the snake-handling 
Pentecostal preachers Covington befriended, “[who] confounds us and challenges us with his or her 
difference is silenced and securely relegated to otherness.”89  Orsi charges Covington with portraying 
renowned snake-handler Punkin Brown as sub-human in the final chapter of Salvation on Sand 
Mountain; in doing so (Orsi suggests), Covington reassures himself and his popular American 
readership that we, scholars and/or practitioners of good religion, are not they, the practitioners of 
the bad or false. 
Religious studies as a field is similarly guilty of such boundary-buttressing, Orsi alleges.  He 
attributes the scholarly policing of good religion’s boundaries to anxieties about the practices of 
                                                          
87 Ibid., 182. 
 
88 Ibid. 
 
89 Ibid., 183. 
 
 71  
“dark-skinned or alien peoples” presented the “Christian middle class.”90  Such fears are “pervasive 
and characteristically American,” Orsi maintains.91  Indeed, there is significant slippage between the 
academic study of religion and mainstream American understandings of true or good religion.92   
The discipline reflects the religious politics of the United States as well as the particular history of 
American higher education.  The embedded, hidden others against whom the “religion” in religious 
studies is constituted are the religions on the American landscape that appeared so terrifying and un-
American to the guardians of the culture.93 
The scholarly construction of religion as a simple and exclusive category has ominous echoes 
in American society.  The “embedded, hidden others” considered “terrifying and un-American” 
include Mormons, Roman Catholics, and radical evangelicals Orsi discusses, as well as Muslims and 
religious witches (which Orsi neglects).94  Orsi implicates American religious scholars in perpetuating 
a hierarchical religious dichotomy: he notes that scholars of American religions assured an anxious 
nation that 9/11 terrorists were not practitioners of good or true Islam and that the failure of the 
federal government and law enforcement to recognize and respond to the religious convictions of 
Waco’s Branch Davidian sect resemble religious studies’ scholars failure to take unconventional 
religions seriously.95  Orsi’s “Snakes Alive!” thus implicates the academic study of religion itself in 
the construction and perpetuation of American religious intolerance. 
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Orsi’s identification of “otherizing” as the “basic move” in the academic study of religion is 
extremely relevant to my exploration of of religious intolerance.96  “Snakes Alive!” contends that 
religious studies as a field does not merely attend to mainstream Protestantisms to the exclusion of 
less prevalent forms of religion, but is also deeply invested in the exclusion of such “troublesome” 
modes.  Religious studies “inscrib[es] a boundary between good and bad religions at the very 
foundation of the field...and enacts an important cultural discipline.”97  Good or true religion is 
modeled on “denominationally neutral” mainstream Protestantism; anything that escapes those 
boundaries meets with suspicion or derision, is considered bad religion.  This disciplining of religion 
into a hierarchical binary—good over bad—has significant repercussions both within and beyond 
the academy, Orsi insists.98  Thus the work of religious studies is never merely descriptive, but always 
prescriptive: the academic study of religion tells us not so much what “religion” is as what it should 
or can be.  Until religious studies moves away from “otherizing,” the field will remain complicit in 
institutionalizing religious intolerance. 
Burlein, Moore, and Orsi all note a pervasive exclusion of non-mainstream Protestants from 
American religious history and the construction of “American religion.”  Burlein and Orsi attribute 
this exclusion to preferences for the familiar and safe: Burlein theorizes interreligious conflict as 
“ignore-ance,” while Orsi locates such conflicts in scholarly practices of “otherizing.”  All three 
scholars indicate that fear of difference motivates the exclusion of religious others, and all three 
attribute these anxieties to concerns for defining “good” or “true” American religion exclusively in 
terms of denominationally neutral mainstream Protestantism.  Orsi and Burlein both highlight the 
extent to which religious intolerance draws on and reinforces American gender and sexual cultural 
norms, a point to which I shall return.   
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Orsi, Moore, and Burlein further suggest that scholars and citizens might not fully realize the 
fear motivating such definitions.  Orsi’s “otherizing” and Burlein’s “ignore-ance” have less to do 
with explicit or overt action than with normalized assumptions of what does and does not count as 
“real” American religion.  In addition, all three scholars note institutional as well as individual 
manifestations of religious intolerance, specifically within the academic study of religion.  And all 
three note that the exclusion of religious others in the religious studies scholarship has broader 
ramifications in American culture.  
Terryl Givens, Tracy Fessenden, and Sean McCloud note similar occlusions of religious 
difference endemic to American print culture.99  Givens examines popular nineteenth century anti-
Mormon novels to demonstrate the ways such narratives work to discourage minority religious 
practice. Fessenden and McCloud both highlight the Protestant assumptions that have historically 
informed print media, and Fessenden insists on the Protestant ethics underlying professedly secular 
media (and, indeed, secularism at large).  While Givens proposes an “unarticulated orthodoxy” at 
work in American print culture and McCloud uses Bourdieu’s habitus to theorize the excoriation of 
religious difference in terms of “heresiography,” Fessenden targets secularism as an “unmarked 
category,” one that conceals and perpetuates its normative Protestantism.100   
Literary theorist and Mormon historian Terryl Givens’ The Viper on the Hearth: Mormons, 
Myths, and the Construction of Heresy notes the tensions between professed American ideals—
particularly the ideal of religious tolerance—and the lived reality of religious intolerance (or the 
rejection of what Givens calls heresy). 101  The Viper on the Hearth “consider[s] how transgression 
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comes to be represented when unacceptable difference manifests itself in the midst of a community 
or society that has already founded its identity on ideals of pluralism and tolerance.”102  Givens’ 
project analyzes literary examples of attempts to police and reject perceived religious transgressions 
or heresies.   
Givens suggests that the United States is deeply invested in an ideal of a religious tolerance 
that is uniquely American.  “The American investment in the ideal of religious tolerance has been 
part of our self-presentation, our share American mythology, for two hundred years and more,” he 
notes.103  How then to account for the “rhetoric of vituperation” and “practice[s] of exclusion” 
Givens identifies in anti-Mormon literature?104  That is, “how are we to understand the acceptable 
range of religious innovation when orthodoxy and religious conformity are not part of a country’s 
heritage or ideology?”105 
Viper on the Hearth argues that American public opinion negotiates its understanding of 
acceptable and intolerable modes of religion through the lens of an “unarticulated orthodoxy” – the 
weight of which is considerable when it falls on excluded forms of religion.106  “In the absence of a 
state religion, and in spite of an American predilection for religious diversity,” Givens insists, “heresy 
has persisted as a category that transcends narrow denominational boundaries.”107  While the 
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boundaries of American religious orthodoxy remain vague, the rejection of heterodoxies “marks the 
limits of religious freedom from which any one particular community will tolerate.”108   Thus in 
Givens’ estimation, polemics against Mormonism and other “heresies” emerge as sites for the 
definition and delimitation of American religion. 
Givens engages religious intolerance in terms of a fiercely policed orthodoxy and 
vituperative, often violent, rejection of heresies.  The significance of such rejection lies in the 
proportion of the response to heterodox groups and activities: while the groups themselves are 
relatively small and lacking in influence on a national scale, the backlash against these groups can be 
enormous.109  An ill-defined but convicted religious majority, then, prides itself on religious 
intolerance while rejecting and persecuting minority religions for unacceptable transgressions against 
an unarticulated but nevertheless inviolable “American religion.” 
The genre of popular literature provides particular insights into these expressions of religious 
intolerance, Givens proposes.  “Representational patterns” in anti-Mormon literature demonstrate 
the simultaneous “construction of heresy” and the construction of a collective religio-national 
identity.110  Religiously intolerant narratives “demonstrate the necessary conditions that religion must 
be subjected to, the rhetorical strategies that must be deliberately and ingeniously applied, in order to maintain 
intact the underlying value system of pluralism and religious toleration while the aberrant group is 
proscribed.”111   
Viper on the Hearth contributes a nuanced definition of religious intolerance to American 
religious studies.  Givens adeptly demonstrates the tensions between a professed American 
commitment to (and pride in) a unique form of religious tolerance and persistent American 
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rejections and persecutions of perceived heterodoxies.  Givens particularly emphasizes the 
vehemence of religious exclusion in the face of an unarticulated American orthodoxy – that is, 
minority religions are frequently excluded and persecuted as essentially intolerable, but “American 
religion” is not reducible to a well-defined set of beliefs or practices.  Givens further identifies 
intolerance in the disproportion of popular responses to such “heresies:” heretical groups are 
relatively small, but the public outcry against their beliefs and practices is considerable.  Finally, 
Givens demonstrates the value of engaging popular literature as a prime site of religious hostility.   
Sean McCloud’s 2004 Making the American Religious Fringe: Exotics, Subversives, and Journalists, 
1955-1993 demonstrates that in the four decades of materials McCloud examines print media 
depictions of marginal religions were deeply shaped by the journalists’ socioeconomic, demographic, 
and professional practical positions, or journalistic habitus (via Bourdieu).  Mid-to-late 20th century 
magazine coverage of the “religious fringe” emphasized marginal religions’ variations and deviations 
from the American Protestant mainstream, belittling or condemning those religious movements with 
“high levels of religious zeal, dogma, and emotion.”112   Journalists became de facto “heresiographers,” 
positioning “emotional” religions that demonstrated “abnormal” levels of piety (“fringe” religions) 
against “rational” religions with “normal” piety levels (observable in mainstream Protestant 
denominations).113  In this way, the national print media McCloud surveys acted as “an arena of 
symbolic production,” constructing and authorizing American racial and class inequality in the last 
half of the 20th century.114 
Making the American Religious Fringe credits print journalists with constructing the category of 
marginal religions in contemporary America.115  While noting that “changes in fringe depictions 
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coincided with larger changes in society, culture, and the magazine industry,” McCloud demonstrates 
key patterns in journalistic depictions of the American religious fringe.116  These magazine journalists 
“imagined the religious mainstream as white middle class and upper middle class,” which McCloud 
attributes to the writers’ similar social locations; the journalists in question imagined the members of 
the religious mainstream to be like themselves and their readers.117  “Many (but of course not all) of 
the largest news and general-interest magazine writers and authors shared approximate dispositions, 
conscious opinions, professional obligations, and unconscious assumptions,” McCloud explains.118   
These shared attitudes, opinions, and assumptions form what McCloud terms a “journalistic 
‘habitus’”119  Drawing on Bourdieu, McCloud suggests that a set of unconscious presuppositions and 
actions (or doxa, in Bourdieu’s framing) caused his subjects to authorize and police a particular 
definition of mainstream American religion – one whose practitioners closely resembled the 
journalists themselves.  Thus, in McCloud’s analysis, mid-to-late 20th century print media effectively 
served as a “spiritual apologetics for the dominant social order.”120 Its journalists presented and 
reinforced a definition of the “normative American mainstream” that was white, upper-middle and 
middle class, male, religiously liberal or nonaffiliated – effectively normalizing and universalizing 
middle-class values and practices.121   
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McCloud argues that the American religious fringe—groups and individuals who 
“demonstrated high levels of religious zeal, dogma, and emotion”—has served as a “negative 
reference group” in the journalistic construction of American cultural identity.122  This is to say that 
journalists—white, middle-class, well-educated, who were religiously liberal or unaffiliated—defined 
the religious fringe as everything they themselves were (presumably) not: “fanatical, bigoted, 
parochial, emotional, and implicitly ethnic and lower class.”123  In this way, McCloud contends, his 
subjects acted as “heresiographers”; their magazines identified “false or inauthentic religion and thus 
symbolically establish[ed] boundaries between a mainstream religious center and a suspect 
periphery.”124  While McCloud primarily concerns himself with the ways in which the construction 
of the religious fringe authorized and reified class, racial, and cultural inequalities as “natural and 
inevitable,” I would argue such discursive constructions also functioned to establish and police 
expressions of “good religion.”125   
Making the American Religious Fringe argues that print media participates in constructing the 
center and peripheries of mainstream American religion.  Drawing again on Bourdieu, McCloud 
describes this participation as a “symbolic production” of the religious fringe, in which “magazines 
categorize groups as mainstream or marginal, orthodox or heterodox, religious or non-religious in 
ways that accord with the social locations of their producers.”126  McCloud is particularly concerned 
with the capacity of print media to naturalize, maintain, and/or disrupt social hierarchies.127  But 
while Bourdieu’s theory applied solely to the naturalization of class differences, McCloud’s 
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consideration of heresiography engages broader social inequalities, including those of race, 
education, and social location, as well as discrepancies in theology and geographical region.128  The 
power of this symbolic production can be observed in the responses by alternative magazines to 
charges of being “fringe”:  
Many alternative representations [of the religious fringe] failed to challenge the broader 
categories and characterizations that the largest magazines had established.  Often, rather 
than question the categories themselves, journalists writing “from the fringe” strove only to 
improve or reverse their religious, racial, or economic group’s status within the existent 
classifications.129 
 
That is, when marginal religious movements provided their own alternative narratives, they did not 
challenge the categorizations presented by popular media.  Rather, these “fringe” groups only sought 
to improve their own status within the established categories.130  Print media had so firmly 
established the boundaries of mainstream normalcy that “fringe” journalists essentially bolstered the 
categories of their own vilification, even while trying to improve the social standing of their specific 
groups – here again suggesting that religious exclusion is not always conscious or intentional. 
Heresiography, then, serves as an important component of religious intolerance in print 
media constructions of the American mainstream.  McCloud rightly notes that journalistic 
constructions of the mainstream and its fringe are never static: rather, “the American religious fringe 
is a constructed and contested category that is constantly in flux, reflecting certain interests, 
concerns, and power positions.”131  At the same time, however, that category consistently reflects the 
interests, concerns, and power positions (or habitus) of those constructing particular modes of 
religiosity as marginal.  Making the American Religious Fringe demonstrates the extent to which print 
media depictions of religious difference can reflect the experiences and assumptions (doxa) of their 
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authors; inasmuch as these doxa are normalized “unconscious actions and presuppositions,” 
McCloud’s theory of heresiography further problematizes the notion that religious intolerance must 
always and everywhere be intentional.  Making the American Religious Fringe, then, demonstrates the 
significant role American print media plays in the symbolic production of religious intolerance. 
Tracy Fessenden’s 2007 Culture and Redemption: Religion, the Secular, and American Literature 
argues that “public Protestantism”—that is, certain modes of Protestant religion, largely read as 
private beliefs—has emerged as an “unmarked category” in American religious and literary history.132  
This is to say that, according to Fessenden, American print culture has helped normalize Protestant 
ethics as secular values.  Those beliefs and practices that do not conform to this normalized 
Protestantism are therefore more visible in the public sphere, and are often met with public 
suspicion.  Fessenden insists that the purported secularism of the American public sphere is directly 
informed by particular assumptions and aesthetics of mainline reformed Christianity, that the 
assumptions of public American secularism are often demonstrably (if tacitly) Protestant.  Fessenden 
further stresses the brutality of religious exclusion operant in the construction of national identity.133   
While Fessenden acknowledges that Protestantism is not a historical, cultural, or theological 
monolith, she insists that the “convenient fiction” of shared American Protestant values has been 
“powerful and enduring,” as well as “ingeniously difficult to counter.”134  In defining “Protestant,” 
Fessenden qualifies that “there has been no theologically, racially, economically, or politically 
homogenous culture named American Protestantism at any point in our history.”  This is to say that 
“Protestant” operates as a blanket term for a set of values informed by multiple denominations of 
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mainline Christianity, and that the persistence of an American Protestant majority has rendered these 
conservative Christian priorities unmarked.135 
Qualifying Orsi’s conclusions, Fessenden contends that good religion is marked by its 
inconspicuousness.136  “‘Good’ [American] religion is good in the measure that it tends toward 
invisibility, or at least unobtrusiveness,” Fessenden observes.137 She proposes that public 
understandings of American religion are the result of several elisions: specific modes of reformed 
Christianity into a monolithic Protestantism; Protestantism into Christianity; Christianity into 
religion.  Specific forms of Protestant belief and practice [have] come enduringly to be subsumed 
under the heading of “Christian”—to the exclusion of non-Protestant and differently Protestant 
ways of being Christian—and…in many cases…the “Christian” come[s] to stand in for the 
“religious” to the exclusion of non-Christian ways of being religious.138  
Thus Culture and Redemption proposes that “particular forms of Protestantism emerged as an 
‘unmarked category’ in American religious and literary history.”139  “Religion” in the context of the 
American public sphere has come to imply specific modes of Protestant Christianity, though public 
figures will often ignore or deny this elision.140 
Fessenden further maintains that the public sphere understands this unmarked category as 
specifically American.  Fessenden proposes “‘public Protestantism’ [is] the ‘one religion’ of the United 
States, a dominant if tacit ‘religious system’ that gives ‘cultural cohesion [to] American society.”141 
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She suggests the “developmental narrative” of American religious historiography links good religion 
(that is, public Protestantism) to American national identity – effectively condemning all other 
modes of religiosity as “foreign to democracy,” “allegedly irrational, regressive, or inscrutable.”142   
Since good religion must be unobtrusive, public Protestantism renders suspect any religious 
group whose beliefs or practices are out of sync with the American religious mainstream.  Fessenden 
explains: “the salutary transparency of good religion and the attribution of anti-democratic leanings 
to any other kind made it inevitable that…all visible forms of religion might easily be regarded as 
irrational, regressive, and threatening to the democratic project.”143  Religions beyond the boundaries 
of public Protestant ethics are not presumed not only “bad,” but un-American.  Marginalized 
religions are “induced or compelled to assimilate themselves to Protestant norms in order to be 
recognized as legitimately American.”144 Since traditions of public Protestantism align themselves 
with “democracy and personal freedom,” marginal religions are suspected of being antithetical to 
both.145 
The narrative of public Protestantism, with its shared values and national identity (i.e. 
democracy and personal freedom), constructs a progression in which modern nations are always and 
everywhere becoming more tolerant of religious difference and less invested in religious identity.  
Fessenden explains:  
The assumption that some religions or aspects of religion have simply played themselves out, 
or ought to, or eventually will, is crucial to the developmental schema of good and bad 
religion—the first associated with freedom and enlightenment, the second with coercion and 
constraint—implicit in the progress narrative of democracy.146 
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Good religion, then, becomes synonymous with democratic values and ever-increasing tolerance. 147  
The secularization narrative thus presumes that the public sphere is necessarily secular—where 
“secular” is defined as an “unremarkable absence of once-dominant ‘religion’”—and that religious 
commitments will eventually dissolve into those of national identity.148   
Fessenden insists that this kind of post-Protestant secularism is “blind to its own 
exclusions.”149  We cannot understand secularism as a bland absence of religion, nor may we assume 
that a secular public sphere is void of religiosity. 150  The secularization narrative rather encodes 
specifically Protestant assumptions about what religion is (individual, belief-based) and where it 
belongs (in private), while normalizing those assumptions as the shared values of an American 
national identity.  This narrative shifts occludes the Protestant ethics encoded in secularism: “the 
consolidation of a Protestant ideology… has grown more entrenched and controlling even as its 
manifestations have often become less visibly religious.”151  Such an occlusion is possible, Fessenden 
contends, because Protestantism—having directly participated in the formation of the American 
public sphere—penetrates that sphere more easily than other modes of religion.   “The secular 
sphere as constituted in American politics, culture, and jurisprudence,” she maintains, is “far from 
being a neutral matrix.”152 
The presumed—and, Fessenden insists, false—neutrality of secularism effectively masks the 
operations of religious intolerance in the American public sphere.  The “co-implication of secularism 
and reformed Christianity” has allowed that public sphere to construe Muslims, Catholics, Mormons, 
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Jews, and Native Americans (among other marginal religiosities) as threats to democracy or affronts 
to the “American way,” “all without apparent violence to” Americans’ “cherished notions of 
religious freedom.”153  Thus “Christian religious polemic [can] remain compatible with America’s 
vaunted history of religious liberty and toleration by being cast in strictly secular terms.”154  That is, 
the secularization narrative obscures the operations of religious intolerance in the public sphere while 
perpetuating the grand narrative of America’s unique commitment to tolerating religious difference. 
Rather than fostering religious diversity and multiplicity, the secularization narrative actually 
constrains the conditions of religious possibility in American life:  
When secularism in the United States is understood merely as the absence of religious faith, 
or neutrality in relation to religious faith, rather than as a variety of possible relationships to 
different religious traditions…then religion comes to be defined as “Christian” by default, 
and an implicit association between “American” and “Christian” is upheld even by those 
who have, one imagines, very little invested in its maintenance.155 
 
To illustrate, recall the “fringe” journalists of McCloud’s archive, who failed to contest the terms on 
which mainstream American print media evaluated their respective “alternative” religious 
movements – terms directly informed by the Protestant ethics and aesthetics of good religion.  As 
McCloud demonstrates, these fringe journalists only ever attempted to improve their position within 
an implied American religious hierarchy – thus reifying the categories of their own marginalization.  
This type of constraint on religious possibility has broader implications as well: Fessenden notes that 
secularism has become the prevalent critical practice in humanities scholarship, such that “religion 
therefore fails to warrant the kinds of attention we give to other social formations in American 
literary history, including gender, race, sexuality, and class.”156  At the same time, “an implicitly 
Christian culture puts pressure on all who make claims on American institutions to constitute 
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themselves as religious on a recognizably Protestant model.”157  Fessenden demonstrates that 
participation in the American public sphere often requires religious agents to translate themselves 
and their messages into recognizably Protestant terms – effectively constraining religious possibility, 
rather than tolerating religious difference. 
The normalization of Protestantism implicit in the public construction of American national 
identity is inherently violent, Fessenden insists.  She cites instances of physical violence—such as 
Indian removals by Puritans—as well as of the epistemic violence implicit in internal and external 
colonizations, exercises of imperialism, and, most pertinent to my project, constructions of sexual 
and gender norms.  Citing American Catholic historian Jenny Franchot, Fessenden underscores the 
relationship between “religious democratization” and “the practices of often brutal exclusion 
involved in the formation of American selfhood.”158  The “American value” of religious freedom 
made possible by privatized religion and a secular public sphere “hides the violence and coercion that have 
attended the formation of the American democratic space in the guise of the neutrality and universality of the secular,” 
Fessenden contends.159  Here again, the violence of religious intolerance is epistemic as well as 
explicit: the normalization of Protestant Christian ethics as American values subsumes, obscures, and 
constrains religious difference, while simultaneously congratulating itself on its unique and 
remarkable commitment to religious tolerance. 
                                                          
157 Ibid., 4.  Fessenden cites arguably mandatory confessions of faith in presidential elections as evidence on this 
point.  Related to public Protestantism’s influence in American politics, she suggests that “the question of how 
conservative Catholics and Protestants have now come jointly to wield the authority of ‘true’ religion in American 
public life, all the while pressing their claims in ways that make religion seem anything but private and discretionary, 
bears thoughtful consideration.”  Ibid., 220.  Indeed, many fundamentalist Protestants, Roman Catholics, and 
Latter-day Saints currently participate in the political rhetoric of public Protestantism, often authorizing their 
candidacies for office on platforms of presumably common American morality.  I noted in my introduction the 
extent to which religious regulations of or attitudes regarding sexuality are often elided into “morality” or “ethics” in 
the public sphere.   
 
158 Ibid., 221. 
 
159 Ibid., 217 (emphasis added). 
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Without explicitly addressing religious intolerance, Tracy Fessenden’s work offers significant 
insight into its operations in the American public sphere.  Her concept of “public Protestantism” 
suggests that “religion” has been elided into certain “good” modes of Protestantism (particularly 
those that prioritize voluntarism, individuality, privacy, progress, and religion-as-belief).  In addition, 
Fessenden proposes that the popular understanding of American identity has aligned with this public 
Protestantism, rendering it an unmarked category of presumably American values.  Thus visible 
religions become bad, suspicious, un-American.  The progressive teleology of American identity 
presumes secularization—defined merely as the absence of religion—as inevitable, requisite in the 
formation of the modern public sphere.  Fessenden contends that public Protestantism and the 
secular national identity that develops from it it are blind to their own exclusions, effectively 
constraining religious difference while touting their unique religious tolerance.  The false neutrality of 
secular national identity is inherently violent in its exclusions, Fessenden insists.   
Making the American Religious Fringe and Culture and Redemption both investigate the Protestant 
assumptions underlying print media’s construction of American identity—as well as the violent 
implications of such an exclusive construction.  McCloud’s heresiography and Fessenden’s public 
Protestantism both help illuminate the operations of religious intolerance in the American public 
sphere.  McCloud emphasizes the journalistic habitus that contributes to the marginalization of 
religious difference, but ultimately understands the trajectory of American national identity in terms 
of religious plurality. By contrast, Fessenden proposes a secularization narrative operant in modern 
national identity-formation, underscoring the Protestant assumptions that inform American 
secularism.  Both Fessenden and McCloud’s models challenge the notion that religious intolerance 
must be conscious or intentional, but Fessenden attends more directly to the epistemic violence of 
marginalization.  Both approaches recognize unconscious motivating forces for institutional modes 
of religious intolerance – though McCloud emphasizes the doxa of individual journalists, while 
Fessenden stresses assumptions implicit in the assumptions of secular modernity.  Most relevant for 
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my purposes here, only Fessenden discusses the relationship between normative Protestant ethics 
and gender and sexual regulations. 
Winnifred Sullivan, Ann Pellegrini, and Janet Jakobsen all emphasize the normalization of 
Protestant ethics in American jurisprudence.  Sullivan insists that the American legal system’s 
inherently Protestant understandings of the category of religion, or what Sullivan calls “small-p 
Protestantism,” essentially precludes religious freedom.  Like Fessenden, Pellegrini and Jakobsen 
contend that American identity assumes and compels performance of Protestant ethics; they pay 
particular attention to the ways in which presumably secular legal regulations of sexual behavior rely 
on implicitly Protestant notions of appropriate sexuality.   
Winnifred Sullivan’s 2005 The Impossibility of Religious Freedom demonstrates the extent to 
which American jurisprudence relies on an essentialized—and essentially mainline Protestant—
definition of religion.  A nationalistic understanding of religious practice, which Sullivan refers to as 
“small-p protestantism,” informs this definition. 160 As with Fessenden’s “public Protestantism,” 
Sullivan’s concept of protestantism elides American national identity and liberal Protestant 
commitments to individuality, tolerance, voluntarism, and progress.  Sullivan argues that religious 
freedom is ultimately impossible to enforce legally, because courts require a clearly delimited and 
exclusive definition of “true” religion – an orthodoxy incompatible with the complexities of lived 
American religion.   
Like Fessenden, Sullivan notes that American identity is characterized in large part by a 
professed commitment to religious freedom.  Yet, Sullivan argues, religious freedom is easier to 
advocate than to enforce.  The United States prides itself on this commitment as “one of the shining 
achievements of the United States.”161  Indeed, Sullivan expounds, “nowhere [in the world], as 
                                                          
160 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 7. 
 
161 Ibid., 1. 
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Americans understand it, is religion so strong and so free.”162  But the legal protection of religious 
freedom requires a legal definition of what constitutes religion – and, as Sullivan notes, “drawing a 
line around what counts as religion and what does not is not as easy as periodically recommitting 
ourselves politically to religious freedom. Defining religion is very difficult.”163  The complexities of 
lived religion, then, complicate the American legal system’s professed commitment to defending 
religious freedom. 
Sullivan contends that American jurisprudence requires an essentialized definition of religion 
so as to determine if a practice is “legally religious.”164  That is, “in order to enforce laws 
guaranteeing religious freedom you must first have religion.”165  In the absence of an articulated 
American religious orthodoxy, the courts rely, in large part, on individual judges’ assessments of 
particular instances of religious practice – the judge of the case Sullivan analyzes in Impossibility 
applied the “I know it when I see it” standard.166  As she explains:  
Religion, particularly American religion, fits uneasily into a legal scheme that demands such 
categories and such expert certainty. Rationalizing religion in the ways proposed by courts 
and legislatures in this country fails to capture the nature of people’s religious lives at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, maybe of any century. Such rationalization also asks 
the government to be the arbiter of religious orthodoxy.167 
 
Despite a presumed separation of church and state, American judges effectively codify American 
religious orthodoxy in their attempts to protect religious freedoms.   
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165 Ibid., 1. 
 
166 Ibid., 3, 4.  See also Givens’ notion of “unarticulated orthodoxy.” Givens, The Viper on the Hearth, 78. 
 
167 Sullivan, The Impossibility of Religious Freedom, 10. 
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Jurisprudential definitions of “true” American religion closely resemble mainline Protestant 
theology and phenomenology, Sullivan suggests.168  According to the author, “secular law only 
appears secular.” “In fact, it is replete with ideas and structures that find their origin in and are parallel 
to, ideas and structures in religious traditions.”169  In particular, the American legal system draws 
heavily on “protestant reflection and culture.”170  Sullivan’s “small p” protestantism refers to “a set 
of political ideas and cultural practices that emerged in early modern Europe in and after the 
Reformation,” which understands “true” religion as “private, voluntary, individual, textual, and 
believed.”171  As with Fessenden’s public Protestantism, Sullivan’s protestantism is an unmarked but 
crucial component of American national identity.  Small-p protestantism “is religiously invisible, 
having been assimilated into ‘secular’ culture, though it may have enforcement power through 
legislation.”172  It is “a kind of nationalism.”173  By defining religion in protestant terms, the 
American legal system has normalized a mainline Protestant understanding of what does and does 
not count as “true” religion and rendered protestantism itself an unmarked category. 
The courts’ normalization of protestant definitions of American religion bifurcates lived 
religions, Sullivan contends.  If protestantism is true, believed, voluntary, and individual, non-
protestant religions—“public, coercive, communal, oral, and enacted” religions—are by extension 
rendered false, or at least suspect.174  Legal protections of religious freedom are similarly bifurcated, 
Sullivan suggests.  “Crudely speaking, it is the first kind—the modern protestant kind—that is ‘free.’ 
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172 Ibid., 148, 154. 
 
173 Ibid., 148. 
 
174 Ibid., 8. 
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The other kind is closely regulated by law” and “has been carefully and systematically excluded, both 
rhetorically and legally, from modern public space.”175 Sullivan refers to this as the Janus-faced 
quality of American religion in relation to law: protestant religion is unmarked, invisible, assumed, 
while non-protestant religiosities are feared and kept separate.176  Sullivan locates her book’s 
eponymous impossibility in this unstable dichotomy.  “Religion,” she insists, “is not always, in fact, 
absolutely free, legally speaking.  The right kind of religion, the approved religion, is always that 
which is protected, while the wrong kind, whether popular or unpopular, is always restricted or even 
prohibited.177  While American courts rely on protestant understandings of true religion to enforce 
the notion of religious freedom, non-protestant religions are constrained and excluded. 
The American legal system’s “schizophrenia” in relationship to religion shapes its 
protections of religious freedom.178   Thus Sullivan insists any attempt to protect religious freedom 
in the courts ultimately restricts the free exercise thereof – rendering judicial decisions at best 
contradictory and “theoretically incoherent,” and at worst unconstitutional.179  I would argue that the 
protestant bias of American jurisprudence moreover authorizes and perpetuates religious intolerance 
through the reliance on protestant definitions of religion.   
The Impossibility of Religious Freedom challenges both the secularism of the American legal 
system and the prospect of legally defending religious freedom.  Sullivan proposes a religio-national 
identity directly informed by mainline Protestant sensibilities, which in turn informs legal 
understandings of which religions do or do not count as “true” (and thus deserving of legal 
protection).  Sullivan identifies this religio-national identity as “small-p protestantism,” suggesting 
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that the courts’ need for an essentialized definition of religion cannot accommodate the complexities 
of lived American religion.  Religious modes that emphasize practice, community, and submission 
are suspect and not protected by American courts in the same way as mainstream religions.  Sullivan 
concludes that courts should attempt to enforce equality, as legal assurances of religious freedom are 
impossible.180  While American courts decide religious cases based on protestant notions of 
appropriate practice, those decisions have the effect of promoting religious intolerance.   
Janet R. Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini’s 2004 Love the Sin: Sexual Regulation and the Limits of 
Religious Tolerance illustrates this assertion. Jakobsen and Pellegrini address the normalization—and 
legislation—of Protestant sexual morality as “good old American values.”181 Through an analysis of 
Supreme Court decisions, Pellegrini and Jakobsen argue that American assumptions about religion, 
values, and public interest are “crucially connected” to sexuality and its regulation.182 Indeed, they 
suggest that “the secular state's regulation of the sexual life of its citizens is actually religion by other 
means.”183 The authors problematize the rhetoric of both religious and sexual tolerance, suggesting 
that tolerance is an inherently hierarchical model.  They conclude that tolerance is a limited and 
ultimately flawed model, arguing instead for legal protections of religious and sexual freedom. 184   
Jakobsen and Pellegrini insist that Protestant Christianity—and often conservative Protestant 
Christianity—serves as the measure of both religion and morality in America.  “To be traditionally 
American is to be Christian in a certain way”; “[Protestant] Christianity is the de facto established 
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181 Jakobsen and Pellegrini, Love the Sin, 3. 
 
182 Ibid., 4. 
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184 See also Janet R Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini, “Practicing Sex, Practicing Democracy,” The Immanent Frame: 
Secularism, Religion, and the Public Sphere, January 9, 2008, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2008/01/09/practicing-sex-
practicing-democracy/.This article further engages the American political “presumption that ‘values’ equals 
‘sexuality,’ and conservative sexuality at that.” As with their previous work, Jakobsen and Pellegrini insist that 
religious and sexual freedom are mutually contingent. “Ironically,” the authors insist, “there might be more religious 
freedom if there were more sexual freedom.” 
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state religion.”185  The elision of Protestantism and American values constitutes a religio-national 
identity, one the authors refer to as “stealth Protestantism.”186  As they explain, the professedly 
secular Supreme Court of the United States has normalized stealth Protestantism specifically with 
regard to sexual regulations: Protestant sexual ethics directly inform the Supreme Court’s decisions 
on queer rights to privacy and other forms of enfranchisement.  “Religion—specifically 
Christianity—shapes legislation, public policy, and even jurisprudence around sex… [T]he 
assumptions that underlie sexual regulation are so deeply embedded that people no longer recognize 
them as being derived from religious thought.”187  Jakobsen and Pellegrini argue that secularism 
indicates, not the retreat, but the reinvention of religion in the public sphere, made possible by a 
“conflation of religion and morality.”188   
As Fesseden and Sullivan note, the presumed secularism of the American public sphere 
renders Protestantism invisible.  Jakobsen and Pellegrini argue in turn that “in the particular case of 
the United States, the dominant framework for morality is not simply ‘religious’ or even ‘Christian,’ 
but is specifically Protestant… the unstated religious assumptions of U.S. secularism are specifically 
Protestant.”189  The authors attribute the elision of Protestant sexual ethics into secular morality to a 
“process of historical amnesia… [American values’] specific religious lineage is often forgotten.”190   
The occlusion of American values’ Protestant origin has made Protestant Christianity the de facto 
state religion.  
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The normalization of Protestantism as (secular) American values marginalizes religious and 
sexual difference.  Those excluded by “stealth Protestantism”—non-Christians and “those who are 
Christian in another way”—“will always and only be ‘minorities’ to be ‘tolerated’ within the ‘general’ 
American public,” the authors maintain.191  The constraint of religious difference establishes a 
hierarchical order of American religions, which Jakobsen and Pellegrini insist is perpetuated by the 
model of religious tolerance.   
Religious tolerance is not synonymous with religious freedom, the authors explain:  
 
Being the object of tolerance does not represent full inclusion in American life, but rather a 
grudging form of acceptance in which the boundary between “us” and “them” remains clear, 
sometimes dangerously so. This boundary is also elevated to a mark of moral virtue. The 
tolerant are generous and open-minded even as they are exclusionary.192 
 
Tolerance assumes a hierarchical insider/outsider dichotomy, in which those in power tolerate those 
who do religion and/or sex differently.193   Jakobsen and Pellegrini note that religious tolerance has 
grown more inclusive, but at the same time tolerance ultimately creates an exclusionary public.194  
Moreover, the rhetoric of “love the sinner, hate the sin” allows mainstream Americans to 
understanding themselves as ethical and compassionate—that is, tolerant—while discriminating 
against other American citizens.195  Because the notion of tolerance targets extremism rather than 
injustice, it can serve to justify hatred, exclusion, and domination.196  Simply put, “tolerance is not 
enough.”197 
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Jakobsen and Pellegrini advocate instead a model of religious and sexual freedom.  
“Freedom allows for the production of moral alternatives,” they propose, creating a more expansive 
public space for secularism and for moral claims and public policy to be based on notions of 
freedom, rather than mere tolerance.198  
It is the democracy of religious freedom in which one group's idea of sin does not limit the 
freedom of those who believe and practice differently, in which laws are based on 
democratic processes, not on particular religious beliefs. The majority of Americans do not 
hate anyone, but neither do they grant the same democratic freedoms to everyone.199  
 
Freedom, they suggest, is a better means of creating justice.200  Tolerance, ironically, has proved to 
perpetuate religious and sexual intolerance.  Jakobsen and Pellegrini propose that religion should 
ground sexual freedom, rather than justify sexual regulation.201  American laws should, according to 
the authors, begin by emphasizing individual rights rather than broad restrictions based on 
normalized Christian ethics.   
Jakobsen and Pellegrini identify Protestant Christianity as the de facto established religion of 
the United States; Protestant sexual ethics directly shape the legal regulation of sexual behaviors.  
The presumed secularism of the American public sphere and American jurisprudence renders this 
“stealth Protestantism” invisible.  The normalization of Protestantism as (secular) American values 
marginalizes religious and sexual difference, establishing a hierarchical order of American religions 
perpetuated by the model of religious tolerance.  Because it targets extremism rather than injustice, 
tolerance can justify hatred, exclusion, and domination.  Tolerance is an insufficient model; Jakobsen 
and Pellegrini rather advocate a model of religious and sexual freedom.   
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have argued for an understanding of religious intolerance that encompasses not 
only explicit hate speech and violence, but also normalized assumptions of good American religion.  
For the remainder of this dissertation, I will demonstrate the ways in which public sphere rhetoric 
relies both on assumptions that good religion resembles mainline Protestantism, and that religions 
outside the mainstream are necessarily suspect.202   
In particular, I am concerned with the ways intolerant rhetoric uses normative American 
sexuality to police and discourage religious difference.   I examine three narrativizations of contact 
with religious minorities—Under the Banner of Heaven, Not Without My Daughter, and Michelle 
Remembers—as examples of such rhetoric.  These stories articulate anxieties about other-ness, often 
expressed as suspicions about sexual impropriety.  Problematically, the actors in each case study 
emphasize their own religious tolerance while discriminating against religious minorities; the 
justification for this discrimination is consistently sexual.   
My case studies identify minority religious communities as especially given to gendered and 
sexual exploitation, and thereby sanction interference into religious minority communities in efforts 
to liberate vulnerable American women and children.  I present these case studies as participants in 
an ongoing public negotiation of the kinds of beliefs and practices mainstream Americans will and 
will not tolerate – and the extent to which normative American sexuality informs and bounds this 
                                                          
202 Scholarly theorizations on the Christian underpinnings of American secularism have largely emphasized 
influence of Protestant beliefs and practices on the constitution of the American body politic.  However, the pan-
Christian alliance of the late 1970s absolutely adopted Roman Catholic rhetoric on issues like abortion, premarital 
sex, and homosexuality.  (See, for example, Ibid., 5 regarding public appropriation of Catholic sexual morality to the 
exclusion of most other Catholic doctrines on social justice.  Cf. Tracy Fessenden’s argument that the post-Vatican 
II Roman Catholic Church has strengthened its alliances with conservative forces in the United States by continuing 
its hardline stance on contraception and abortion.  See Tracy Fessenden, “Sex and the Subject of Religion,” The 
Immanent Frame: Secularism, Religion, and the Public Sphere, January 10, 2008, http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2008/01/10/sex-
and-the-subject-of-religion/.)  For this reason, I refer to these religious influences as Christian, acknowledging both 
the extensive influence of Protestant dogma and the irreducibility of these ethics to any discreet denomination. 
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tolerance.  Rhetorical constructions of religious outsiders as sexually predatory facilitate Americans’ 
self-perception as simultaneously religiously tolerant and morally upright. 
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An Unusual Place: Do Mormon Fundamentalists Really Need Saving? 
 
that's Mormon 
territory and clearly 
there's work to be 
done. 
 
Charles Bukowski, "an unusual place" 
 
 
 
In 1999, mountaineer and author Jon Krakauer stopped for gas near Short Creek, Arizona.  Across 
the highway, he saw a “hazy hodgepodge of half-built houses and trailers…like something out of a 
Steinbeck novel.”1  Women working in vegetable gardens wore “pioneer-style dresses that reminded 
him of Muslim burqas” and inexpensive unisex sneakers.2 When he drove in for a closer look at the 
settlement, Krakauer received “a Short Creek welcome”: “a large 4x4 pickup with darkly tinted 
windows loomed in his rear-view mirror and began aggressively tailing him.”3  Krakauer “couldn’t 
shake the vigilantes following him” and claimed the encounter “scared the shit out of [him].”4  
Krakauer eventually located a National Park ranger, who allegedly dismissed Krakauer’s concerns.5  
“You were in Short Creek, the largest polygamist community in the country.  That’s the way it’s been 
out there forever.”6 
                                                          
1 Sam Brower, Prophet’s Prey: My Seven-Year Investigation Into Warren Jeffs and the Fundamentalist Church of Latter-Day Saints 
(New York: Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2011).   
 
2 Ibid., 79.   
 
3 Ibid. 
 
4 Brower, Prophet’s Prey. 
 
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Ibid., presumably paraphrased. 
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In 2004, Krakauer published Under the Banner of Heaven: A Story of Violent Faith, which 
parallels the history of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and an account of two brutal 
murders committed by excommunicated Mormon fundamentalist zealots.7  Krakauer’s stated 
intention in writing Under the Banner of Heaven was “to grasp the nature of religious belief,” “to cast 
some light on…the roots of [religious] brutality [and]…the nature of faith.”8  But according to 
private investigator Sam Brower’s account in Prophet’s Prey: My Seven-Year Investigation Into Warren Jeffs 
and the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Banner constitutes Krakauer’s attempt to 
“portray Short Creek as it really was, a place without joy that is run by a Taliban-style theocracy.”9  
Brower further notes that Banner “might never have been written if the xenophobic people of Short 
Creek had not run [Krakauer] out of town.”10 
Jon Krakauer is the author of several works of popular non-fiction.  He is best known for 
his accounts of out-of-doors derring-do, including Into Thin Air and Into the Wild.11  While he claims 
no investment in policing boundaries of American religion or nationalism—indeed, he professes an 
ardent agnosticism in his concluding “Author’s Remarks”—Krakauer seems confident in his 
                                                          
7 Throughout this dissertation, I have pluralized “Mormonisms” to indicate the complexity and variety among 
different branches of the religion founded by Joseph Smith Jr. in the early 1830s.  The best known of these 
branches is the the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS), which under the leadership of church 
president Wilford Woodruff publicly disavowed polygyny in 1890.  Mormon fundamentalisms refers to those sects 
that retain tenets and practices abandoned by LDS, including but by no means limited to the practice of plural or 
plural marriage (i.e. theologically sanctioned polygyny).  I provide a more detailed explanation of the differences 
among some of the largest Mormon fundamentalist groups later in this chapter.   
 
8 Jon Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven: A Story of Violent Faith (Anchor, 2004), 334, xxiii. 
 
9 Brower, Prophet’s Prey, 79. 
 
10 Ibid. 
 
11 Into Thin Air: A Personal Account of the Mt. Everest Disaster (1997) is recounts Krakauer’s experiences during the 1996 
Mount Everest Disaster, during which eight climbers died and several others were stranded during a severe storm.  
Into the Wild (1996) chronicles the 119-day sojourn of Christopher McCandless into the Alaskan frontier before his 
death from unknown causes.  Director Sean Penn later adapted Into the Wild into a feature film released in 2007.  
Krakauer also released Where Men Win Glory: The Odyssey of Pat Tillman (2009), about an NFL player turned U.S. 
soldier who died in Afghanistan. 
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assessment of both the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and its fundamentalist offshoots 
as irrational, violent, and sexually suspect.12 
The purpose of this chapter is not to chronicle Krakauer’s personal animosity toward Latter-
day Saints, Mormon fundamentalists, or the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints – though the author himself has dedicated significant time and personal resources toward the 
capture and imprisonment of former FLDS leader Warren Steed Jeffs (whom Krakauer uses 
interchangeably with FLDS and all Mormon fundamentalisms).  Rather, I examine Krakauer’s 
account of his contact with the Fundamentalist Latter-day Saints, beginning with the publication of 
Banner, moving through Krakauer’s self-confessed obsession with Warren Jeffs and testimony before 
the Texas House of Representatives’ Juvenile Justice and Family Issues Committee, and concluding 
with the largest custodial seizure of American children in American history following a state-funded 
raid on an FLDS community in Eldorado, Texas in April 2008.13  My goal is to demonstrate the 
significant influence Krakauer and his work have exercised in shaping public rhetoric and responses 
to FLDS beliefs and practices, particularly in regard to the practice of plural marriage (or 
theologically mandated polygyny).14  More importantly, I hope to examine the ways Krakauer’s prose 
                                                          
12 Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven, 341. 
 
13 HB 3006 (1:01:16). 
 
14 Polygyny is a form of marriage which unites one man and several women.  The Doctrine and Covenants of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints Containing Revelations Given to Joseph Smith, the Prophet, with Some Additions by his Successors 
in the Presidency of the Church (first published 1835, hereafter Doctrine and Covenants), as part of Mormonisms’ open 
scriptural canon, includes a number of revelations made to Mormon prophets throughout Church history.  Section 
132 of Doctrine and Covenants, is a “revelation given through Joseph Smith the Prophet, at Nauvoo, Illinois, recorded 
July 12, 1843, relating to the new and everlasting covenant, including the eternity of the marriage covenant and the 
principle of plural marriage” (Joseph Smith Jr., “The Doctrine and Covenants - Section 132,” The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, n.d., https://www.lds.org/scriptures/dc-testament/dc/132?lang=eng).  Section 132 lays 
out the principle of plural or plural marriage: that is, theological validation for the practice of polygyny.  While LDS 
repudiated polygyny in 1890, many Mormon fundamentalists continue to observe “the Principle” by entering into 
plural marriages.   
 
Though popular rhetoric regarding Mormon fundamentalism and sexual difference frequently refer to this practice 
as polygamy (i.e. marriage involving multiple partners), in the interest of specificity I refer to plural marriage 
throughout this chapter as polygyny unless direct quotes dictate otherwise. 
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and testimony promote responses to Mormon fundamentalism rooted in fear and suspicion of 
religious and sexual difference.   
Jon Krakauer’s Under the Banner of Heaven fostered a highly visible and contentious debate 
about Mormon fundamentalism, polgyny, and the responsibility of the American public to intervene 
when religious minorities overstep the boundaries of American tolerance.  Krakauer, Utah Attorney 
General Mark Shurtleff, the Texas House of Representatives’ Committee for Juvenile Justice and 
Family Issues, and other public figures made stirring appeals to the American public about its 
obligation to save Mormon fundamentalist women and children.  In this chapter, I argue that such 
discourse of liberation—exhortations to save women and children deemed defenseless and 
exploited—incited actions that ultimately did little to prevent abuse within this minority religious 
community and failed to address or even acknowledge far more common domestic abuses of 
American women and children.  At the same time, these discourses, exemplified by Banner and 
sustained throughout the raid on Yearning for Zion, actively discouraged religious and sexual 
difference within the American body politic by vilifying Mormon fundamentalism and the practice of 
polygyny as inherently abusive and irrational.     
This is to say that the public narratives concerning twenty-first century American Mormon 
fundamentalism— including Banner, the Texas House of Representatives’ Juvenile Justice and Family 
Issues Committee proceedings, and the legal documentation surrounding the raid on Yearning for 
Zion—instantiates American sexual exceptionalism by insisting that child sexual abuse, multiple-
partner sexual relationships, and coercive sexual practices are necessarily other than conventional 
American sexuality.  The hypersexualization of the FLDS community, evident in the myopic focus 
on polygyny as the community’s defining characteristic, necessarily marked Mormon fundamentalists 
as religious outsiders and legitimate targets for intolerance based on their religious and sexual 
nonconformity to America’s “shared values.”   
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“Common Sense is No Match for the Voice of God” 
 
Under the Banner of Heaven offers interweaves two narratives:  an informal history of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) and an account of murders committed by Dan and Ron 
Lafferty, two former members of a Mormon fundamentalist sect.  Krakauer’s account of Mormon 
history begins with the Church’s founding by Joseph Smith in the 1830s, his revelation of the 
doctrine of plural marriage in 1843, and Smith’s murder by mob in 1844. 15  Krakauer recounts 
Brigham Young’s succession as prophet and LDS church president in 1847 and the growing 
prevalence of plural marriage among Mormon communities.16  The author then narrows to center on 
Mormon fundamentalism, and specifically the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints (FLDS) and its offshoots.17  Krakauer’s account of 20th century Mormon fundamentalist 
history primarily focuses on the FLDS communities in Short Creek, Arizona/Colorado City, 
Colorado and Bountiful, British Columbia. 18 
The chapters of Banner not devoted to Mormon history recount in grisly detail the events 
surrounding the murders of Brenda and Erica Lafferty by Brenda’s brothers-in-law, Dan and Ron 
Lafferty.19  Krakauer identifies Dan and Ron as excommunicated members of both LDS and a very 
                                                          
15 Krakauer attributes Smith’s murder in part to allegations of Smith’s lechery – see for example Krakauer’s 
references to Smith’s “frenzied coupling” and “sexual recklessness” with a number of women.  Krakauer, Under the 
Banner of Heaven, 124. 
 
16 Historians contest the extent to which polygyny was practiced or endorsed among 19th century Mormons.  See 
Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel 
Hill: Univ of North Carolina Press, 2002) and Terryl Givens, The Viper on the Hearth: Mormons, Myths, and the 
Construction of Heresy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 5.  
 
17 On the doctrinal and practical distinctions among Mormon fundamentalisms, see notes 73-77 in this chapter.  See 
also Bennion, “The Many Faces of Polygamy: An Analysis of the Variability in Modern Mormon Fundamentalism 
in the Intermountain West,” 180: in many writings and in the minds of many observers, all Mormon fundamentalists are 
lumped in one negative pot.  The rich variability of lifestyles, beliefs, and behaviors is completely ignored by the public, 
government officials, and the press” (emphasis added). 
 
18 One of the oldest and largest FLDS communities in the United States is located on the border between Colorado 
and Arizona.  This interstitial location has often complicated both states’ law enforcement efforts to operate within 
the community.   
 
19 Dan and Ron Lafferty murdered their youngest brother Allen’s wife, Brenda Wright Lafferty (24), and Allen and 
Brenda’s infant daughter, Erica, on 24 July 1984.   
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small radical FLDS splinter group, the School of Prophets.20  Relying on interviews and news 
accounts, Krakauer suggests that Brenda was murdered for challenging an patriarchal religious 
system.21  Banner’s parallel structure, with its emphases on sexual predation and violence, present 
Brenda Lafferty’s gruesome murder as the consequence of Mormon history and theology.22 
For the purposes of this project, I am most concerned with Krakauer’s consistent conflation 
of Mormon fundamentalist identity with the practice of polygyny, which the author portrays 
exclusively as predatory and abusive.23  Thus in my analysis of Banner, I focus explicitly on the ways 
in which Krakauer provides evidence for the allegedly dangerous and irrational nature of sexual 
difference – here, the practice of religiously sanctioned polygyny.  Krakauer repeatedly emphasizes 
that the members of FLDS, and especially the community’ women and children, are unable to think 
for themselves and are thus in need of rescue.24 For Krakauer, then, Mormon fundamentalist 
                                                          
20 The School of Prophets is an LDS splinter sect founded by Robert C. Crossfield in 1982.  Richard S. Van 
Wagoner, Mormon Polygamy: a History (Signature Books, 1989). 
 
21 As I note above, Krakauer consistently blurs distinctions between FLDS, LDS, and other forms of Mormonisms, 
particularly with regard to the tradition(s)’ alleged sexism and sexual transgressions.  For example: “Mormonism is a 
patriarchal religion, rooted firmly in the traditions of the Old Testament.  Dissent isn’t tolerated.  Questioning the 
edicts of religious authorities is viewed as a subversive act that undermines faith… [T]his holds true in both the 
mainstream LDS Church and in the Fundamentalist Church, although the fundamentalists take these rigid 
notions—of obedience, of control, of distinct and unbending roles for men and women—to a much greater 
extreme.  The primary responsibility of women in FLDS communities (even more than in the mainline Mormon 
culture) is to serve their husbands, conceive as many babies as possible, and raise those children to become obedient 
members of the religion,” (33, emphasis added).  As throughout the dissertation, my concern here is not with 
Krakauer’s assessment of Mormonisms as a patriarchal religious tradition, but rather with his implication that this 
kind of patriarchalism is in any way unique in contemporary American culture. 
 
22 Krakauer argues that religious belief “compel[s] an impassioned few, predictably, to carry that irrational belief to 
its logical end” – including Ron and Dan Lafferty, “apparently sane, avowedly pious m[e]n,” Under the Banner of 
Heaven, xxi. 
 
23 For example, Krakauer quotes Utah county attorney David Leavitt: “the practice of polygamy is abusive to 
children, is abusive to women, is abusive to society” Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven, 24.     
 
24 See in particular Krakauer’s emphasis on FLDS women being “brainwashed” (Ibid., 24, 52).  Brainwashing refers 
to a process by which an individual’s control over hir own thinking, behavior, or emotions.  While brainwashing was 
a popular explanation for an unprecedented number of young people joining new religious movements in the 1960s 
and 1970s, religious studies scholars and psychologists have largely discredited this theory as an explanation for 
membership in marginal religious communities.  See Barker, The Making of a Moonie and David Chidester, Salvation 
and Suicide: Jim Jones, the Peoples Temple, and Jonestown (Indiana University Press, 2003). 
 
Through judicious use of subjects’ quotes, Krakauer consistently stresses that plural marriages are not “a matter of 
religious freedom or a harmless sexual relationship [sic] between consenting adults” because women in plural 
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women’s physical, spiritual, sexual, and psychological captivity is demonstrated by the continued 
practice of polygyny – a practice he describes as essentially irrational.    
Krakauer’s emphasis on the irrationality of Mormon fundamentalist belief is pronounced 
throughout his work.  In fact, Krakauer concludes Banner with an anecdote to this effect.  The 
reflections of DeLoy Bateman, an FLDS apostate and former polygynist turned atheist, comprise the 
final pages of the book: 
It’s amazing how gullible people are…but you have to remember what a huge comfort the 
religion is.  It provides all the answers.  It makes life simple.  Nothing makes you feel better 
than doing what the prophet commands you to do… it’s not having to make those critical 
decisions that many of us have to make, and be responsible for your decisions… 
 
I think people within the religion—people who live here in Colorado City—are probably 
happier on the whole, than people on the outside…But some things in life are more 
important than being happy.  Like being free to think for yourself.25 
 
Krakauer, through Bateman, thus closes his reflection on “the nature of faith” by suggesting that 
people of faith are cheerful idiots26: note the observation about the gullibility and simplicity that 
accompanies their supposed happiness.  This condescension echoes Krakauer’s own account of time 
spent in the “happy company of Latter-day Saints.”27  (“Happy” serves as a decidedly charged word, 
given this observation’s proximity to Bateman’s concluding remarks.)   
The implication that pious submission—exemplified for Krakauer in the practice of plural 
marriage—is necessarily irrational is at the heart of Krakauer’s thesis:   
Although the far territory of the extreme can exert an intoxicating pull on susceptible 
individuals of all bents, extremism seems to be especially prevalent among those inclined by 
temperament or upbringing toward religious pursuits.  Faith is the very antithesis of reason, 
                                                          
marriages “from the cradle, knew no other life but polygamy” (23).  Krakauer quotes Attorney David Leavitt 
extensively on this point: women in polygynous relationships “are victims of pedophiles, and they are the victims of 
the state of Utah, which turned its back on polygamy for sixty years” (23). 
 
25 Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven, 334. 
 
26 There is a similar condescension evident in Krakauer’s “author’s remarks” at Ibid., 336: “I envied what seemed to 
be the unfluctuating certainty of the faith professed so enthusiastically by my closest Mormon pals, but I was often 
baffled by it.”  
 
27 Ibid., 335. 
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injudiciousness a crucial component of spiritual devotion.  And when religious fanaticism supplants 
ratiocination, all bets are suddenly off.  Anything can happen.  Common sense is no match for the 
voice of God.28 
 
This is Krakauer’s argument writ large: no person could willingly or rationally engage in an 
“extreme” form of religion like Mormon fundamentalism or an “extreme” practice like polygyny.   
Krakauer also conflates Mormon fundamentalism with the practice of polygyny.  The author 
refers to several Mormon fundamentalist groups—among them the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints [FLDS, also affiliated with the United Effort Plan (UEP)],29 the Apostolic 
United Brethren (AUB, also known as the Allreds),30 the School of Prophets (to which the Laffertys 
formerly belonged), the Latter-day Church of Christ (also known as the Kingston Clan),31 and 
                                                          
28 Ibid., xxiii (emphasis added). 
 
29 FLDS has roughly 10,000 members, largely concentrated in Hildale, Utah and Colorado City, AZ (Bennion, 
Polygamy in Primetime, 27).  FLDS leadership, including church president Warren Jeffs, moved to the Yearning for 
Zion ranch in 2003.  Roughly a thousand FLDS members reside in Bountiful, British Columbia, while others live in 
Colorado and South Dakota.  The United Effort Plan is “a collective controlled by FLDS Church leaders that owns 
most of the property and businesses of members” (Ibid., 28).  FLDS is more “rigidly patriarchal” than other 
Mormon fundamentalist groups; FLDS theology requires a man to have multiple wives to reach the highest level of 
paradise (thus “plural marriage”).  Each FLDS man has an average of 3.5 wives, 8 children per wife (Ibid., 30).  
FLDS theology condemns interracial marriage, and the communities experience a high incidence of rare genetic 
disorders due to inbreeding (Ibid., 34).  William Jeffs Jessop briefly replaced Warren Steed Jeffs as church president 
after Jeffs’ arrest in 2006, but Jeffs regained leadership in February 2011. 
 
30 The Apostolic United Brethren split off from FLDS in 1950s and currently has about eight thousand members 
(Bennion, Polygamy in Primetime, 35).  Janet Bennion estimates that between 1990 and 1996, six LDS families per 
month converted to the AUB; this “short-term conversion frenzy” slowed around 2000 (Ibid., 34).  The church’s 
headquarters are in Bluffdale, UT, and AUB communities are scattered throughout Utah, as well as in Pinedale, 
Montana, Lovell, Wyoming, Mesa, Arizona, Humansville, MO, and Ozumba, Mexico.  There are also smaller AUB 
communities in Germany, the Netherlands, and England (Ibid., 34-35).  Bennion notes that AUB is the “[Mormon] 
fundamentalist sect most similar to the LDS Church, and among the Mormon groups it has the most converts 
directly drawn from the mainstream Mormon community,” (Ibid., 36).  AUB also integrates with surrounding LDS 
communities more than FLDS or LeBarons (see note 75, below), which Bennion attributes to leaders’ “desire to 
work with local law enforcement officials, especially to end rumors of arranged marriages with underage girls,” 
(Ibid., 37).  Bennion contends that AUB “is more progressive and law-abiding than other [Mormon fundamentalist] 
groups,” (Ibid., 37).  The Browns, the polygynous family featured on TLC’s “Sister Wives,” are AUB Mormon 
fundamentalists. 
 
31 The Latter Day Church of Christ, also known as the Kingston Clan or the Davis County Cooperative, is currently 
led by Paul E. Kingston.  The LDCC is based in Salt Lake City but has branches in Davis County, Utah and 
scattered settlements along the Wasatch Front in Utah (Bennion, Polygamy in Primetime, 39).  The Kingstons left 
Short Creek in 1935 and are, according to Bennion, “the most secretive of all [Mormon fundamentalist] polygamy 
groups,” (Ibid., 39-40).  Bennion notes that the Kingstons “are known for the large number of underage marriages 
they perform, the highest number of incestuous marriages, and the highest natural birth rate of any of the 
fundamentalist Mormon groups,” (Ibid., 40).  LDCC theology emphasizes “kingdom building” (millennialism; see 
note 84) through establishing a pure bloodline traced back to Jesus (Ibid., 40).  The LDCC as an organization is 
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various LeBaron factions32—but does little to differentiate among these groups’ several theological 
and practical disparities.33  Banner repeatedly identifies plural marriage as the single defining practice 
of contemporary Mormon fundamentalism, suggesting that the practice both signifies and motivates 
theologically sanctioned violence and duplicity among Mormon fundamentalists – particularly 
toward the communities’ women and children.34   
In his introduction, Krakauer notes that LDS and Mormon fundamentalists “diverge on one 
especially inflammatory point of religious doctrine: unlike their present-day Mormon compatriots, 
Mormon fundamentalists passionately believe that Saints have a divine obligation to take multiple 
wives.”35  Despite significant scholarship to the contrary, Krakauer insists that “polygamy was, in 
fact, one of the most sacred credos of Joseph [Smith]’s church”36: “the revered prophet described 
plural marriage as part of ‘the most holy and important doctrine ever revealed to man on earth.’”37  
In his account of LDS history, Krakauer emphasizes Joseph Smith’s alleged “frenzied coupling” and 
                                                          
wealthy, but “some families live in extreme poverty and must go on welfare or scrounge for their food and 
clothing,” (Ibid., 43).   
 
32 The LeBaron factions are fractious, but the primary group is The Church of the Firstborn of the Fulness [sic] of 
Times, established in 1955 in Mexico (Ibid., 43).  Bennion emphasizes the church’s “tumultuous history,” which she 
attributes to “severe mental illnesses associated with the LeBaron gene pool,” (Ibid., 43).  The Church of the 
Firstborn has several hundred members, most of whom reside in Galeana, Mexico; members also live in Baja and 
San Diego in California, as well as in parts of Central America and Salt Lake Valley (Ibid., 43).  LDS 
excommunicated the LeBarons in 1944 for advocating and practicing plural marriage (Ibid., 44).  Unlike most 
Mormon fundamentalist groups, the LeBarons engage in active proselytization among other Mormon 
fundamentalist groups as well as in regions of Mexico (Ibid., 50). 
 
33 Bennion, Polygamy in Primetime, 23.  Bennion estimates the population of Mormon fundamentalists somewhere 
between 38,000 – 60,000, 75% of whom are affiliated with FLDS, AUB, or the Kingstons.  The remaining 25% are 
independent or affiliated with the LeBarons.   
 
34 Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven, 5, 6, 11, 13, 18, 21, 24, 27, 28-9, 33, 46-9, 51-55, 85, 124, 150-6, 194, 203, 
206, 325, 327-8, 330.   
 
35 Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven, 5. 
 
36 Ibid., 6. 
 
37 Ibid.  Krakauer attributes this quote to Smith, though sources generally attribute the quote to an observer, 
William Clayton.   
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“sexual recklessness,” as well as how deeply opposed Emma Hale Smith Bidamon, Smith’s first wife, 
was to plural marriage.38   
Krakauer presents polygyny as the defining doctrinal and practical crisis of the Mormon 
church(es).39 In Banner’s penultimate chapter, Krakauer suggests an “ironic [sic] component” to LDS 
mainstreaming: “to whatever extent the LDS religion moves beyond the most problematic facets of 
Joseph Smith’s theology [read: polygyny] and succeeds at becoming less and less peculiar, 
fundamentalists are bound to pull more and more converts away from the Mormon Church’s own 
swelling ranks.”40 Here Krakauer presents fundamentalism and its defining feature, polgyny, as an 
inevitable consequence of mainstream Mormon theology, consistent with his assertion that murder 
and sexual exploitation are the logical (if irrational) products of religious belief.   
Krakauer recounts former FLDS leader Rulon Jeffs’ 75 wives, some of whom Jeffs married 
in his eighties, many of whom were younger than sixteen.41  The author also notes that Rulon’s son, 
Warren Steed Jeffs, had at the time of Banner’s publication fathered children with at least two 
underage girls.42  Krakauer dwells at length on the crimes and prosecution of Tom Green, who is 
unaffiliated with any of the three main branches of Mormon fundamentalism; Green was convicted 
                                                          
38 Ibid., 124. 
 
39 Ibid., 194.   
 
40 Ibid., 325. 
 
41 Ibid., 12. 
 
42 Warren Steed Jeffs is the president and prophet of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, and is currently serving a life sentence plus 20 years for convictions of aggravated sexual assault and sexual 
assault of a minor.  (The Associated Press, “Texas: Polygamist Leader Convicted,” The New York Times, August 4, 
2011, sec. U.S., http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/05/us/05brfs-Texas.html.)  Brent Jeffs alleged that his uncle 
had sexually molested him in the 1980s, and would later act as a witness for the prosecution during Warren Jeffs’ 
sentencing in August 2011 (http://www.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/08/06/texas.polygamist.jeffs/index.html 
?iref=allsearch). Brower was later retained by attorney Roger Hoole, who represented Elissa Wall in her civil suit 
against Warren Jeffs.  (Wall also served as a witness for the prosecution of Jeffs in his initial conviction for 
accomplice rape in 2007.)   
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of bigamy in 2001 and first degree rape of a child in 2002.43 Likewise, Krakauer alleges that the AUB 
splinter sect, the LeBaron clan, is rife with sexual assault.44  Krakauer further recounts Ruth Holm’s 
allegations that she was coerced by family members and FLDS leaders into becoming the third wife 
of Officer Rodney Holm at the age of sixteen.45  Krakauer’s observation that “the Colorado City 
police department has not disciplined Officer [Rodney] Holm” for the statutory rape of Ruth Holm 
implies that Mormon fundamentalist culture not only condones sexual misconduct, but actually 
protects its perpetrators.46   
Krakauer notes antipolygamist activist and former FLDS member Flora Jessop filed sexual 
abuse charges against her father at age fourteen, though “the judge presumed she was lying and 
dismissed the case.”47  Krakauer further reports that FLDS member Dan Barlow Jr., son and 
namesake of Colorado City’s then-mayor, “was charged with repeatedly molesting five of his 
daughters over a period of ten years… [and] admitted that he viewed his daughters as ‘wives.’”48  
However, Krakauer alleges that Colorado City residents, many of whom are FLDS members, “closed 
                                                          
43 Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven., 20-23.  Green is a former member of the Righteous Branch of Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, an offshoot of AUB.  The Supreme Court of Utah upheld Green’s conviction for 
bigamy in 2004.  Elizabeth Neff, “Polygamist Green Loses Appeal of His Bigamy Convictions,” The Salt Lake 
Tribue, September 24, 2004, http://archive.sltrib.com/printfriendly.php?id=2407641&itype=ngpsid. 
 
44 Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven, 270. 
 
45 Ibid., 26.  Krakauer notes that “Officer Holm…is acting like the aggrieved party” in the custody battle that 
followed Ruth Holms’ “escap[e] from Colorado City,” ibid.   
 
46 Ibid., 26.  See also the Barlow Jr. case below.  Holm was convicted in 2003 of “unlawful sexual conduct with a 
sixteen- or seventeen-year-old and one count of bigamy for his marriage to and impregnation of plural wife Ruth 
Stubbs.” Bennion, Polygamy in Primetime, 33.  Krakauer did not include this conviction in list 2004 list of corrections 
to the hardcover edition of Banner.  It’s also worth noting that sexual assaults are notoriously difficult to prosecute.  
Even with an overwhelming amount of evidence, very few trials for sexual assault result in convictions.  Here again, 
this is not to excuse Holm’s actions but to demonstrate that the legal process for investigating and prosecuting his 
crimes were in no way unique to FLDS or Mormon fundamentalist communities.  Matt Thacker, “Rape Cases 
Prove Difficult to Prosecute,” News and Tribune, June 8, 2008, 
http://newsandtribune.com/clarkcounty/x519380765/Rape-cases-prove-difficult-to-prosecute; M. Wood, “City 
Attorney Shares Reality of Prosecuting Sexual Assault Cases,” University of Virginia Law School, March 25, 2002, 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2001_02/zug.htm. 
 
47 Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven, 51. 
 
48 Ibid., 27. 
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ranks around [Barlow Jr.], and his father, the mayor, went before the court and pleaded for 
leniency.”49  Like the Colorado City Police Department’s failure to prosecute Rodney Holms, 
Krakauer finds Barlow Jr.’s actions and the dismissal of Jessop’s suit indicative of a “documented 
pattern of sexual abuse in Colorado City.”50 
Krakauer chronicles numerous instances of incest among Mormon fundamentalist groups.  
He highlights the Kingston clan as especial perpetrators: “even more than in other fundamentalist 
Mormon groups, incest is a common practice among the Kingstons.”51  (Note the implication that 
incest is a common practice among all Mormon fundamentalist communities; Krakauer merely 
characterizes the Kingstons as the worst of a bad bunch.)  Women who attempt to resist underage 
marriage and incestuous sexual assault are allegedly “re-educated,” a process Krakauer narrates in 
chilling detail: 
After being married against her will to her uncle, David Ortell Kingston, at the age of 
sixteen, Mary Ann Kingston tried to run away twice…[her father] John Daniel then drove 
Mary Ann to an isolated ranch near the Utah-Idaho border, which the Kingstons used as a 
“re-education camp” for wayward wives and disobedient children.  He took the girl into a 
barn, pulled his belt off, and used it to whip her savagely across the buttocks, thighs, and 
lower back, inflicting hideous injuries.52 
 
Neither are such sexual abuses unique to the United States, Krakauer alleges.  Debbie Palmer’s 
accounts of multiple sexual assaults comprise much of the “Bountiful” chapter in Banner.53  Palmer 
                                                          
49 Ibid. 
 
50 Ibid. 
 
51 Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven, 19. 
 
52 Ibid., 19.  Mary Ann’s father, John Daniel Kingston, was arrested and imprisoned for seven months on charges 
related to this case.  Her husband, David Ortell Kingston, was convicted of incest and unlawful sexual conduct and 
sentenced to four years in prison.  Bennion, Polygamy in Primetime, 42.  As I noted in my introduction, such focus on 
salacious details make this account both provocative and conservative: they present such abuses as both horrific and 
inevitable.   
 
53 Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven, 35.  Palmer is a former FLDS member and the subject of the documentary 
film “Leaving Bountiful.”  Palmer’s account is worth consideration.  However, scholars have noted the fraught 
nature of apostate testimony in understanding new religious movements.  See in particular David G. Bromley, The 
Politics of Religious Apostasy: The Role of Apostates in the Transformation of Religious Movements (Greenwood Publishing 
Group, 1998).. 
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insists that “incest and other disturbing behaviors are rampant” in the FLDS community of 
Bountiful, British Columbia.54  In the chapter “Elizabeth and Ruby,” Krakauer juxtaposes the alleged 
assault of Ruby Jessop, Flora’s sister (mentioned above), with the kidnapping and rape of Elizabeth 
Smart.55  Flora Jessop alleges that Ruby was “forced to marry an older member of her extended 
family, whom she despised…[and] was raped immediately after the wedding ceremony – so brutally 
that [Ruby] spent her ‘wedding night’ hemorrhaging copious amounts of blood.”56  As with his 
description of the “re-education of Mary Ann Kingston,” note Krakauer’s emphasis on the sadism of 
the assault. 
Likewise, the “Evangeline” chapter of Banner recounts at length the transnational misdeeds 
of Kenyon Blackmore, former bishop of the FLDS Bountiful community.57  Blackmore’s first wife, 
Annie, recounted “bitterly” that “God had commanded Ken not to tell me” about Gwendolyn, 
Blackmore’s second wife, living in Mexico.58  Gwendolyn’s oldest daughter, Evangeline, alleges that 
Kenyon “took her as his wife” on her twelfth birthday: “that is to say, he began raping her on a 
                                                          
54 Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven, 35.  See also pp. 36-42, which includes accounts of several additional assaults 
on Debbie, including by her father (Ibid., 37), the molestation of her son and daughter by her husband, Michael 
(Ibid., 39), and her daughter’s concern that she would have to marry her molestor “because some of her friends in 
Colorado City had had to marry their stepfathers after being molested by them” (Ibid., 39).  I do not challenge 
Debbie Palmer’s account of these events.  I do note, however, that such abuses are unusual among Mormon 
fundamentalist communities in general.  See Bennion, “The Many Faces of Polygamy: An Analysis of the Variability 
in Modern Mormon Fundamentalism in the Intermountain West,” 180.  
 
55 Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven, 51.  I have argued elsewhere that Krakauer fundamentally misreads the 
events surrounding Elizabeth Smart’s captivity and sexual enslavement. See Megan Goodwin, “Common Sense Is 
No Match for the Voice of God": Krakauer’s Misreading of Elizabeth Smart,” in The Mormon Heritage Industry: 
Reading Mormon the Mormon Past in Popular Medias (presented at the American Academy of Religion National Meeting, 
Chicago, 2012) and  “Don’t Stand So Close to Me: On Not Hearing Elizabeth Smart,” The Juvenile Instructor, May 15, 
2013, http://www.juvenileinstructor.org/dont-stand-so-close-to-me-on-not-hearing-elizabeth-smart/. 
 
56 Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven, 51-2.  This episode contains no direct quotes, making it unclear how 
Krakauer received this account.   
 
57 Ibid., 271-9.  Krakauer misidentifies Blackmore as part of a LeBaron clan.  Rulon Jeffs excommunicated 
Blackmore in the 1990s, causing a fracture in the Bountiful community.  Roughly 700 members left to follow 
Blackmore. Bennion, Polygamy in Primetime, 30. 
 
58 Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven, 275. 
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regular basis.”59  “According to Evangeline, her father believed that he should start having sexual 
intercourse with her when she turned twelve ‘because that is when Mary, the first mother of Jesus, 
was impregnated.’”60 When Evangeline resisted, Kenyon “would throw [her] on the ground, punch 
[her], and cover [her] mouth when [she] would try to scream.”61  “To keep from being beaten,” 
Krakauer reports, Evangeline “started yielding to her sixty-year-old father’s incestuous assaults.”62  
Krakauer concludes this extensive and sadistic abuse narrative by noting that “the oldest of 
Evangeline’s sisters had her twelfth birthday in May 2001, the next in February 2003; another will 
turn twelve in July 2004.”63  Note the ominous foreboding of Krakauer’s concluding remarks.   
As I have shown, Krakauer employs several strategies to discredit Mormon fundamentalists.  
Among these tropes are an overemphasis on polygyny, the depiction of plural marriage as necessarily 
the product of mental deception and coercion, the characterization of Mormon men as sadistic 
sexual predators, and the reduction of Mormon fundamentalist women to victims in need of rescue.  
As gender studies scholar Michelle Gibson notes in her 2010 “However Satisfied a Man May Be:’ 
Sexual Abuse in Fundamentalist Latter-day Saints Communities,” portraying FLDS women as being 
in need of rescue from a religious organization that seems to threaten Americans’ “shared values” 
authorizes the American public—whether in the form of law enforcement, news media, or popular 
culture—to “wage war against the oppression of ‘other’ women—even if their salvation from sexual 
abuse and exploitation seems impossible.”64 This is not to deny that abuses occur in Mormon 
                                                          
59 Ibid., 277. 
 
60 Ibid., 277-8. 
 
61 Ibid., 278. 
 
62 Ibid.  Here again, note Krakauer’s focus on the sadistic detail of these abuses.   
 
63 Ibid., 279. 
 
64 Michelle Gibson, “‘However Satisfied Man Might Be’: Sexual Abuse in Fundamentalist Latter-day Saints 
Communities,” The Journal of American Culture 33, no. 4 (December 1, 2010): 287. 
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fundamentalist communities, but rather to insist that polygyny does not always strip women of their 
autonomy or happiness.65 
Krakauer’s account places disproportionate emphasis on incidents of sexual predation, 
coercion, and abuse within Mormon fundamentalist communities.66  The author portrays Mormon 
fundamentalist men as especially prone to sexual predation, violence, coerciveness, and deception.  
Throughout Banner Krakauer makes tacit appeals to “shared” American values – which, as I have 
argued, are informed by conservative Christian sexual ethics.67   
Under the Banner of Heaven makes affective—and often misinformed—appeals to shared 
American values, meant to arouse sympathy and presumably inspire legal change.68 The drama and 
polemicism of such writing lends itself to factual errors and superficial investigation into a multiple 
and complex network of Mormon fundamentalist communities.  And, as Gibson notes, Krakauer’s 
and similar works function to “shor[e] up of monogamous patriarchal marriage and mainstream 
Christian religious doctrine.”  Such discourses are performative: they incite the public to act against 
intolerable religiosities and sexual practices.69   
  
                                                          
65 Bennion, “The Many Faces of Polygamy: An Analysis of the Variability in Modern Mormon Fundamentalism in 
the Intermountain West,” 164. 
 
66 As Bennion inquires, “Why do we send United States troops against a small Texas community for teen pregnancy 
when the entire nation is plagued by similar issues?” Bennion, “The Many Faces of Polygamy: An Analysis of the 
Variability in Modern Mormon Fundamentalism in the Intermountain West,” 180.  As Duffy notes, however, 
scholars can both attend to the religious intolerance at work in public attempts to regulate FLDS practices and note 
the public’s sincere concern for the women and children of FLDS.  Duffy, “Saints Under Siege,” 554.  Gibson 
notes the overemphasis of Mormon fundamentalist polygyny in public discourse more broadly.  Gibson, “‘However 
Satisfied Man Might Be,’” 283. 
 
67 See the introduction to this dissertation, as well as Lori G. Beaman, “Church, State and the Legal Interpretation 
of Polygamy in Canada,” Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 8, no. 1 (July 1, 2004): 32 and 
Song, “Polygamy in America,” 145.  
 
68 Gordon, “War of Words,” 748. 
 
69 Bennion, Polygamy in Primetime, 164-5.  For the historical context of these kinds of anti-polygyny narratives, see 
Gordon, The Mormon Question, 54.   
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“The Report Has to Come from the Inside” 
 
In this section, I examine religiously intolerant public discourse evident during the state of Texas’ 
response to an influx of FLDS members in 2004-2005.  I note that legislature and law enforcement 
statements of religious intolerance echo (and in some cases, draw directly upon) Krakauer’s own 
intolerant rhetoric in Banner.  In particular, I focus on two specific visible instances of religious 
intolerance in Texas law enforcement officials’ interactions with FLDS.   
The first is a hearing before the Texas House of Representatives’ Juvenile Justice and Family 
Issues Committee on the matter of House Bill (HB) 3006, a bill that directly targeted the FLDS 
community of Eldorado, Texas, as sexually suspect.70  This proceeding has, to my knowledge, 
received no scholarly attention within the field of religious studies.  This lack of academic scrutiny is 
perhaps not surprising; HB 3006 was ultimately rolled into State Bill (SB) 6, which included 
amendments proposed by HB 3006’s author Rep. Harvey Hilderbran, but (unlike 3006) did not 
target FLDS by name.  However, the hearing on HB 3006 before the Juvenile Justice and Family 
Issues Committee had direct bearing on the events surrounding Texas’ Department of Family and 
Protective Services’ raid on the FLDS Yearning for Zion ranch in April 2008.  This hearing, which 
took place on April 3, 2005, includes Krakauer’s testimony on the evils of Mormon fundamentalism 
and Warren Jeffs.71   
The second important instance of religious intolerance I will examine is the raid on Yearning 
for Zion itself.  Like HB 3006, the raid itself has garnered scant academic attention.72  My 
                                                          
70 House Research Organization Bill Analysis (HB 3006) (Texas: Juvenile Justice and Family Issues, May 12, 2005), 4.  
“CSHB 3006 would strengthen Texas’ laws against polygamy and election laws to protect communities from being 
infiltrated by fringe religious groups. A group of Fundamentalist Church of Latter-Day Saints is building a compound 
south of S an Angelo where local residents are concerned that members may be forcing young girls to marry, engage 
in polygamist activities, and possibly marry their relatives,” (emphasis added). 
 
71 Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues (Texas House of Representatives, 2005), 
http://www.house.state.tx.us/video-audio/committee-broadcasts/committee-
archives/player/?session=79&committee=340&ram=50413p24. 
 
72 Duffy, “Saints Under Siege,” 551. 
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consideration of the public statements surrounding the raid includes examining the Texas 
Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) “Eldorado Investigation” report, as well as 
the department’s official statement regarding the raid and its “Original Petition for Protection of 
Children in an Emergency and for Conservatorship in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship” 
(hereafter the “Original Petition”), filed with the district court of Schleicher County, Texas, the day 
before the raid. 
Public rhetoric surrounding both these incidents mimics and sometimes draws directly on 
the sensational claims of Banner – perhaps in part because of Krakauer’s own involvement with the 
HB 3006 hearing.73  As with my analysis of Banner, I am particularly interested in examining these 
documents for equation of FLDS and/or Mormon fundamentalism with polygyny, characterizations 
of FLDS men as sexual predators, and assumptions regarding irrationality or coercion with regard to 
FLDS women in plural marriages.  The documents I analyze in this section demonstrate a consistent 
conviction in the inherently abusive nature of polygyny and the inevitability of sexual misconduct 
among the FLDS community.74  It is telling, then, that investigations following the raid yielded very 
little evidence of physical or sexual abuse at Yearning for Zion.75 
                                                          
73 Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues. 
 
74 Diane Winston, “Texas Court Rules Against Polygamist Raid,” Religion Dispatches, May 23, 2008, 
http://religiondispatches.org/archive/politics/262/texas_court_rules_against_polygamist_raid___politics___/. 
 
75 Several authors (Wright and Richardson, Palmer, Schreinert and Richardson, and Wright) have noted the relative 
lack of evidence for sexual abuse found during the raid on Yearning for Zion.  Wright and Richardson, Saints Under 
Siege; Palmer, “Rescuing Children?  Government Raids and Child Abuse Allegations in Historical and Cross-Cultural 
Perspective;” Tamatha L. Schreinert and James T. Richardson, “Pyrrhic Victory?  An Analysis of the Appeal Court 
Opinions Concerning the FLDS Children,” in Saints Under Siege: The Texas State Raid on the Fundamentalist Latter-day 
Saints, ed. Stuart Wright and James Richardson (NYU Press, 2011), 242–264; James T. Richardson and Tamatha L. 
Schreinert, “Political and Legislative Context of the FLDS Raid in Texas,” in Saints Under Siege: The Texas State Raid 
on the Fundamentalist Latter-day Saints, ed. Stuart Wright and James Richardson (NYU Press, 2011), 221–241; and 
Stuart Wright, “Deconstructing Official Rationales for the Texas State Raid on the FLDS,” in Saints Under Siege: The 
Texas State Raid on the Fundamentalist Latter-day Saints (New York: NYU Press, 2011), 124–149.  But as Duffy notes, 
“the courts did not exonerate the FLDS.”  Almost 125 adults were classified as “designated perpetrators” of sexual 
abuse or neglect (though these charges were largely based on the adults’ association with FLDS as a suspect entity).  
Twelve men were also indicted on charges related to underage marriages.  Duffy, “Saints Under Siege,” 553. 
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Like Banner, the HB 3006 hearing and the Texas Department of Family and Protective 
Services’ documents manifest an earnest desire to aid Mormon fundamentalist women and children 
whom Texas lawmakers and social service providers understood to be helpless victims.76  These 
documents, like Banner, frequently refer to the practice of polygyny as evidence for the need to 
intervene into a minority religious community.  But far from liberating these women and children, 
the raid resulted in the mass detention of FLDS women and children as well as increased legal and 
social services scrutiny of FLDS and other Mormon fundamentalist groups.  Ultimately, then, the 
rhetoric of liberation—which consistently emphasized the need to save FLDS women and 
children—evidenced in HB 3006 and the DPFS documents resulted in actions that both limited the 
ability of FLDS women and children to leave their community and actively discouraged religious and 
sexual difference within the contemporary United States.77    
 
“I Wouldn’t Recognize Them”: Texas House Bill 3006  
 
Texas State Representative Harvey Hilderbran authored House Bill 3006 in April 2005.  Rep. 
Hilderbran intended the bill to “strengthen Texas’ laws against polygamy and election laws to protect 
communities from being infiltrated by fringe religious groups.”78  Existent state laws classified 
bigamy as a class A misdemeanor and recognized the right of any person between the ages of 14 and 
18 to marry with parental consent.79  The Texas penal code prohibited “sexual contact between 
                                                          
76 Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues, Hilderbran (10:50 - 11:02) “But we know that Texans want to protect women 
and children, and we don't want to have all these child brides that they have in these communities in other states, and 
we feel like Texas law was weak and didn't anticipate addressing this problem, so that's why we brought the bill,” 
emphasis added. 
 
77 On the ways legal intervention and social stigma regarding polygyny discourages Mormon fundamentalist women 
from leaving even abusive situations, see Song, Justice, Gender, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, 160.  For evidence of 
ongoing fears among other polygynous communities regarding the possibility of child seizures and arrests, see in 
particular Janet Bennion, Evaluating the Effects of Polygamy on Women and Children in Four North American Mormon 
Fundamentalist Groups: An Anthropological Study (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008).   
 
78 House Research Organization Bill Analysis (HB 3006), 4. 
  
79 Ibid., 1. 
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certain individuals, including parents and children, stepparents and stepchildren, and siblings,” and 
classified such acts as third-degree felonies.80   
HB 3006 would have elevated bigamy to a second-degree felony if the partner (presumably 
female) were older than sixteen and to a first-degree felony if the (again, presumably female) partner 
were younger than sixteen.81  The bill also proposed raising the age of marriage with parental consent 
to sixteen.82  The court could void marriages in which either party was younger than sixteen “or if 
there was a stepchild-stepparent relationship.”83  The bill would further amend the Penal Code to 
prohibit sexual acts between first cousins by blood or adoption (making such acts a second-degree 
felony), and it would adopt gender-neutral language in “definitions of who is prohibited from 
engaging in sexual acts.”84  Performing marriage ceremonies in which the marriage would be 
prohibited by law would have been punishable as a third-degree felony.85 
As he explained, Hilderbran [proposed] the bill in response to  
 
a group of Fundamentalist Church of Latter-Day Saints…building a compound south of San 
Angelo where local residents are concerned that members may be forcing young girls to 
marry, engage in polygamist activities, and possibly marry their relatives. Local residents also 
are concerned that members of the group will run for public office and will have moved a 
large enough group of voters into the area to take over local governance.86   
 
Opponents of the bill noted that “there is no actual evidence that this group is doing any of 
the things accused by local residents” and insisted that “Texas should not endorse laws aimed at one 
specific group lawfully practicing its religious beliefs.”87  But the bill analysis provided by the Texas 
                                                          
80 Ibid. 
 
81 Ibid., 2. 
 
82 Ibid. 
 
83 Ibid., 3. 
 
84 Ibid. 
 
85 Ibid. 
 
86 Ibid., 4. 
 
87 Ibid., 4. 
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House Research Organization stated that “the bill would not unfairly target any religious practice or 
philosophy.”88  The bill analysis document suggested that HB 3006 “simply would clarify Texas’ laws 
on marriages.”89  Despite these assertions, the document named FLDS as a “fringe religious group” 
and argued that the bill was necessary to “strengthen Texas’ laws against polygamy” and prevent 
“infiltrat[ion]” of Texas communities by such groups.90  Rep. Hilderbran also publicly referred to the 
bill as “thirty ought-six,” “because it pack[ed] a serious punch.”91   
 As part of ongoing efforts to curb the activities and limit the financial resources of the 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints across state lines, former Utah Attorney 
General Mark Shurtleff,92 private investigator Sam Brower,93 and Jon Krakauer testified in favor of 
                                                          
88 Ibid. 
 
89 Ibid. 
 
90 House Research Organization Bill Analysis (HB 3006), 4. 
 
91 “Hilderbran’s 30-06 Bill Gathers Momentum in Austin,” The Eldorado Success, April 21, 2005.  “Thirty ought-six” 
might refer either to the .30-06 Springfield rifle cartridge used by U.S. Army personnel from 1906 until the early 
1970s or to Texas Penal Code section 30.06, which allows landowners to post signage forbidding licensed persons 
from entering the premises carrying concealed weapons.  Gibson, “‘However Satisfied Man Might Be,’” 287, in 
particular has noted the tendency of FLDS critics to use militaristic language in describing attempts to rescue FLDS 
women and children.   
 
92 Shurtleff served as Utah’s Attorney General from 2001 until 2013 and was actively involved in attempts to the 
curb activities and financial resources of FLDS.  However, Shurtleff and the Arizona Attorney General’s Office also 
worked with the AUB to produce “The Primer,” a resource for law enforcement and social workers to help 
“victims of domestic violence and child abuse in polygamous communities.” Mark Shurtleff, Tom Horne, and 
Bonnie Peters, The Primer: A Guidebook for Law Enforcement and Human Services Agencies Who Offer Assistance to 
Fundamentalist Mormon Families (Family Support Center, January 2011), 
http://attorneygeneral.utah.gov/cmsdocuments/The_Primer.pdf.  Shurtleff has also publicly stated his disinterest 
in prosecuting consenting adult polygamists who are not committing other crimes.  Brian Skoloff, “‘Sister Wives’ 
Lawsuit: No Bigamy Charges For Kody Brown And Wives,” Huffington Post, May 31, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/01/sister-wives-bigamy-lawsuit-kody-brown_n_1561962.html. 
 
93 Sam Brower is a private investigator and former bounty hunter who was originally retained by Baltimore attorney 
Joanne Suder for case preparation and process serving; Suder was herself hired by former FLDS member Dan 
Fischer and his Diversity Foundation, which assists displaced FLDS youth (77).  Fischer hired Suder on behalf of 
Brent Jeffs, nephew of Warren Steed Jeffs and plaintiff in 2004 a civil suit accusing the FLDS prophet of sexual 
assaulting Brent as a minor.  (http://www.deseretnews.com/article/print/595087473/FLDS-church-leaders-sued-
by-6-lost-boys.html).   
 
Brower claims he was later “asked by state and federal law enforcement agencies” to track down Warren Jeffs 
(Prophet’s Prey, 3).  Throughout Prophet’s Prey, Brower credits himself as largely responsible for Jeffs’ capture and 
claims to have provided material evidence toward the prosecution and conviction of Warren Jeffs on felony counts 
of child sexual assault.  In this anecdote, Brower seldom quotes Krakauer directly; and frankly, Brower’s personal 
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HB 3006 before the Juvenile Justice and Family Issues Committee on April 13, 2005.94  Their 
testimony—coupled with that of Randy Mankin, publisher and editor of the local newspaper, the 
Eldorado Success—and the comments of members of the JJFI Committee, demonstrate religiously 
intolerant rhetoric similar to that evidenced by Under the Banner of Heaven.   
Participants in the hearing for HB 3006 echo Krakauer’s tendency to hypersexualize and 
overemphasize polygyny.  Witnesses who testified in favor of the bill—there were no opposing 
witnesses present at the hearing—offered the Committee numerous horror stories of sexual assault, 
child molestation, incest, and sexual coercion.95  Rep. Hilderbran warned that child abuse, child 
endangerment, and incest, as well as “underage marriage,”96 domestic violence, “denial of equal 
education services,” and election and welfare fraud necessarily followed “the religious practices of 
bigamy and polygamy.”97  "All these things are things that happen in polygamist communities, and 
we anticipate happening in Texas if they aren't already happening."98  Utah Attorney General 
Shurtleff regaled the committee with tales of lost boys—young men forced to leave FLDS 
communities to ensure sufficient plural wives—forced to turn to prostitution in Salt Lake and Las 
Vegas.99  Krakauer insisted that polygyny was paramount among FLDS beliefs and practices.  "They 
                                                          
animosity toward Jeffs renders much of this book questionable at best.  I am, however, assuming Brower is a 
credible witness with regard to Krakauer’s involvement with this case.  Krakauer wrote the preface to Prophet’s Prey 
and avows that Bower is “the real deal” (xii).  Brower likewise notes that Prophet’s Prey “never would have happened 
without the help of Jon Krakauer” (313).  
 
94 Witness List for HB 3006 (Texas: Juvenile Justice and Family Issues, April 13, 2005), 
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/79R/witlistbill/html/HB03006H.htm.   
 
95 Hannah Riddering (president) and Molly Solomon (former member, Young Feminists Task Force) both initially 
appeared to testify on behalf of the Texas National Organization for Women in favor of the bill, but left the 
committee chair called them.  Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues, 1:37:00 and 1:37:20. 
 
96 At the time of this hearing, the legal age of marriage with parental consent was fourteen in Texas.  House Research 
Organization Bill Analysis (HB 3006), 2. 
 
97 Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues, Hilderbran (4:07 - 4:27). 
  
98 Ibid., Hilderbran (9:30). 
 
99 Ibid., Shurtleff (33:20). 
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[FLDS members] think they're the true Mormon church.  They still believe that polygamy is key to 
entering the plural kingdom, to entering heaven, and it's the bedrock of their religion.”100  But the 
author warned the committee that "HB 3006 is no panacea.  It's not by itself gonna abolish these 
abuses – and these abuses seem to be part and parcel of every polygamous culture.  Or almost every polygamous 
culture."101  Again, note that Krakauer and the other witnesses do not refer to the FLDS community 
or Mormon fundamentalists as religious people who practice polygyny, but rather as a uniform 
“polygamous culture.”  Private Investigator Brower relayed similar tales of young boys being sexually 
abused and underage girls forced into marriage and subsequently raped.102 
As in Banner, witness testimony in favor of HB 3006 characterized FLDS men as exclusively 
sexually predatory and/or coercive.  The specter of FLDS prophet Warren Jeffs frequently 
functioned as a metonymy for FLDS men throughout the session.  State Rep. Hilderbran warned 
that FLDS men were “having children with minors that the law, that we're not recognizing as their 
wives, so to me that's shouting child rapes, statutory rape, and everything, everything else associated 
with sexual assault,” but he lamented that such suspicions were “hard to enforce."103  In response to 
committee member Rep. Thompson’s question about whether the prophet had sexual access to any 
woman he wanted, Attorney General Shurtleff replied, “absolutely.”  When Thompson replied that 
Jeffs enjoyed” the best of all worlds because of his unfettered access to FLDS women, Shurtleff 
laughed, saying that Jeffs might “get all the sex,” but wasn’t allowed to watch football.104  Krakauer 
deployed the nightmare figure of Warren Jeffs, describing Jeffs as “a freak…a sick guy” who had 
                                                          
100 Ibid., Krakauer (41:45).  
 
101 Ibid., Krakauer (46:28), emphasis added – Krakauer’s claim to expertise in polygamous cultures beyond FLDS is 
unverifiable.  
 
102 Ibid., Brower (1:13:00, 1:25:48). 
 
103 Ibid., Hilderbran (12:28 - 38). 
 
104 Ibid., Shurtleff  (32:20-26). 
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“raped and sodomized boys as young as five…and girls as well."105 Krakauer warned that Jeffs is “an 
evil, evil man – and he has moved into your state."106  The author moreover warned that Jeffs is 
"worst of these polygamists [Krakauer has] ever encountered, and there have been some really bad 
ones.  [Jeffs] is really bad news, and he's not going away anytime soon."107  Sam Brower identified 
himself as part of the legal team attempting to bring a civil suit against Warren Jeffs for “rape and 
sodomy of a child,” explaining that the statute of limitations for criminal prosecution of the case had 
expired.108  Attorney General Shurtleff ended the session by cautioning the committee that Jeffs 
could, "as we speak be having sex with minors, he could be sodomizing his young boys in that 
compound, and how do we know?"109 Committee members were frequently invited to infer that all 
FLDS men want to behave as Jeffs did, as a sexually manipulative and coercive predator.110 
Like Banner, the testimony in support of HB 3006 depicts FLDS men exclusively as sexually 
predatory and coercive.  Witnesses dismissed the religious imperative of plural marriage, a key 
component of fundamentalist Mormon theology.  These same witnesses consistently conflated the 
then-alleged felonies of Warren Jeffs with the presumed sexual misconduct of FLDS men generally. 
Members of the Juvenile Justice and Family Issues Committee were encouraged to presume that all 
FLDS men sought to emulate Jeffs – implying that all FLDS men are sexually predatory.111  Having 
reduced Mormon fundamentalism to the practice of polygyny and presented a hypersexualized and 
predatory caricature of FLDS men, participants in the HB 3006 hearing proceeded to characterize 
                                                          
105 Ibid., Krakauer (44:28, 44:30). 
 
106 Ibid., Krakauer (44:47). 
 
107 Ibid., Krakauer (47: 37). 
 
108 Ibid., Brower (1:04:04). 
 
109 Ibid., Shurtleff (1:40:04). 
 
110 Ibid., Shurtleff (20:35). 
 
111 Ibid. 
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FLDS women as helpless victims or brainwashed dupes.  Witnesses frequently referred to FLDS 
women as “property” or “chattel.”112 
Acknowledging the differences between current Texas law and the changes proposed by HB 
3006, State Rep. Hilderbran noted that while Texas law allowed fourteen-year-old girls to be married 
with parental consent, “in Texas most parents have their children's interest in mind when they give 
consent.  It's usually an unusual circumstance that causes that to happen.  But when you're in one of 
these polygamy communities, of course, it's forced – and when it's not forced, it's certainly 
encouraged.”113  Again ignoring both the theological complexity and lived experience of Mormon 
fundamentalism, Attorney General Shurtleff insisted that FLDS “women have two purposes in life 
in this community: and that is to please their men sexually and to have children.”114  After quoting 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Shurtleff averred that "there is injustice in these communities.  There are 
victims that are not being protected by the law."115  Shurtleff also attested that FLDS girls often flee 
their communities because "they were going to be forced to marry an old man,” but are sent back by 
law enforcement because "there wasn't an imminent threat of harm, which is required by law.”116   
 Krakauer corroborated Shurtleff’s testimony: 
To be a woman in this culture, you know, it's funny, they know nothing else...From birth, 
girls are told that the only way you can achieve salvation, to go to heaven—which for them 
is everything—is to be a polygamous wife to a man who has at least three husbands [sic].  So 
these girls think it's their only choice.  They're pulled out of school; they're kept barefoot and 
pregnant...This is an evil culture.117 
 
                                                          
112 Ibid., Krakauer (1:03:38), Hilderbran (1:40:40), Shurtleff (17:30 - 18:38).  
 
113 Ibid., Hilderbran (5:54 - 6:27). 
 
114 Ibid., Shurtleff (18:37-8). 
 
115 Ibid., Shurtleff (27:54). 
 
116 Ibid., Shurtleff (35:15).  Shurtleff is referring to the case of Ruby Jessop.  Shurtleff alleges that "no one's ever 
heard from her again."  This assertion is inconsistent with Brower’s testimony about Jessop, wherein he recounts 
that a Mohave County sheriff frequently checks in on her to make sure she’s okay.  Ibid., Brower (1:28:14). 
 
117 Ibid., Krakauer (49:05 - 49:32, emphasis added). 
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Krakauer also insisted that “wives are doled out as rewards… They become...wives and kids are 
property.  They're chattel, in this religion."118  At no point did any witness or committee member 
recognize the agency of FLDS women – witness testimony and committee commentary spoke of 
these women only as victims.  Women’s participation in the practice of polygyny served as evidence 
of their irrationality or coercion.119 
Witnesses and committee members also consistently compared the Fundamentalist Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints with other minority religions – in particular, with Islamic 
extremism and new religious movements (or “cults”).  Twice hearing participants aligned FLDS with 
Islam and Islamic extremism.120  Shurtleff remarked that when discussing FLDS, “people, they say, 
'what are you talking about?  Is this Afghanistan?’”121 (His remark met with muffled laughter 
throughout the in hearing room.)  Shurtleff testified that FLDS "women are kept under the thumb.  
They are not allowed outside; they're not allowed to speak unless spoken to; they're mostly kept 
indoors.122  They must be covered from their neck to their ankles and to their wrists, [in] 120, 130 
                                                          
118 Ibid., Krakauer (1:03:09, 1:03:38). 
  
119 An exchange between Shurtleff and Thompson about welfare fraud reinforces the dichotomy of FLDS women-
as-victims and FLDS men-as-criminals.  At Ibid. 22:03, Shurtleff admits that FLDS women are not targets of any 
welfare fraud investigation despite evidence of their fraud.  Thompson asked "so they [FLDS women] can violate 
the law as long as they're women, because you're focusing like that – you're focusing on the men."  Shurtleff 
confirmed, "the focus is on the men.”   
 
120 The elision of Mormon fundamentalism with Islam and especially Islamic fundamentalism is also characteristic 
of Krakauer’s work in Under the Banner of Heaven.  As I noted in my introduction, the blurring of specificity in 
descriptions of religious minorities is common in religiously intolerant discourse.  On this point, see David Brion 
Davis, “Some Themes of Counter-Subversion: An Analysis of Anti-Masonic, Anti-Catholic, and Anti-Mormon 
Literature,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 47, no. 2 (1960): 213, as well as Ann Burlein, Lift High the Cross: 
Where White Supremacy and the Christian Right Converge (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 7 and John Corrigan 
and Lynn S. Neal, Religious Intolerance in America: a Documentary History (Chapel Hill: UNC Press Books, 2010), 262.  
Disparaging comparisons between Mormons and Muslims are not unique to twenty-first century discourse.  See 
Timothy Marr, The Cultural Roots of American Islamicism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 185 – 218. 
 
121 Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues., Shurtleff (19:35). 
 
122 This is inconsistent with the documented agricultural activities on Yearning for Zion.  See Brower, Prophet’s Prey, 
79. 
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degree weather."123  To which Rep. Thompson responded, "Almost like a burqa."124 Shurtleff 
concurred, nodding: “absolutely.  That's exactly right.”125 
Rep. Hilderbran explicitly referred to FLDS as a cult.126  Attorney General Shurtleff and 
Rep. James Dunnam linked FLDS with the Branch Davidian fiasco that occurred in Dumman’s 
district.  Shurtleff averred that in FLDS  
there has not been, in this particular group, any evidence of violence against another human 
being that we can put our finger on, but there is a pattern I think Mr. Krakauer can talk to 
you about, about people like Warren Jeffs who get, uh, get into this “I'm talking to God and 
I am the one mighty and great [sic]127 and I am a polygamist and I control everything.”128 
 
Rep. Dunnam responded: "we have some experience with that in my district.”  When the Attorney 
General confessed “I don't know which district that is,” several committee members responded, 
“Waco.”  The chamber filled with awkward, subdued laughter, after which Rep. Dunnam informed 
Shurtleff that "god is coming back in Mt. Carmel, not this place.  Somebody needs to tell 'em 
that.”129  Later in the hearing, Krakauer attested that the committee must “take [Jeffs] seriously.  I 
personally think the possibility of another Waco, or even...except it's going to be much bigger.  It's 
going to be like Jonestown, in Guyana, where almost a thousand people were killed.  I think it's 
                                                          
123 Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues, Shurtleff (20:03 - 18). 
 
124 Ibid., Thompson (20:19). 
 
125 Ibid., Shurtleff (20:20).  See Gibson on this point as well.  “The issue is not so much whether or not the 
comparison of Jeffs’ rule in Colorado City to the Taliban is apt; the problem is that the comparison seems to imply 
that a reasonable course of action to rectify the problems in this FLDS sect is liberation by aggression or force.”  
Gibson, “‘However Satisfied Man Might Be,’” 291. 
 
126 Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues, Hilderbran (6:27). 
 
127 Shurtleff is alluding to Joseph Smith’s 1832 prophecy of “the one mighty and strong.”  Joseph Smith Jr., “The 
Doctrine and Covenants - Section 85,” The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, November 27, 1832, 
http://www.lds.org/scriptures/dc-testament/dc/85.7-8?lang=eng. 
 
128 Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues, Shurtleff (38: 36 - 56). 
 
129 Ibid., Dunnam et alia (38:57 - 39:08).  On the efficacy of the label “cult” to authorize anxiety and ridicule, see 
Lynn S. Neal, “‘They’re Freaks!’: The Cult Stereotype in Fictional Television Shows, 1958–2008,” Nova Religio: The 
Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 14, no. 3 (February 2011): 81–107. 
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huge."130  Krakauer repeated, "the potential for violence is huge," and he worried that "I don't know 
how you're going to get him out of there without another Waco or Jonestown."131  Brower escalated 
Krakauer’s concerns, noting that FLDS "beliefs are so ingrained from birth.  Unlike other sects and 
cults and things of that sort, this starts at birth...this is deeply ingrained.  They have no phase of 
normalcy to go back to.  This is how they've grown up."132  Testimonial comparisons of FLDS to 
Islam and Islamic extremism and marginal new religious movements framed the former as a 
legitimate target of ridicule and anxiety, while reinforcing assumptions of polygyny’s inherent 
violence, lasciviousness, irrationality, and coerciveness.   
These strategies of marginalization—the conflation of FLDS identity with the practice of 
polygyny; the hypersexualization and overemphasis of that practice; the characterization of FLDS 
men as sexually predatory and coercive; and the insistence that practitioners of polygyny (particularly 
women and children) are necessarily coerced or duped—show the precedence of religiously 
intolerant rhetoric in the proceedings regarding HB 3006.  And as I have argued, this religious 
intolerance is deeply informed by “shared values” shaped by a normalized conservative Christian 
sexual ethic. 
When Shurtleff apologized for “basically export[ing] our [that is, Arizona’s] problem to 
Texas,” Rep. Dunnam’s response question ("How did you get them [FLDS] out of Utah?") met with 
sustained laughter from the audience and committee members alike.  When Rep. Strama asked the 
Attorney General if there were any FLDS witnesses present, committee chair Dutton replied, “I 
wouldn't recognize them,” eliciting further laughter from the audience.  Shurtleff qualified:  “They 
[FLDS] won't be here.  I guarantee it.”133  Strama further inquired as to whether the facts of the case 
                                                          
130 Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues, Krakauer (45:20). 
 
131 Ibid., Krakauer (45:57, 1:01: 43). 
 
132 Ibid., Brower (1:09:08).  
 
133 Ibid., Strama et alia, (36:30). 
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were being disputed; Shurtleff responding by alleging that FLDS representatives had been in his 
office and had “outright lied” about their polygamist activities.134 
Informal exchanges between committee members and witnesses occasionally made light of 
the alleged FLDS threat, but witnesses and committee members also frequently engaged in hostile 
and adversarial language as well.  Several members vowed they would “get” or “go after” the FLDS 
during these proceedings.  As I mentioned above, bill author Rep. Hilderbran referred to HB 3006 as 
“thirty ought-six,”135 which might refer either to the .30-06 Springfield rifle cartridge used by U.S. 
Army personnel from 1906 until the early 1970s or to Texas Penal Code section 30.06, which allows 
landowners to post signage forbidding licensed persons from entering the premises carrying 
concealed weapons.136  Both imply hostile connotations for the bill.  Krakauer confessed to being 
“quite obsessed” with Jeffs and the FLDS, as well as to “spen[ding] thousands and thousands of 
dollars of [his] own money” tracking Jeffs.137  No committee member raised concerns that Krakauer, 
a private citizen, was essentially stalking Jeffs.138  In the midst of Brower’s testimony, Rep. Goodman 
interjected: 
I hope this sect doesn't think it's going to come to Texas, which is kind of a law-and-order 
state, and commit child abuse or sodomy and not be prosecuted by the state of Texas and 
the full resources that are available to this state... I mean this state will literally go after these people 
                                                          
134 Ibid., Shurtleff (37:15). 
 
135 Ibid., Hilderbran (2:45). 
 
136 “.30-06 Springfield,” Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, July 31, 2013, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=.30-06_Springfield&oldid=564700426 and “Gun Laws in Texas,” 
Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, July 24, 2013, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Gun_laws_in_Texas&oldid=565570231.  
 
137 Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues (Texas House of Representatives, 2005), 
http://www.house.state.tx.us/video-audio/committee-broadcasts/committee-
archives/player/?session=79&committee=340&ram=50413p24, (1:01:16).  Sam Brower also describes several 
encounters during which Krakauer helped him search for Warren Jeffs.  These incidents included Krakauer flying a 
private airplane over the Yearning for Zion ranch on 1 January 2005 to catch a glimpse of Jeffs and sneaking onto 
FLDS property with Brower at night using night-vision goggles so that Krakauer could “watch [Brower’s] back” 
while Brower attempted to serve Jeffs with a summons.  Brower, Prophet’s Prey, 165-6, 153-5. 
 
138 Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues, Krakauer (1:01: 16).  See also Brower’s account of sneaking onto 
Yearning for Zion with Jon Krakauer, both of them wearing night-vision goggles.  Brower, Prophet’s Prey, 155. 
 125  
if they commit those kinds of acts and they have the kind of evidence that you're telling us 
you have.139 
  
Goodman then directly addressed Rep. Hilderbran, noting that State Bill 6 was on the House floor 
the following week; Goodman insisted that whether HB 3006 went through or not, the state 
representatives would “go after these people” by amending SB 6 with provisions from HB 3006.140  
Goodman reiterated: "well, if they come down here, we'll try to help you... down here, we'll get 'em."141 
After further inquiries about the lack of criminal prosecution of FLDS, Rep. Hilderbran 
clarified that Texas "[hasn’t] had it [the alleged abuses] happen here yet, we don't have any reports 
yet here.”142  Hilderbran insisted that “the report" [of abuse] “has to come from inside, so we've got to 
be a little more creative in how we get the report."143  Goodman responded that “there's no reason that we 
can't take the reports that have already been generated and say this is a dangerous situation for a 
child.”144  Again, the hostility and suspicion of such exchanges, coupled with the certainly of sexual 
misconduct, demonstrates high levels of religious intolerance.  
I am struck by the inconsistency of these proceedings.  As I discuss below, it was entirely 
lawful in Texas before September 1, 2005 for fourteen-year-old girls (and boys, presumably) to marry 
adults, including their own uncles (or aunts).  Rep. Hilderbran stated repeatedly his conviction that 
                                                          
139 Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues, Goodman (1:21:11), emphasis added. 
 
140 Ultimately, the Texas House of Representatives tabled HB 3006.  Many of its provisions, including increasing 
penalties for polygamy and bigamy were strengthened, and raising the age of marriage with parental consent to 16, 
were included in State Bill 6.  Jane Nelson, State Bill 6, 2005, 
http://www.legis.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=79R&Bill=SB6. 
 
141 Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues, Goodman (1:40:30), emphasis added. 
 
142 Ibid., Hilderbran (1:22:17). 
 
143 Ibid., Hilderbran (1:22:04), emphasis added. 
 
144 Contra Daniel Mach and Lisa Graybill, BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE, American Civil Liberties Union & American 
Civil Liberties Union of Texas, IN OPPOSITION TO  RELATOR’S PETITION FOR MANDAMUS (Supreme Court 
of Texas, May 29, 2008), 1.  “Because the law recognizes the parents’ paramount right to raise their children without 
unjustified intrusion by the State, the State bears the statutory burden of demonstrating that the removal of a child 
from his or her parents is necessary to prevent imminent harm to the child.” 
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most Texas parents in such cases “have the child’s best interest in mind.”145  However, he insisted 
that within FLDS, “when you're in one of these polygamy communities, of course, it's forced – and 
when it's not forced, it's certainly encouraged.  And that's the culture of the community of the 
cult.”146  Hilderbran offers no reflection about the voluntarism of the former marriages, but is 
convinced that the latter must always be coerced.  Such claims render the witnesses’ frequent 
assertions that “this [HB 3006] isn’t about religion” suspect.147 
A number of participants in this hearing emphasized that their desire to “get” the local 
FLDS community did not unfairly target any religious group.  Shurtleff addressed absent FLDS 
members during his testimony, arguing "this isn't about religion.  We don't want to persecute your 
religious beliefs.  It's not about religion.  It's about crimes and civil rights violations that you are 
committing in the name of your religion that we have a problem with, and we're not going to stand 
for it.”148  Krakauer counseled committee members to think of FLDS “not in terms of religion, 
although religion is the bedrock of their beliefs and their practice, but think of them as organized 
crime.”149  These statements stand in stark contrast to the wording of the bill itself, which explicitly 
targets FLDS, and the general tone of the hearing, during which members of the Juvenile Justice and 
Family Issues Committee and their witnesses frequently derided FLDS beliefs and practices.150 
                                                          
145 Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues, Hilderbran (1:40:40).  See also (5:54 - 6:27), as well as Hilderbran’s 
insistence that, unlike FLDS, “Texas does care about its women and children and its communities and its families” 
(1:43:48).   
 
146 Ibid., Hilderbran (5:54 - 6:27).  Note the tension between Hilderbran’s condemnation of FLDS marriages and 
Dutton’s insistence that the current marriage age (14 years old) is sometimes necessary, because parents “who have 
the children’s best interest in mind” think marriage is warranted (1:40:40). 
 
147 Ibid., Shurtleff (24:30).  
 
148 Ibid., Shurtleff (24:30), emphasis added. 
 
149 Ibid., Krakauer, (51:17). 
 
150 House Research Organization Bill Analysis (HB 3006). 
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Though committee members and witnesses consistently emphasized that their concern was 
“not about religion,” several speakers did express concern that religious freedom could mask sexual 
misconduct.  In particular, Hilderbran insisted that “some Texas laws have allowed for alleged crimes 
to be committed under the practice of religious freedoms.”151  Krakauer also noted that FLDS “guys 
are really good at raising, at you know claiming that their religious freedom's been violated; they're 
really good at going on camera when need be and acting like victims.”152  Such statements highlight 
the tension in these hearings between a professed commitment to religious freedom and a pervasive 
suspicion about sexual predation among a minority religious community.   
The Texas House of Representatives shelved HB 3006, but incorporated many of its 
proposed changes into Texas State Bill 6 (passed June 6, 2005, effective September 1, 2005).  
Notable among these were amendments that raised the legal age for marriage with parental consent 
from fourteen to sixteen,153 elevated bigamy to a first degree felony if one partner is younger than 
sixteen,154 adopted stricter prohibitions against stepchild/stepparent marriages,155 and proscribed 
marriage between uncles/aunts and nieces/nephews by blood or adoption as second degree 
felonious offenses.156  Again, before September 1, 2005, it was entirely lawful in Texas for fourteen-
year-olds to marry adults, including their own uncles or aunts.  While SB 6 lacks HB 3006’s language 
identifying FLDS as a “fringe religious group,” the state bill directly adopted many of HB 3006’s 
                                                          
151 Committee on Juvenile Justice and Family Issues, Hilderbran (3:45).  Note the implication that “religion” provides cover 
for sexual and other crimes. 
 
152 Ibid., Krakauer, (1:00:11) Note again Krakauer’s implication of FLDS members’ inherent disingenuousness. 
 
153 Nelson, State Bill 6, 247, lines 12-17.  See also Ibid., 253, lines 9-10. 
 
154 Nelson, State Bill 6., 242, lines 11-12.  Bigamy is otherwise a second degree felony.  Ibid., 242, lines 9-10. 
 
155 Nelson, State Bill 6., 242, lines 15-22. 
 
156 Ibid., 243, lines 1-7 and Ibid., 243, lines 5-7.  See also Ibid., 253, lines 11-13.  Other HB 3006 provisions included 
in SB 6 were making knowingly providing parental or guardian consent for marriage younger than sixteen or for 
someone already married a third degree felony (Ibid., 248, lines 1-3), and making the conducting of a marriage of 
“minor whose marriage is prohibited by law” or of currently married (or appearing to be married) person a third 
degree felony (Ibid., 248, lines 10-14). 
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proposed amendments aimed at the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
living in Eldorado, Texas.157  Moreover, Rep. Hilderbran’s statement that Texas law enforcement 
would have to “be a little more creative in how we get the report” of sexual abuse from “inside” Yearning for 
Zion would prove prescient with regard to the events of spring 2008.158   
 
“It Has Never Been About Religion:” The Raid on Yearning for Zion 
 
From March 29 to April 3, 2008, a woman identifying herself as Sarah Jessop made calls to the 
Newbridge Family Shelter Hotline in San Angelo, Texas.159  “Jessop” said she was sixteen years old, 
living in FLDS’ Yearning for Zion ranch in Eldorado, and had been beaten and raped by her 
“spiritual husband” “Dale Barlow,” whom she claimed was more than thirty years her senior.160  She 
also claimed that “Barlow” had three other wives.161  “Jessop” reported that Barlow had on several 
occasions choked her, broken her ribs, and forced himself on her sexually.162  She further insisted 
that she had been forced to marry “Barlow” at age fifteen, had an eight-month-old child, and was 
                                                          
157 House Research Organization Bill Analysis (HB 3006), 4 and Harvey Hilderbran, “Press Release: HILDERBRAN 
AMENDS SB 6 TO ADDRESS POLYGAMIST ACTIVITIES,” April 25, 2005.  
 
158 Regarding the implicit targeting of FLDS in SB 6, see Richardson and Schreinert, “Political and Legislative 
Context of the FLDS Raid in Texas,”226-7 and Wright and Richardson, Saints Under Siege, 14-15. 
 
159 Wright and Richardson, Saints Under Siege, 1.  Swinton also conducted 30-40 hours of phone calls with former 
FLDS member and antipolygamy activist Flora Jessop.  Ibid., 3.  On the circumstances surrounding the calls, see 
Ibid., 3-6, as well as “Rozita Swinton’s Bad Call,” Newsweek Magazine, July 26, 2008, 
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160 Wright and Richardson, Saints Under Siege, 1.  Reports differ as to whether the alleged husband was 49 or 50.  
Ibid., 19.   Regarding spiritual marriage, see also Original Petition for the Protection of Children in an Emergency 
and for Conservatorship in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship, Peggy Williams, Clerk (District Court of 
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criminal charges of sexual charges with a minor and conspiracy to commit sexual charges with a minor “in 
connection to a purported marriage to a minor in Arizona, with whom he had conceived a child,” plead no contest, 
and was convicted in August 2007.  
 
161 Cf. Original Petition for the Protection of Children in an Emergency and for Conservatorship in Suit Affecting 
the Parent-Child Relationship, Peggy Williams, Clerk (District Court of Schleicher County, TX 2008), 4.  
 
162 Wright and Richardson, Saints Under Siege, 1.  See also Original Petition for the Protection of Children in an 
Emergency and for Conservatorship in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship, Peggy Williams, Clerk (District 
Court of Schleicher County, TX 2008, 3.  
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currently pregnant.163  “Jessop” maintained that she was being held at Yearning for Zion against her 
will, and requested help from the NewBridge Family Shelter and Family and Protective Services.164   
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DPFS) received a report of this 
alleged abuse on March 30, 2008.165  According to the DPFS “Eldorado Investigation” report, Child 
Protective Services and law enforcement officers raided the Yearning for Zion Ranch on April 3 to 
investigate “Jessop”’s allegations.  In their 2011 Saints Under Siege: The Texas Raid on the Fundamentalist 
Latter-day Saints, sociologists Stuart Wright and James Richardson note that “the heavily armed raid 
force included SWAT teams with automatic weapons and agents festooned in camoflauge, Kevlar 
helmets and vests, and flanked by helicopters, dozens of law enforcement vehicles, and an armored 
personnel carrier.”166 
During the two-day investigation that followed the raid, DPFS interviewers and Texas state 
police officers failed to locate either “Sarah Jessop” or “David Barlow” on ranch premises.167  
However, DPFS interviewers reported that “several underage girls had been ‘spiritually united’ with 
adult men.”168  
                                                          
163 Wright and Richardson, Saints Under Siege, 1, and corroborated by Original Petition for the Protection of Children 
in an Emergency and for Conservatorship in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship, Peggy Williams, Clerk 
(District Court of Schleicher County, TX 2008), 2.   
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Emergency and for Conservatorship in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship, Peggy Williams, Clerk (District 
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168 Eldorado Investigation, 1. 
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The DPFS “Eldorado Investigation” report, prepared on December 22, 2008, alleges a “pattern of 
deception” among the girls and women interviewed.169  On the evening of April 3, following the 
raid, DPFS took custody of eighteen girls.170  The department took hundreds of additional children 
into protective custody in the days following the initial raid. 
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services continued their investigation for 
three days.  DPFS interviewers “saw wedding photos involving young girls” and “found records 
indicating a pattern of underage marriages and births.”171  Based on this evidence, DPFS filed an 
“Original Petition for Protection of Children” on April 7 with the Schleicher County District Court 
on behalf of the “330 unidentified children” the department had removed from the Yearning for 
Zion ranch.172  The petition alleged that “there is a substantial risk that the children will be the 
victims of sexual abuse in the future and/or there is evidence that the household to which the 
children would be returned to includes a person who has abused or neglected another child in a 
manner that caused serious injury to another child and/or sexually abused another child.”173  DPFS 
and law enforcement officials treated the entire Yearning for Zion Ranch community as a single 
household, “under the theory that the ranch community was ‘essentially one household comprised of 
extended family subgroups’ with a single, common belief system and there was reason to believe that 
                                                          
169 Ibid.  Regarding allegations of “deceptiveness” – “Women and children frequently said that they could not 
answer questions about the ages of girls or family relationships.  Children were moved from location to location in 
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Protection of Children in an Emergency and for Conservatorship in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship, 
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171 Eldorado Investigation, 1.   
 
172 Original Petition for the Protection of Children in an Emergency and for Conservatorship in Suit Affecting the 
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from the DPFS varied with regard to the actual number of children removed from Yearning for Zion.  Scholars 
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a child had been sexually abused in the ranch ‘household.’”174  In what it called “the largest child 
protection case documented in the history of the United States,” the Department for Family and 
Protective Services took custody without a court order of 468 persons believed to be children – 
twenty-nine of whom were legally adult women.175  Between August and November 2008, a 
Schleicher County grand jury charged twelve FLDS men from Yearning for Zion with twenty six 
counts of charges related to sexual assault of a minor.176 
On May 22, 2008, the Third Court of Appeals ruled that DPFS had not met the burden of 
proof required to conduct an emergency removal of children; the Supreme Court of Texas declined 
to overturn the court of appeals decision.177  On June 2, 2008, the District Court ordered the return 
of all the children to their parents, but allowed Child Protective Services to continue its 
investigations.178  DPFS reported that all children returned to their parents by 2 p.m. on 4 June 
2008.179 However, one child remained in foster care – her mother refused to sign a “safety plan” 
promising to protect her daughter from sexual abuse.180   
Both the DPFS’ “Original Petition” and its “Eldorado Incident” report deploy rhetorical 
strategies similar to those evident in Banner and the HB 3006 proceedings.  Again, the FLDS (here, 
                                                          
174 In re Sara Steed, et al. (Texas Court of Appeals, Third District, at Austin 2008).  See also Mach and Graybill, 
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE, American Civil Liberties Union & American Civil Liberties Union of Texas, IN 
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specifically its Yearning for Zion contingent) are defined by the practice of polygyny, which is 
hypersexualized and overemphasized in DPFS statements.  Both the petition and the report portray 
FLDS men as unrepentant sexual predators and FLDS women and children—between whom the 
FLDS fails to meaningfully distinguish—as victims.  Though DPFS eventually returned all FLDS 
children to their mothers, the department insisted that all FLDS families provide “safety plans to 
protect their children from sexual abuse” and DPFS retains the right to take the children back into 
protective custody without notice or court order if future need presents itself.181  The state of Texas 
further classified almost 125 FLDS adults—primarily mothers—as "designated perpetrators” of 
sexual abuse or neglect; this designation levies civil restrictions on FLDS community members so 
designated, including restricting members’ right to adopt.182  Thus the DPFS findings following the 
raid continue to mark the people of Yearning for Zion as religiously and sexually suspect. 
The DPFS’ “Original Petition” states that  
 
while searching for the teenaged mother [“Jessop”] and her infant child, investigators at the 
YFZ Ranch observed a number of young teenaged girls who appeared to be minors and 
appeared to be pregnant, as well as several teenaged girls who had already given birth and 
had their own infants.  Investigators determined that there is a wide-spread pattern and 
practice among the residents of the YFZ Ranch in which young minor female residents are 
conditioned to expect and accept sexual activity with adult men at the ranch upon being 
spiritually married to them.  Under this practice, once a minor female child is determine [sic] 
by the leaders of the YFZ ranch to have reached child bearing [sic] age (approximately 13-14 
years old) they are then “spiritually married” to an adult male member of the church and 
they are required to then to [sic] engage in sexual activity with such male for the purpose of 
having children.183 
 
The “Original Petition” further alleges that  
 
it is the pattern and practice of the adult males to have more than one spiritual wife resulting 
in them having sexual relationships with a number of women, some of whom are minors.  
Minor boy children are expected, after they reach adult age and when their spiritual leader 
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determines appropriate [sic], to enter into a spiritual marriage with a female member of the 
church designated by the leader, which female [sic] may be a minor.184 
 
(It should be noted that, as I explored at length above, marriage to a minor per se is not illegal under 
Texas state law.)   
DPFS’ “Original Petition” further interpreted the practice of polygyny as a “pervasive 
pattern and practice of indoctrinating and grooming minor female children to accept spiritual 
marriages to adult male members of the YFZ ranch resulting in them being sexually abused” and 
that “minor boys residing on the YFZ Ranch, after they become adults, are spiritually married to 
minor female children and engage in sexual relationships with them resulting in them becoming 
sexual perpetrators.”185   
This petition reduces the theology and culture of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints to a “a wide-spread pattern and practice among the residents of the YFZ Ranch 
in which young minor female residents are conditioned to expect and accept sexual activity with 
adult men at the ranch upon being spiritually married to them.186 The petition uses bizarre language 
to discuss male children—“minor boy children…after they reach adult age”—implying that these 
boys are raised to be “sexual predators,” as stated above.  Likewise, the petition asserts that FLDS 
“groom[s] minor female children” for sexual abuse.  As with Banner and the proceedings concerning 
HB 3006, then, the “Original Petition” conflates FLDS with polygyny and exaggerates the 
importance of its practice in FLDS communities.  The petition also characterizes FLDS men as 
hypersexualized predators (and male children as predators-in-training), while failing to meaningfully 
distinguish between FLDS women and children, both of whom the petition suggests have been 
“indoctrinate[ed] and “groom[ed]” to accept sexual abuse. 
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The DPFS’ final report on the “Eldorado Incident” likewise defines the FLDS by the 
practice of polygyny and, more significantly, finds that practice evidence of “neglectful supervision” 
of children.187  DPFS found that the parents of 274 children (including twelve who DPFS 
determined had been sexually assaulted) had subjected their children to neglect because they failed to 
“remove their child from a situation in which the child would be exposed to sexual abuse committed 
against another child within their families or households.”188  This is to say that DPFS charged 124 
people from 91 families with “neglectful supervision” because they allowed their children to live at 
the Yearning for Zion Ranch.189  DPFS alleged that “in significant ways, the community functioned 
as a single household with a pervasive belief system that groomed girls to become future victims of sexual abuse 
and boys to become future sexual abuse perpetrators.”190 
FLDS mothers were largely responsible for agreeing to implement “safety plans” to protect 
their children from sexual abuse – again implying that FLDS men were suspected of rampant sexual 
predation and coercion.191  Indeed, the only mother to refuse to sign such a plan was forced to 
remand her child to the state.192  As with Banner, the hearings on HB 3006, and the “Original 
Petition,” the “Eldorado Incident” report reduces FLDS to the presumably abusive practice of 
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188 Ibid., 3.  This finding directly contradicts that of the Texas Third Court of Appeals, which stated that “[t]he 
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polygyny, portrays FLDS men as predators (and FLDS boys as predators-in-training), and FLDS 
women/girls as “groomed” to be “victims of sexual abuse.” 
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services remains adamant that the seizure 
of FLDS women and children was not motivated by religious intolerance.  The “Eldorado Incident” 
report states twice that “it [the raid and subsequent proceedings] has never been about religion.”193  
As with Banner and the hearings on HB 3006, however, it seems evident that notions of “bad 
religion” informed the actions of DPFS and Texas law enforcement officials.  Wright and 
Richardson comment on the “hawkish, military-like style of the raid force” sent to investigate the 
original report of abuse. 194 Wright and Fagen propose that FLDS and Texas law enforcement were 
“predisposed to believe sensational tropes” about FLDS; the authors suggest that “intrinsic 
narratives” about marginalized religions—including sexual assault, child abuse, brainwashing, and the 
stockpiling of weapons—might have prejudiced official actions toward FLDS.195 Richardson and 
Schreinert argue that Yearning for Zion had for some time been the target of surveillance, in an 
attempt by law enforcement to prepare for the eventuality of such a raid; the authors link these 
activities to SB 6 and Rep. Hilderbran’s earlier attempts to make FLDS feel unwelcome in 
Eldorado.196 
As the “Eldorado Incident” report notes, Texas state law requires DPFS to “investigate all 
reports of abuse or neglect ‘allegedly committed by a person responsible for a child’s care, custody, 
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or welfare.’”197 Rather, like the ACLU and the Supreme Court of Texas, I take issue with the 
excessive and unwarranted actions that followed that initial investigation.198   
Scholars are just beginning to offer sustained analysis of these events; the existent 
scholarship has made much of DPFS’ failure to prove systemic sexual abuse in the Yearning for 
Zion community.199  In their contribution to Saints Under Siege, Richardson and Schreinert note that 
“for all the YFZ children, except a handful of pubescent girls who, between the ages of fifteen and 
seventeen, were found to have had children, no other evidence has been submitted of any abuse or 
neglect, physical or sexual.”200  But this analysis does not fully account for the findings of the DPFS.   
DPFS removed twelve girls between the ages of twelve and seventeen from the Yearning for 
Zion Ranch; they confirmed 12 girls as victims of sexual abuse and neglect because those girls had 
been married between the ages of twelve to fifteen.  As the “Eldorado Incident” report notes, these 
findings indicate that “more than one in four pubescent girls on the ranch was in an underage 
marriage.”201  Twelve men were indicted on charges of various charges.  Warren Jeffs has since been 
convicted of child sexual assault and aggravated child sexual assault.202  Eight of those accused have 
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been convicted of bigamy and/or sexual assault of a child.  Additionally, Frederic Merril Jessop was 
convicted of performing an unlawful marriage ceremony involving a minor (that of his twelve-year-
old daughter), and Dr. Lloyd Barlow was convicted of failure to report child abuse because he 
delivered the babies of three underage girls. 
Obviously, even one case of child sexual assault discovered among the FLDS community at 
Yearning for Zion warrants official investigation – though not the militaristic and disproportionate 
response of Texas law enforcement, nor the unwarranted violation of family integrity or parental 
rights.203  But scholars have expressed surprise that DPFS found so little evidence and so few 
incidents of child sexual abuse among the Eldorado FLDS community, and that many women who 
had left Yearning for Zion with their children chose to return to the ranch of their own volition.204   
In raiding Yearning for Zion, Texas law enforcement and Family and Protective Services 
Department stigmatized this FLDS community.  In their excessive and militaristic actions, these 
agencies emphasized that FLDS in its entirety—not the single alleged perpetrator originally 
investigated or the nine men eventually convicted of bigamy and sexual assault of children—was 
religiously and sexually suspect, “bad religion.”  In doing so, these agencies invested in protecting 
victims of domestic and sexual abuse inadvertently discouraged FLDS women who might want to 
leave the community from seeking out state services, exacerbating the community’s isolation.205 
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The documents and statements I have analyzed here promote the constraint of religious and 
sexual difference, as evidenced by the “unprecedented” act of “mass detention,” the seizure of more 
than 400 FLDS children.206  While authorities phrased their actions in terms of protecting children, it 
is significant that women and children—not the men suspected of sexual assault—were the ones 
removed from Yearning for Zion.  The raid was indisputably a rescue mission.207  In this chapter’s 
final section, I suggest tropes of “liberating” women and children can work to constrain the religious 
and sexual freedom of religious minorities. 
As American religious historian John-Charles Duffy argues in his review of Saints Under Siege, 
there is an inherent tension between the state’s duty to prosecute child sexual abuse and the FLDS 
understanding of young adolescents as marriageable.208  In the final section of this chapter, I want to 
think more concretely about this tension, and how it might shape considerations of agency and 
voluntarism in the practice of marginalized, even unpopular, American religions.   
 
Women and Children First 
 
The Texas Department of Protective and Family Services and law enforcement officials forcibly 
removed 439 children from the Yearning for Zion Ranch in Elodorado.  DPFS also removed 
twenty-nine “children” later determined to be adult women.209  This is perhaps understandable, given 
the size and haste of the raid.210  However, DPFS’ inability to meaningfully distinguish between 
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FLDS women and children illustrates a problem systemic to public rhetoric about and treatment of 
religious minorities: portraying them as in desperate need of rescue.211 
The characterization of religious minorities—and particularly women members of unpopular 
religions—as “trapped” or “brainwashed” is, of course, not unique to Texas, its State House of 
Representatives, law enforcement officials, or other civil servants.  The American public’s eagerness 
to consume narratives of religio-sexual abuse among Mormon fundamentalist communities is 
evident in the popularity of books like Under the Banner of Heaven, as well as that of Carolyn Jessop’s 
autobiographical Escape (2007), the Oprah-distributed and award-winning documentary “Sons of 
Perdition” (2010),212 and Sam Brower’s Prophet’s Prey: My Seven Year Investigation into Warren Jeffs and the 
Fundamentalist Church of Latter-day Saints (2011).  Neither are such stigmatizing depictions unique to 
Mormon fundamentalist women, as I shall show with my subsequent case studies.  America loves a 
rescue story,213 and discourse surrounding FLDS and the Yearning for Zion raid is rife with 
protectionist discourse.214   
Such protectionist discourse is most evident in the language framing FLDS women as the 
victims or dupes of their husbands, fathers, and prophets.  Recall DPFS’ depiction of FLDS female 
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children being “groomed” for sexual assault.215 This language served as the overt justification for the 
largest state custodial detention of children in U.S. history, and the removal of an additional 139 
women – presumably from the abuses DPFS and Texas law enforcement officials considered 
intrinsic to the “pervasive belief system” of Yearning for Zion.   
 The protectionist discourse regarding Mormon fundamentalist polygyny is problematic for 
several reasons.  First, the rhetoric portrays FLDS, its people and its problems, as somehow outside 
the boundaries of contemporary American culture, as though women and children were not abused 
in other contexts.  In addition, this rhetoric fails to take seriously women’s first-hand accounts of 
lived Mormon fundamentalism and thus disregards the complexity of these women’s religious and 
sexual agency.  Finally, attempts to act on protectionist discourse—to rescue religious minorities—
may actually work against the ability of abuse victims to seek out or receive assistance.   
As Michelle Gibson notes in her 2010 “‘However Satisfied a Man May Be:’ Sexual Abuse in 
Fundamentalist Latter-day Saints Communities,” the protectionist discourse surrounding Yearning 
for Zion and Warren Jeffs suggests that abuses within FLDS are unique to the community.  Gibson 
cites Attorney General Shurtleff as insisting that “the kind of abuse and isolation inflicted on women 
and children by Jeffs and his followers results from polygamy and is therefore exceptional, contained in the 
sect.”216  Here Shurtleff attributes the sexual assaults that occur within FLDS directly to the practice of 
polygyny, rather than to the fact that one-third to one-half of all sexual abuse “committed against girls 
in the United States is perpetrated by family members.”217  By attributing the abuses at Yearning for 
Zion to polygyny, Gibson suggests that Shurtleff “exonerat[es] (monogamous) mainstream families 
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from patriarchal attitudes that place women and children at risk.”218 Depicting FLDS as exceptional 
shifts the blame for abuse and coercion to a non-normative sexual practice (polygyny), a maneuver 
Gibson considers “prurient focus on imagined sexual activity.”219   
The problem with such blame shifting is three-fold.  First, if we see these abuses as isolated 
in polygamous communities, then the solution to the problem becomes controlling the behavior of 
one deviant man, or one deviant group of men, or one deviant community, not about “calling into 
question an entire culture’s attitudes and behaviors.”220  I have commented at length about the 
tendency to conflate Mormon fundamentalism with sexual predators and the practice of polygyny; 
the American media and legal system’s fixation on Warren Jeffs speaks to a conviction that removing 
the FLDS president would resolve the “problem” of Mormon fundamentalist polygyny.  But perhaps 
more importantly, Gibson insists that “placing the ‘blame’ for abuse and autocratic control on 
polygyny is tantamount to placing the blame on nonnormative sexual practice, a move which finally supports 
the oppression of any number of sexual minorities.”221  Discourse that identifies religious minorities 
as especially prone to sexual predation ignores larger systemic issues that perpetuate the abuse of 
women and children in broader American society.  Gibson urges scholars to engage FLDS women 
and children as part of a larger national citizenry rather than as outsiders.”222  Gibson observes that 
the voices of FLDS women and children are “lost in the righteous indignation” of protectionist 
exceptionalism, for their stories are mediated by producers, publishers, and audiences unwilling to 
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confront the fact that FLDS attitudes about gender and sexuality reflect patriarchal attitudes deeply 
embedded in US society and culture.”223 
 Anthropologist Janet Bennion has emphasized in numerous publications the importance of 
taking seriously Mormon fundamentalist women’s accounts of their own lived religious 
experience.224  In her 2011 “The Many Faces of Polygamy: An Analysis of the Variability in Modern 
Mormon Fundamentalism in the Intermountain West,” Bennion insists that Mormon fundamentalist 
women’s experiences of plural marriage are “rich and varied.” Her ethnographic work among the 
AUB communities in British Columbia has led Bennion to conclude that polygyny cannot be 
“uniformly and directly tied to abuses against women and children,” and she attributes findings to 
the contrary to a lack of data collection on women’s experiences.225  Bennion moreover insists that  
Like any other alternative family form, polygamy does not easily fit into mainstream 
society… [S]ome groups may be at higher risk than the others, this does not mean that entire 
communities should be held at gunpoint, nor does it mean that all underage marriage is 
“abusive”…[I]n certain circumstances, when a young woman is trained to take on the duties 
of wife and mother and has full choice in whom she marries, she may not interpret underage 
marriage as sexual abuse.”226 
 
Many of Bennion’s interlocutors insist that they are content in their marriages and deeply value their 
relationships with their sister-wives.227  Bennion’s interlocutors often emphasize the stability, 
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financial advantages, and friendship promoted by plural marriage.228  Consistent with Bennion’s 
observation of Mormon fundamentalist modesty, few women commented on the sexual benefits or 
detriments of plural marriage.  This corroborates my assertion that outsider accounts of Mormon 
fundamentalism overemphasize the sexual aspects of polygyny; silencing the experiences of Mormon 
fundamentalist women contributes to this persistent misrepresentation.229   
The failure to account for Mormon fundamentalist women’s lived religious experience also 
ignores the complexity of these women’s religious and sexual agency.  I concur with Bennion’s 
observation that “there are ample illustrations of female autonomy, achievement, and contentment 
within a polygamous context.”230  However, the cases I have examined in this chapter demonstrate 
the necessity for more nuanced considerations of gendered religious agency.  In her influential 2004 
Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, Saba Mahmood argues compellingly that 
neoliberal societies (and particularly feminist scholars) define women’s agency too narrowly.  
Mahmood insists that agency cannot and should not be understood solely in terms of resistance to 
patriarchal systems – that the ability to act must also be recognized in the act of submission, a 
concept she calls “negative freedom.”231  Gibson’s analysis supports Mahmood’s argument: 
The war against the sexual abuse and exploitation of FLDS women and children is 
unwinnable precisely because it is framed as war, and FLDS women are unsavable precisely 
because they are viewed as in need of salvation. Narratives in which patriarchal saviors wage 
war on behalf of women position those women as passive characters whose lives are always 
already subject to control by others.232 
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I concur with Mahmood’s assertion that accounts of gendered religious agency must acknowledge 
the possibility and appeal of religious submission.  However, the case studies I have addressed in this 
chapter require further consideration of American assumptions regarding individual autonomy in 
religious and sexual practices.   
As demonstrated in the public rhetoric about contemporary Mormon fundamentalism, 
participation in bad sex is often interpreted as coerced or irrational.  The inverse also pertains: bad 
religion is assumed to be irrational or forced as well.  As Gibson notes, this leads to a contradiction 
in public rhetoric about Mormon fundamentalism: “FLDS women and children are portrayed as 
‘innocent’ to the sexual permissiveness of mainstream US society at the same time that mainstream 
US society sees the group’s practice of polygamy as sexually permissive.”233   
If, as Bennion suggests, we take seriously the lived experience of contemporary Mormon 
fundamentalists, it seems necessary to conclude that some Americans choose to participate in 
transgressive religio-sexual practices.  Attempts to act on protectionist discourse—to rescue religious 
minorities—may actually work against the ability of abuse victims to seek out or receive assistance.  
Gibson raises the concern that “overt militaristic action against polygamous sects will…engender 
greater isolation and secrecy, thereby increasing the risk to FLDS women and children.”234  Gibson 
acknowledges the reality of abuses in FLDS culture, though she refuses to credit their exceptionality; 
she moreover insists that FLDS women “deserve support and intervention on their behalf—as long 
as that intervention comes in forms defined and controlled by them.”235   
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In her 2007 Justice, Gender, and the Politics of Multiculturalism, political scientist Susan Song 
argues for the qualified legal recognition of polygamy to secure such support and intervention.  
Recognizing polygamy, Song suggests, might secure a “realistic right of exit” for Mormon 
fundamentalist women who wish to leave their marriages but retain custody of their children or who 
experience physical or sexual abuse within their communities.  In this, Song proposes a more 
nuanced understanding of religious agency:   
The central claim here is that religious and cultural groups should be let alone as long as 
membership in these groups is voluntary.  Not voluntary in the sense that a religious belief 
and cultural attachments are experienced as choices, but rather that individual members can, 
if they wish, exit groups.236 
 
Securing the right for individual exit not only protects individuals, Song notes.  In addition, the threat 
of mass exits might have significant effect on policies and practices within minorities religions such 
as the FLDS.237  Legal recognition of polygamy would allow state and federal agencies to help 
ameliorate the barriers to leaving Mormon fundamentalism, including educational and employment 
opportunities and “other material benefits” issuing from group membership.238  Song concludes that 
focusing efforts on ensuring women’s reasonable right to exit through a qualified legal recognition of 
polygamy “can better protect the basic rights of Mormon women and children in polygamous 
households” than legal proscriptions.239 
 
Conclusion 
 
Texas state legislators, law enforcement, and civil servants insistence that the raid on the Yearning 
for Zion ranch was “never about religion” precisely exemplifies my larger argument: the rhetorical 
emphasis on sexual impropriety discourages both religious and sexual difference while upholding a 
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professed national commitment to religious tolerance.  These officials’ desire to protect victims of 
sexual assault and coercion is laudable, but the conviction that sexual assault must be occurring at the 
ranch because its residents practice polygyny displays a demonstrable, if unconscious, intolerance of 
minority religions and unconventional sexual practices.  Such cases are precisely about religion.   
As religious studies scholars, we must resist attempts to reduce Mormon fundamentalism—
marked as it is by communalism, apocalypticism, poverty, and isolation—to the practice of polygyny.  
So too must we challenge the reduction of plural marriage to sexual predation.  We must 
acknowledge the complexities of a theology and community that understand as “marriage” a practice 
considered “sexual abuse” by state and federal law enforcement agencies.240  We must recognize 
both that Mormon fundamentalists are a vulnerable religious minority who encounter overt and 
subtle religio-sexual intolerance and that some of these same individuals suffer and perpetuate sexual 
coercion and abuse. 241  The operations of state and federal law enforcement toward Mormon 
fundamentalists demonstrate subtle and overt religious intolerance informed by a normalized 
conservative Christian sexual ethic.  Moreover, the rhetoric surrounding the “need” to liberate 
Mormon fundamentalist women and children discouraged religious and sexual difference in the 
contemporary United States. 
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 “Daddy, Do I Hate Americans?” Domestic Terrorism and  
American Sexual Exceptionalism in Not Without My Daughter 
 
Mahtob: Daddy, do I hate Americans? 
 
Bozorg: What do you mean?  Of course not. 
 
Mahtob: Lucille says I hate Americans because you're from Eye-Ran. 
 
Bozorg: Sweetheart, Lucille doesn't really know what she's talking about.  So we shouldn't pay too 
much attention to her.  I've lived in America for 20 years.  I'm as America as apple pie.  So are you.  
 
“Not Without My Daughter,” dir. Brian Gilbert (1991)  
 
 
“He hugged me.  Then he kissed me.  And during the few minutes of passion that  
followed I was able to dissociate myself from the present.  At that moment my body  
was simply a tool that I would use, if I had to, to fashion freedom.” 
 
Betty Mahmoody with William Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter (1987) 
 
 
 
The 1987 international best-seller Not Without My Daughter chronicles Betty Mahmoody’s harrowing 
escape with her daughter, Mahtob, from captivity and abuse in post-revolutionary Iran.   Betty 
Mahmoody narrates her husband’s rapid deterioration from an industrious and thoroughly 
Americanized medical doctor into an abusive, impotent lunatic shortly after their family’s arrival in 
Tehran.  Dr. Sayyed Bozorg Mahmoody allegedly held his wife and daughter captive, refusing to let 
them return to America and beating them when they voiced their dissent.  When the American State 
Department failed to rescue Mahmoody and her daughter, they braved the icy mountains of 
northern Iran to escape into Turkey and freedom.   
Betty Mahmoody’s tale of captivity and liberation sold 15 million copies internationally and 
has been translated into 20 languages.1  Mahmoody also told her story to Barbara Walters, Larry 
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King, Phil Donahue, Sally Jessie Raphael, and Oprah Winfrey – and through them, to millions of 
American viewers.2  The book was selected as a Literary Guild alternate and nominated for a Pulitzer 
Prize in 1987.3  Sally Field portrayed Mahmoody in the poorly reviewed but oft-referenced 1991 film 
adaptation of Not Without My Daughter.  Mahmoody was celebrated as Outstanding Woman of the 
Year by Oakland University and as Woman of the Year in Germany.  Her alma mater, Alma College, 
awarded Mahmoody an honorary doctorate of letters.  The US State Department appointed 
Mahmoody as an advisor “on the plight of American women and children held against their will in 
foreign countries.”4  It is no exaggeration to say that Not Without My Daughter made Betty Mahmoody 
an international feminist icon, the poster girl for women’s liberation from oppressive—and notably 
religious—patriarchal abuse. 
Yet Mahmoody’s account is not uniformly accepted.  As film scholar Nacim Pak-Shiraz 
notes, “on the Iranian screens, the victim was Mahmoudy [sic] and not his wife.”5  In the Finnish 
documentary “Without My Daughter” (2002), Dr. Sayyed Bozorg Mahmoody, family members, and 
acquaintances refute a number of Betty Mahmoody’s assertions.6  “I am a beast and a criminal in the 
eyes of the world,” Dr. Mahmoody told his documentarians.7  “I have been portrayed as a liar, a 
woman-beater, and a kidnapper... My sin, my only sin was that I loved my child, my daughter.”8  
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Without My Daughter also includes interviews with the Mahmoodys’ American friends still living in 
Iran, who accuse Betty of fabricating much of her story.   
But the veracity of Betty Mahmoody’s account is largely beside the point.  Despite its 
contested content, Not Without My Daughter stands not merely as a personal memoir of domestic 
discord, but as “an authoritative manual on Iran.”9  As literature and gender scholar Farzaneh Milani 
emphasizes, “no book about Iran has achieved the phenomenal success of Not Without My 
Daughter.”10 In the relative absence of other narrative portrayals of Islam and Iran during the mid-
1980s to early 1990s, the book and film “enjoyed a monopoly in circulating [their] perspective on 
Islam and Muslims to a broad popular audience.”11  Mahmoody’s account has shaped American 
popular imaginings, not only of Iran, but of Muslim masculinity writ large. 
Not Without My Daughter characterizes Bozorg Mahmoody as a domestic terrorist: abusive, 
irrational, and consumed by religious fanaticism – but the expressions of his religiously-motivated 
rage and violence are limited to the domestic sphere, notably his American wife and daughter.12  This 
domestic terrorism, Daughter implies, is a microcosmic instantiation of the hostility, irrationality, and 
fanaticism inherent to Iran, and by extension, Islam, toward 1980s America.  Milani observes that 
Betty Mahmoody’s portrayal of her husband “leaps from one man to a whole nation, from one 
country to a whole faith,” and invites her audiences to make similar cognitive leaps.13 Mahmoody’s 
accounts of interactions with other Muslim men in Iran also portray them as primarily abusive, 
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list included no books about Iran until 1981; after the publication of Not Without My Daughter, the Times listed five 
books on Iran as best-sellers (3 non-fiction, including Daughter).  See Milani, Words, Not Swords, 208.  
 
12 Here, “domestic” signals both the private (home, family, American normative sexuality) and the public (sovereign 
national identity). 
 
13 Milani, Words, Not Swords, 217.  See also Miles on the ways the film rewards audiences for sympathizing with Betty 
Miles, Seeing and Believing: Religion and Values in the Movies, 91. 
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sexually voracious (particularly when in contact with western women), and religiously fanatical.  
Daughter functions not merely as one woman’s account of a harrowing escape from captivity and 
abuse, but rather as a cautionary tale against exogamy: a warning against marrying and mating with a 
racialized, hypersexualized religious other. 
In this chapter I argue that Not Without My Daughter articulates and authorizes religious 
intolerance by framing Betty Mahmoody’s captivity in terms of anxiety about exogamy.  Daughter pits 
the frustrated religious and sexual excess of Bozorg Mahmoody against the sexual exceptionalism 
(informed by the moderate, private, Protestant religiosity) of his American wife.  The doctor’s 
excessive religiosity and sexuality resist and finally defeat all his attempts to Americanize himself, 
rendering him incontrovertibly, essentially foreign.  At the same time, Betty Mahmoody’s religious 
and sexual exceptionalism, despite her dalliance with a hypersexualized and racialized religious 
outsider, finally redeem her – allowing her to escape from captivity in Tehran.  Thus Daughter 
functions not merely as a narrative of captivity, but also as one of atonement and redemption: Betty 
Mahmoody suffers for her sexual transgression and escapes to freedom only when she has fully and 
finally rejected her illicit liaison with a racially and sexually perverse religious outsider.14 
In this way, Daughter expresses a religious intolerance informed by “good sex,” in this 
context, the assumption that appropriate or culturally validated sex should occur between two 
members of a single cultural group (in this case, among white Protestant] Americans).  By portraying 
Bozorg Mahmoody as a racialized and hypersexualized foreigner and allowing his character to 
function synecdochically for Muslim masculinity, Daughter insists that—despite close to three 
centuries of Muslim presence in what is now the United States—Islam itself can never be a truly 
American religion.15   
                                                          
14 Jasbir K. Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), xiii. 
 
15 On presence of Islam in colonial and early republic Americas , see Thomas A. Tweed, “Islam in America: From 
African Slaves to Malcolm X,” n.d., http://nationalhumanitiescenter.org/tserve/twenty/tkeyinfo/islam.htm and  
Edward E. Curtis, The Columbia Sourcebook Of Muslims In The United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2008). 
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During the mid-1980s and early 1990s, American public approval for Islamophobic 
rhetoric—particularly following the 1979-1981 Iran hostage crisis—facilitated Mahmoody’s 
argument against exogamy to a greater extent than might have been permissible in a pre-crisis 
context.16  Such an overt indictment of exogamy in late 20th century America might have otherwise 
proved contentious.  However, public suspicion regarding Islam, essentialized as violent and hostile 
(particularly toward women), facilitated Mahmoody’s racialized and hypersexualized characterization 
of Muslim masculinity as domestic terrorism and her attendant critique of exogamy. 
This is to say that religious and sexual intolerance, in such contexts as that of Daughter, 
perform a sort of recursive legerdemain: each term simultaneously builds on and distracts from the 
other.  The threat of “bad” or excessive sex facilitates the articulation of religious intolerance and its 
construction and constraint of “good” or “real” American religion, while the specter of “bad 
religion” both authorizes and directs attention away from subtle public regulations of “good” or 
socially acceptable sex – in this case, religio-nationally endogamous procreative marital intercourse.17  
Daughter’s emphasis on and essentialization of the frustrated lasciviousness of Muslim masculinity—
and its logical product, the oppression and abuse of women—exemplifies public anti-Muslim 
rhetorics.  At the same time, Mahmoody’s construction of Islam as essentially un-American at once 
authorizes her denunciation of exogamy. 
Betty Mahmoody portrays her husband as a domestic terrorist: one who tried and failed to 
Americanize himself, who “backslid” into Islamic fundamentalism, ultimately unleashing the 
madness and violence that she had long suspected lurking within him.18  As I shall show, 
                                                          
16 On the public sphere’s discursive shift toward the consolidation of America as a “Christian nation” following the 
Iran hostage crisis, Melani McAlister, “Iran, Islam, and the Terrorist Threat, 1979 - 1989,” in Terrorism, Media, 
Liberation, ed. John David Slocum (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 147.  Obviously, 
Islamophobic rhetoric (and public approval thereof) by no means limited to late 1980s and the early 1990s.  As this 
chapter establishes, however, American Islamophobia following the Iran hostage both precedes and informs early 
21st century (which is to say post-9/11) Islamophobic rhetorics.  
 
17 Endogamy refers to engaging in marital (and therefore sexual) relations outside one’s cultural group. 
 
18 Betty Mahmoody and William Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987), 20, 3.   
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Mahmoody’s portrayals of other Iranian men mirror her characterizations of her husband as abusive, 
hypersexualized, and religiously obsessed. Mahmoody attributes these characteristics to a “primitive” 
and “irrational” religiosity, Shi’i Islam (which she fails to meaningfully distinguish from Islamic 
fundamentalism or Islam as a whole).  Her flight from Iran, portrayed as the triumph of the female 
will over a primitive and irrational religious patriarchy, encourages her audiences to fear and shun 
Muslim men as potential domestic terrorists.  Her account also warns the American reading public—
largely ignorant of the histories and cultures of Central Asia and the Middle East—about the dangers 
of “sleeping with the enemy.” 19 
In this chapter, I read Mahmoody’s account of captivity and escape as a narrative of 
American sexual exceptionalism’s triumph over the domestic terrorism of her Muslim husband.20  In 
analyzing the sexual exceptionalism in Daughter, I build on Jasbir Puar and Amit Rai’s 2002 “Monster, 
Terrorist, Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile Patriots.  Puar and Rai note that 
rhetorical constructions of Muslim masculinity combine tropes of monstrosity, terrorism, and sexual 
deviance; I show that Betty Mahmoody’s characterization of her husband and other Muslim Iranian 
men precisely exemplifies this “monster-terrorist-fag” concept.  For the purposes of this chapter, 
“sexual exceptionalism” refers to an understanding of American sexuality as separate from and 
superior to the presumed racialized perversity of the religious outsider.21  The liberatory rhetoric of 
Mahmoodys’ narrative underscores her exceptionalism while reiterating the lascivious impotence of 
domestic terrorists who capture and abuse her – which is to say, Muslim men.  Mahmoody’s 
discursive construction of Muslim masculinity as domestic terrorism articulates and authorizes public 
religious intolerance of Islam, while her example of American sexual exceptionalism justifies her 
                                                          
19 Jane Campbell, “Portrayal of Iranians in U.S. Motion Pictures,” in The U.S. Media and the Middle East: Image and 
Perception, ed. Yahya R. Kamalipour (Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1997), 179. 
 
20 Puar’s work in Terrorist Assemblages directly informs my understanding of the term; I theorize “American sexual 
exceptionalism” more fully in the following section.   
 
21 Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 3. 
 153  
denunciation of exogamy.  In this way, discursive constructions of “good” American sex and “good” 
American religion simultaneously inform, reinforce, and distract from each other.   
In pursuing this argument, I first demonstrate the extent to which the book and film 
versions of Not Without My Daughter characterize Bozorg Mahmoody—and by extension, Muslim 
men—as domestic terrorists.  I read this form of domestic terrorism as a pre-9/11 instantiation of 
Jasbir Puar’s “monster-terrorist-fag,” a characterization of Muslim masculinity as racially, sexually, 
and religiously perverse.22  Next, I show that Betty Mahmoody’s character in book and film 
embodies an American sexual exceptionalism, simultaneously authorizing anti-Islamic sentiment and 
demonstrating the perils of exogamy.  Finally, I consider the ways in which the dual discourses of 
domestic terrorism and American sexual exceptionalism continue to fascinate and disturb the 
American public sphere.  Pulp nonfiction “hostage narratives” and American foreign policy alike 
mobilize exceptionalist language to portray Muslim masculinity as something that women the world 
over need saving from.  The discursive construction of Muslim masculinity as racially, sexually, and 
religiously perverse collapses the theological and practical complexities of lived Islam, occludes the 
prevalence of American domestic abuse absent any supposed religious motivation, and forecloses the 
complexity of women’s agency within non-Protestant religions. 
 
Sleeping with the Monster-Terrorist-Fag:  
Muslim Masculinity as Domestic Terrorism 
 
Not Without My Daughter portrays Dr. Sayyed Bozorg Mahmoody as a domestic terrorist: an abusive 
and irrational racially and sexually perverse religious other whose violence is necessarily limited to the 
domestic sphere.  This domesticity neither negates nor diminishes Mahmoody’s menace.  Indeed, 
Daughter depicts his domestic terrorism as all the more terrifying for its appearance of assimilation, of 
                                                          
22 Jasbir K. Puar and Amit S. Rai, “Monster, Terrorist, Fag: The War on Terrorism and the Production of Docile 
Patriots,” Social Text 20, no. 3 72 (September 21, 2002): 117–148. 
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“normalcy.”  Moreover, Bozorg Mahmoody’s character comes to function as a synecdoche for 
Muslim masculinity throughout Daughter.  His character is merely the most visible and best 
developed instantiation of the racialized impotent lasciviousness and religious fanaticism Mahmoody 
suspects of all Muslim men.23   
My reading of Bozorg Mahmoody’s character as domestic terrorist is informed by Jasbir 
Puar’s concept of the Muslim man as “monster-terrorist-fag.” Puar introduces this concept in an 
eponymous article written in collaboration with Amit Rai (2002), and she expands on the concept in 
her 2007 Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times.  The construction of Muslim masculinity 
as monster-terrorist-fag, Puar suggests, is a specific mode of orientalism,24 one that collapses Muslim 
masculinity into a hypervisible racially, sexually, and religiously perverse other in need of regulation 
and quarantining by western civilization.25  The notion of the monster-terrorist-fag, Puar insists, 
functions both to marginalize Islam and to produce “normalized and docile” American patriots.26 
The portrayal of Bozorg Mahmoody as a domestic terrorist offers a vivid demonstration of  
Puar’s monster-terrorist-fag.  The portrayal also functions as a synecdoche for Muslim masculinity.27  
I therefore use Puar to analyze Daughter‘s portrayal of Muslim masculinity.  I suggest that Bozorg 
Mahmoody’s domestic terrorism is best considered in three parts: his monstrosity, indicated by the 
character’s uncanniness and racialization; his terrorism, indicated by his violent religious fanaticism; 
                                                          
23 Milani, Words, Not Swords, 217. 
 
24 Orientalism refers to the “subtle and persistent Eurocentric prejudice against Arabo-Islamic peoples and their 
culture” that authorized western imperialism, as famously theorized by Edward Said.  For further discussion of 
orientalism’s relationship to western constructions of religion, see Richard King’s 1999 Orientalism and Religion.  
Edward W. Said, Orientalism (Random House Digital, Inc., 1979); Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Post-Colonial 
Theory, India and “The Mystic East” (Routledge, 2002). 
 
25 Puar and Rai, “Monster, Terrorist, Fag,” 117; Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, xi. 
 
26 Puar and Rai, “Monster, Terrorist, Fag,” 117. 
 
27 Synecdoche is a figure of speech in which the term for part of something is used to refer to the entire entity. 
Here, “Bozorg Mahmoody” stands in for Muslim masculinity. 
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and his faggotry, indicated by his impotent lasciviousness.28  Bozorg Mahmoody functions as a 
synecdoche for Muslim masculinity becomes clear in the context of Mahmoody’s depiction of other 
Muslim men.  The characterization of Bozorg Mahmoody (and by extension, all Muslim men) as 
domestic terrorist(s) portrays Muslim masculinity as essentially and incontrovertibly un-American. 29  
 
 
Monster 
 
Mahmoody first achieves the vilification of Muslim masculinity by characterizing her husband and 
his fellow countrymen as monstrous.  She is not subtle in rendering Bozorg as grotesque: 
Mahmoody refers to her husband as “a sleeping ogre” whose “eyes held the pent-up rage of a 
thousand tortured demons.”30  She “retch[es] with the effort” of feigning affection for him.31  
Mahmoody characterizes her husband, Iranian men, and Muslim men in general as monstrous 
throughout NWMD.  As novelist Porochista Khakpour recounted to the Los Angeles Times:  
When I was 13, “Not Without My Daughter” came out… I still remember my family's naïve 
moment of rejoicing at the trailer — Gidget had married an Iranian! But…Gidget's “crime 
of being an American” was being met with the horrific punishment of living in Iran forever! 
…It was a horror movie about Iran. We were Freddy Krueger.32 
 
In this subsection, I demonstrate and problematize Mahmoody’s construction of Muslim masculinity 
as monstrous.  These rhetorics of monstrosity deploy the tropes of uncanniness and racialization.   
Mahmoody characterizes Muslim men as terrifyingly familiar violators of domestic spaces, as beasts, 
                                                          
28 Note that these characteristics do not fall into neatly separable categories; rather, the monster-terrorist-fag 
assembles ‘a cacophony of informational flows, energetic intensities, bodies, and practices that undermine coherent 
identity” narratives.  Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 222. 
 
29 Ibid., xiii. 
 
30 Mahmoody and Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter, 304-5, 184. 
 
31 Ibid., 229. 
 
32 Porochista Khakpour, “Essay: Iranians Moving Past Negative Depictions in Pop Culture,” Los Angeles Times, June 
27, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/27/entertainment/la-ca-iran-popculture-20100627 (emphasis 
added).  Khakpour is the author of the novel Sons and Other Flammable Objects (Grove Press, 2007).  Freddy Krueger 
is a horrifically scarred, razor-nailed, and be-striped sweatered bogeyman who menaces the teenagers of director 
Wes Craven’s 1990s slasher film series “A Nightmare on Elm Street.” 
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and as figures whose very bodies betray their foreignness – thus suggesting Islam has always already 
been un-American.   This monstrous rhetoric marks Muslim men as legitimate subjects of discipline, 
containment, and even violence. 
In “Monster, Terrorist, Fag,” Puar and Rai identify the monstrosity of Muslim masculinity as 
uncanny.33  My understanding of the “Muslim monster” as uncanny builds on Freud’s theory of the 
unheimlich: an anxiety intensified by the familiarity of its subject.34  In his 1919 essay “The Uncanny,” 
Freud explained that uncanniness—literally unhomeliness—both draws a subject in through 
familiarity and discomforts that subject through a sense of strangeness.  The uncanny monster can 
never be entirely foreign, being familiarly strange and strangely familiar.  The attraction and fear 
Bozorg Mahmoody inspires in his wife demonstrates this sense of the uncanny. Bozorg’s menace lies 
in his discomforting intimacy and in his violation of the domestic sphere.  In her treatment of 
Daughter, political scientist Anne Norton notes that Muslim “hyper-masculinity is, in every sense, a 
domestic matter” and that “the figure of the bad father has acquired almost archetypal status in 
contemporary American cinematic representations of ‘the enemy.’”35  Bozorg Mahmoody’s character 
demonstrates such uncanniness in his degradation from loving and attentive husband and father into 
terrifying—yet familiar—madman.  
The print version of Daughter does more to establish Bozorg Mahmoody’s uncanny 
monstrosity than its cinematic complement.  As Margaret Miles observes in her 1997 Seeing and 
Believing: Religion and Values in the Movies, “perhaps the most dramatic of many divergences from the 
                                                          
33 Puar and Rai, “Monster, Terrorist, Fag,” 124, 139. 
 
34 Sigmund Freud, David McLintock, and Hugh Haughton, The Uncanny (New York: Penguin, 2003).  
 
35 Anne Norton, “Gender, Sexuality, and the Iraq of Our Imagination,” Middle East Report 173, no. 21 (December 
1991), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer173/gender-sexuality-iraq-our-imagination.  Norton underscores the 
prevalence of media accounts emphasizing the “dictatorial domestic rule” and an “unrestrained use of domestic 
violence” by Muslim leaders like Hafiz al-Asad, Saddam Hussein, and Muammar Qaddafi.  As her title implies, 
Norton is primarily concerned with the construction of Arab Muslim masculinity; however, she notes that (as in the 
case of Not Without My Daughter), “the ascription of a threatening masculinity extends…to Muslim Persians as well 
as Arabs.” 
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novel [sic] is the omission of the book’s description of Moody’s disintegration from happy and 
relatively successful young husband and father to domestic tyrant.”36  But the film’s early depictions 
of idyllic suburban American domesticity—Mahtob and Betty fighting over “Moody’s” lap; Bozorg 
reading Persianate fairy tales to his daughter; Betty’s description of Mahtob as “such a daddy’s 
girl”—haunt later scenes of domestic violence in chaotic Tehran.  The husband’s affectionate and 
passive demeanor throughout the film’s opening sequence evaporates abruptly at the 34 minute 
mark.  Bozorg curtly informs his wife their family won’t be returning to Michigan and slaps her when 
she protests.  His behavior is abusive and erratic for the remainder of the film.   
Such an uncanny disruption of the domestic sphere is, the film implies, implicit in Muslim 
marriages. When a Swiss embassy worker asked Betty why she came to Iran, Betty replies: "I don't 
know.  I was afraid to come.  I wanted to please him.  I trusted him.  I was frightened to come but I 
never thought this could happen.  I thought of him as an American.  He's changed.  Oh god, he's 
changed."37  Sally Field’s dramatic interpretation of Betty Mahmoody’s account underscores the 
frightening intimacy of her marriage in Iran.  The man with whom she has been most closely 
connected has proved to be a terrifying “demon.”38  The Swiss embassy representative informs Betty 
that many American women in Iran share her plight, implying that such violent domesticity is 
intrinsic to marriage with Muslim men.  Betty’s American friend, Ellen, confirms this assertion.  Her 
Muslim husband never abused her in America, but became violent when they relocated to Tehran.39  
The Daughter film insists volatile affections and the unsettling intimacy of domestic violence are 
                                                          
36 Miles, Seeing and Believing: Religion and Values in the Movies, 74. 
 
37 Brian Gilbert, Not Without My Daughter, 1991 (emphasis added).   
 
38 Mahmoody and Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter, 151. 
 
39 However, as Betty’s foil, Ellen insists that this violence is not inherent to Islam.  “[Muslim men] are not supposed 
to [be violent toward their wives], you know.  It's not Islamic.  Marriages do work out here.  They can be good.  It 
can be hard at times, but you've got to give it time, Betty.  Islam has such beauty in it.  I mean, I'm glad my kids are 
growing up as Muslims.”  Ellen converted in an attempt to promote domestic harmony; however, she admits her 
marriage is still tense and occasionally abusive.  Mahmoody discusses Ellen’s “negative example” more fully in the 
pulp nonfiction version of Daughter. Mahmoody and Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter, 281. 
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intrinsic to Muslim marriage, thus insinuating that an uncanny monstrosity lurks within Muslim 
masculinity. 
Bozorg Mahmoody’s disturbing disruption of the domestic sphere is more pronounced in 
the pulp nonfiction version of Daughter.  This tension is marked by Mahmoody’ s insistence that even 
when her relationship with Bozorg was going well, she suspected something was not quite right. 
Though initially “honored as the queen of [Bozorg’s] life,” Betty found her husband’s personality 
“paradoxical.”40 She attributes his internal tension to warring internal factions: “His mind was a 
blend of brilliance and dark confusion.  Culturally he was a mixture of East and West; even he did 
not know which was the dominant influence in his life.”41  Mahmoody insists that once they entered 
Iran, Bozorg’s personality conflicts violently resolved themselves in favor of the “East.”  Her 
description of their initial argument over returning to America captures this uncanny shift: 
With Mahtob watching, unable to comprehend the meaning of this dark change in her 
father’s demeanor, Moody growled, “I do not have to let you go home.  You have to do 
whatever I say, and you are staying here.” He pushed my shoulders, slamming me onto the 
bed.  His screams took on a tone of insolence, almost laughter, as though he were the 
gloating victor in an extended, undeclared war.  “You are here for the rest of your life.  Do 
you understand?  You are not leaving Iran.  You are here until you die.”42 
 
After seven years of avoiding marital conflict, two weeks in Iran transformed Bozorg into a 
“venomous stranger who had once been a loving husband and father.”43  Note both the violence and 
the implied inevitability of this character shift.   Mahmoody frequently refers to this uncanny tension: 
Bozorg became “a jailer now rather than a husband”; Mahtob’s “daddy was suddenly our enemy.”44 
                                                          
40 Ibid., 3. 
 
41 Ibid., 3. 
 
42 Mahmoody and Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter., 40. 
 
43 Ibid., 41.  On this point, see also Betty de Hart, “Not Without My Daughter: On Parental Abduction, 
Orientalism, and Maternal Melodrama,” European Journal of Women’s Studies 8, no. 1 (February 1, 2001): 55.  
 
44 Mahmoody and Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter, 56. 
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Ironically, Betty maintains that Bozorg “was simply not the man [she] had married.”45  And yet she 
insists that “for years [she] had seen the shadow of madness descend upon him.”46 
As in the film, the pulp nonfiction version of Daughter implies that such unsettling, violent 
behavior is inherent in Muslim masculinity.  Despite Betty’s protests, Bozorg’s niece insists “all men 
are like this.”47  Ellen, Betty’s American friend who converted to Islam to please her husband, 
suggests that her captivity and abuse taught her to become a “dutiful Moslem wife.”48  (She admits, 
though, that her husband still beats her and her children.)  This disturbing resignation to intimate 
violence underscores the monstrous quality of Muslim masculinity.   
Daughter’s depiction of Muslim men’s monstrosity is also demonstrably racialized.49  Bozorg’s 
character aspires to Americanize himself but ultimately fails.  He “reverts” to oppressive, abusive 
behavior that Mahmoody qualifies as Muslim almost immediately upon returning to Iran.  
Mahmoody depicts Bozorg’s failure to fully assimilate to American culture as something inherent to 
Iran and Islam, categories she elides and discusses in quasi-racial terms. 
Puar and Rai insist that the character of the monstrous Muslim man is always racialized, 
marking male Muslim bodies as legitimate foci of public scrutiny and regulation.50  For my purposes, 
                                                          
45 Ibid., 73. 
 
46 Ibid., 102. 
 
47 Ibid., 101. 
 
48 Ibid., 145-7. 
 
49 The racialization of the monstrous is, of course, not unique to Mahmoody.  See, for example, scholarly analysis of 
Bram Stoker’s Dracula as an expression of anxieties about exogamy.  Cf. Stephen D. Arata, “The Occidental Tourist: 
‘Dracula’ and the Anxiety of Reverse Colonization,” Victorian Studies 33, no. 4 (July 1, 1990): 621–645; John Allen 
Stevenson, “A Vampire in the Mirror: The Sexuality of Dracula,” PMLA 103, no. 2 (March 1988): 139. 
 
50 Puar and Rai, “Monster, Terrorist, Fag,” 117, 131; see also Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 13.  On this point, see also 
Ruth Frankenberg, White Women, Race Matters: the Social Construction of Whiteness (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993), 75: “Integral to [racism as a] set of linked discursive, economic, and political histories were 
constructions of masculinities and femininities along racially differentiated lines.  Foremost was the construction in 
racist discourses of the sexuality of men and women of color as excessive, animalistic, or exotic in contrast to the 
ostensibly restrained or ‘civilized’ sexuality or white women and men.” 
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“racialization” refers to the assigning of supposedly indelible qualities to a group of disparate people 
based on an assumption of shared behaviors and physical attributes.51  That Daughter is set in Iran 
should complicate Mahmoody’s racialization of Islam, as many Iranians are phenotypically white.52  
Mahmoody circumvents this complication by eliding Persian and Arab masculinities.53 
Mahmoody’s racialization of her husband and Islam supports her insistence that both are 
indelibly foreign, almost biologically incapable of assimilating to American culture.54 As literary 
scholar Farzaneh Milani observes in her 2011 Words, Not Swords: Iranian Women Writers and the Freedom 
of Movement, narratives like Daughter portray anti-Americanism as “written in the Iranian nation’s 
collective DNA.”55  Ethnic studies scholar Sylvia Chan-Malik further remarks that despite a 
significant Muslim presence in mid-1980s Michigan, Mahmoody’s husband stands as Daughter’s 
“prime example of a ‘Muslim American’: a resolute foreigner from the Middle East who claims to 
                                                          
51 Khyati Y. Joshi, “The Racialization of Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism in the United States,” Equity & Excellence in 
Education 39, no. 3 (2006): 211–2.  
 
52 Campbell, “Portrayal of Iranians in U.S. Motion Pictures,” 179; though she notes that “paradoxically, at the same 
time that Iranians are often confused with Arabs, they are erroneously perceived as having white privilege rather 
than occupying a marginalized ethnic status.” 
 
53 Mahmoody and Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter, 6-7, 47.  On this point, see also Norton, “Gender, Sexuality, and 
the Iraq of Our Imagination.” 
 
54 Such an assertion is deeply ironic, as Sylvia Chan-Malik observes in her excellent  “Chadors, Feminists, Terror 
The Racial Politics of U.S. Media Representations of the 1979 Iranian Women’s Movement,” The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 637, no. 1 (September 1, 2011): 112 – 140. Chan-Malik points out that 
“from Betty’s perspective, [Bozorg] appears to be the only Muslim in Michigan, an exotic anomaly” (115).  
However, “by the early 1980s…Detroit had already become home to a large diaspora of Muslim immigrants from 
the Middle East (including many Iranians), as well as being the birthplace and a central headquarters for the Nation 
of Islam (NOI)... The multilayered history of Islam within various immigrant and African American communities 
does not exist in Betty’s America—only the singular image of a violent, two-faced, and irrevocably foreign Moody” 
(115). 
 
55 Milani, Words, Not Swords, 216.  More: “There is no mention of the long history of friendship between the two 
nations that predated the Islamic Revolution.  Nothing is said about the decades of valued alliance between the two 
governments before the hostage crisis.  Instead, an angry sea of chest-pounding, fist-shaking mobs burn effigies of 
the American president, trample on the American flag, and scream anti-American slurs and ‘death to America’ like a 
mantra” (216). 
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love the United States and partakes in all of its privileges while secretly harboring the mind and soul 
of a fanatical fundamentalist.”56    
Mahmoody racializes her monstrous depiction of Islam and Muslim masculinity by implying 
that fanatical religious and political affiliations can somehow be transmitted genetically.  The best 
filmic example of this authorial anxiety is an exchange between Mahtob and her father: 
Mahtob: Daddy, do I hate Americans? 
Bozorg: What do you mean?  Of course not. 
Mahtob: Lucille says I hate Americans because you're from Eye-Ran. 
Bozorg: Sweetheart, Lucille doesn't really know what she's talking about.  So we shouldn't 
pay too much attention to her.  I've lived in America for 20 years.  I'm as America as apple 
pie.  So are you.  
But since the audience is already aware that Bozorg will betray and abuse his American family 
members, his claim to be “as America as apple pie” rings false.57  His “reversion” to monstrous 
Muslim behaviors seems inevitable.   
The film’s depiction of this monstrous racialization is, with the exception of the exchange 
noted above, at once omnipresent and ephemeral.  The actors cast as Iranians are phenotypically 
Arab for the most part.  Alfred Molina, who plays Bozorg “Moody” Mahmoody, is of Spanish and 
Italian descent.  The film depicts Iranians as cacophonous, chaotic, irrationally devout and loyal to a 
fanatical political regime.  Betty Mahmoody’s character, played by Sally Field, insists that her 
husband’s desire to remain in Iran is somehow a reversion to his biological roots: “I know what's 
been going on.  They've got no right.  You've got to resist it."  Bozorg’s character replies: "I'm a 
Muslim.  This is where I should be.  This is where my family should be."  Note that he identifies as 
                                                          
56 Chan-Malik, “Chadors, Feminists, Terror The Racial Politics of U.S. Media Representations of the 1979 Iranian 
Women’s Movement,” 115. 
 
57 It is worth noting that the film emphasized American anti-Iranian sentiment to a far greater degree than the book.  
For example: in Gilbert’s film, the doctors at Bozorg’s hospital have extended racist exchange at Bozorg’s expense; 
it is religio-racial discrimination (not malpractice) that gets him fired.  The director, unlike Mahmoody herself, does 
not imply this discrimination is Bozorg’s fault. 
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Muslim, rather than Iranian –an elision of Islam and foreign identity, suggesting that Muslims cannot 
also be Americans. 
The racialization of Muslim masculinity as monstrous is more overt in the pulp nonfiction 
version of NWMD.  Both Bozorg Mahmoody’s foreignness and his frustrated desire to assimilate to 
American culture are refrains throughout the book.  When she met him, Mahmoody recounts, 
Bozorg aspired to be an American.  He claimed to never want to return to Iran and even applied for 
American citizenship.58  But reassurances from friends that he had been “thoroughly Americanized,” 
Mahmoody remained doubtful.59 She attributes their domestic disputes—his failure to put her name 
on their joint checking account; his expectation of “unquestioning obedience” from her sons—to 
their “cultural differences.”60   
The 1979 revolution in Iran exacerbated Bozorg’s foreignness: “the revolution took place in 
our home as well as in Iran.  Moody began to say his Islamic prayers with a piety I had not witnessed 
in him before.  He made contributions to various Shiite groups.”61  The expatriot Iranians of her 
acquaintance “proved to be stubborn about assimilating western culture.  Even those who lived in 
America for decades often remained isolated, associating mainly with other expatriate Iranians.  They 
retained their Islamic faith and their Persian customs.”62  Note Mahmoody’s lack of reflection on 
motivations for expatriate Iranians remaining isolated in the wake of transnational conflict between 
the United States and Iran.  She even goes so far as to suggest that Bozorg deserved prejudicial 
treatment because of his public identification with Iran’s political upheaval.  While she admits 
                                                          
58 Mahmoody and Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter, 47-49, 211. 
 
59 Ibid., 3. 
 
60 Ibid., 212. 
 
61 Ibid., 215. 
 
62 Ibid., 48. 
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Bozorg faced “racial prejudice,” she insists that “much of it was self-inflicted.”63  An extended visit 
from Bozorg’s nephew Mammal finally reveals the indolent authoritarianism of Muslim masculinity.  
Not only does Mammal boss and spy on Betty, but he exacerbates Bozorg’s supposedly inherent 
laziness and authoritarianism. 
These racialized allegations allow Mahmoody to portray Bozorg’s abuse and authoritarianism 
as a reversion to his “true” nature.  Her husband “unAmericanized” his speech during their first days 
in Tehran64; “the longer [they] remained in Iran, the more [Bozorg] succumbed to the unfathomable 
pull of his native culture.”65  Mahmoody insists that the longer they stayed in Iran, Bozorg “reverted 
more and more to his Iranian personality:”66 
I saw my husband, who had lived in the United States for so many years, backslide more and 
more into his old Iranian thinking and behavior. . . . I had married the American Moody and 
the Iranian Moody was an unwelcome stranger to me.67 
 
Note the language of reversion, of “backsliding,” in this passage.  Mahmoody depicts her husband’s 
behavior, not as a desperate attempt to relocate their family, but as an inevitable reversion to his 
monstrous, racialized, essentially foreign identity.  She further observes this transformation while 
Bozorg prays: “once more, before my eyes, he changed from an American into an Iranian.”68  The 
linking of “reversion” to Iranian identity and the act of prayer further reinforces Mahmoody’s 
racialization of Islam.   
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66 Ibid., 349. 
 
67 Ibid., 349; emphasis added. 
 
68 Ibid., 351. 
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Puar and Rai note that the construction of Muslim men as monstrous functions “as a screen 
to project both the racist fantasies of the West and the disciplining agenda of patriotism.”69  These 
monstrous portrayals of Muslim men infantilize the audience, insisting that “the monster is the 
enemy.  The enemy must be hunted down to protect you and all those women and children that you 
do not know, but we know.’”70  In this way, Puar and Rai argue, discourses of monstrosity render 
Americans docile, willing to accommodate foreign policies they might find otherwise objectionable.71  
This version of Muslim masculinity at once renders Muslim men legitimate targets of containment 
and discipline while reifying American domesticity as imperiled and in need of saving. 72 
Mahmoody is at some pains to insist that the racialized and uncanny monstrosity imperiling 
American domesticity is religious in nature.  As Puar notes in Terrorist Assemblages:  “religious belief is 
thus cast, in relation to other factors fueling terrorism, as the overflow, the final excess that impels 
monstrosity – the ‘different attitude toward violence’ signaling these uncivilizable forces.  Difference 
itself is pathological.  In the liberal-secular imaginary, religion is also always already pathological.”73  Thus in 
the figure of the domestic Monster-Terrorist-Fag, the monstrosity of domestic terrorism is 
necessarily linked to an excessive and violent religiosity.  
 
  
                                                          
69 Puar and Rai, “Monster, Terrorist, Fag,” 131. 
 
70 Ibid.  
 
71 See also Milani, Words, Not Swords, 232-3 on this point: “Books hailed as authoritative windows into the Islamic 
world carry political as well as ethical responsibilities…Perhaps we should question distortions of truth and 
betrayals of history as well as the politics of publishing and image making.  Perhaps we should ask why we are so 
easily seduced by plots that resemble fairy tales, with monstrous wardens on one side and helpless prisoners on the 
other.  We live in a time when women’s oppression has the power to attract immediate and passionate attention and 
ironically to prepare the public to accept policy options that they would find otherwise unpalatable.” 
 
72 Puar and Rai, “Monster, Terrorist, Fag,” 135-6. 
 
73 Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 51; emphasis added. 
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Terrorist 
 
Rhetorical constructions of the Muslim man as terrorist—which is to say violent and religiously 
excessive—are perhaps the most conspicuous and familiar of the tropes Mahmoody uses to 
marginalize Islam as necessarily un-American.74  However, the terrorists in Daughter are domestic; the 
primary targets of masculine, Muslim violence are American wives and daughters.   
Both the film and pulp nonfiction versions of NWMD are rife with domestic violence.  The 
cinematic depictions of abuse are less graphic and shorter.  The Bozorg Mahmoody character begins 
hitting his wife at the 34 minute mark in the film.  He slaps Betty and shakes his fist in her face, 
shouting “you listen to me.  You're in my country now.  You're my wife.  You do as I say, you 
understand me?  We're staying here.”  When Betty returns from a covert visit to the Swiss embassy, 
Bozorg punches her in the face, slaps her, and pushes her against the wall, vowing that should Betty 
“try anything like this again, I'll kill you.  I'll kill you.”  When Betty and Mahtob arrive late to 
Mahtob’s school, Bozorg beats them both in front of school officials, shoving Betty against a wall, 
hitting his daughter, and throwing his wife to the ground.  He then drags her out the door, 
threatening that “I'll kill you.  I'm going to cut you up.  You're going to be dead.”  These scenes of 
domestic violence frequently pan to static images of the Ayatollah, soldiers frantically shouting and 
kissing the Qur’an.  Betty watches Friday prayers at the University of Tehran from the terrace of 
Bozorg’s family home, the backdrop for which is a mural depicting bloody swords labeled Israel, 
USA, Saudi, and USSR.  In this way, the film connects the domestic violence Bozorg inflicts upon 
his wife and the political and military violence occurring in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
The Daughter book provides more detailed accounts of Bozorg’s domestic violence.  
According to Mahmoody’s account, Bozorg “slammed [Betty] onto the bed” while threatening to 
                                                          
74 On this point, see Norton, “Gender, Sexuality, and the Iraq of Our Imagination:” “The particular form of 
masculinity ascribed to Arab men in general, and to the holders of Arab power in particular, emphasizes violence.  
Arab ‘strongmen’ and ‘madmen’ are identified with the making of war and the sponsorship of terrorism, with 
military rule, and with the violent repression of dissent. This is confounded, in academic and political discourse and 
in popular culture, with reiterations of Arab masculinity.” 
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keep her in Iran until she died.75  He rigidly controls her access to the phone when she contacts her 
parents: “he told me what to say, and he listens carefully to the conversation.  His demeanor was 
threatening enough to make me obey.”76  His behavior is “erratic,” keeping Betty “off balance.”77 
Bozorg kicks Mahtob in the back for disobeying him, and then screams, curses, and beats both Betty 
and Mahtob after they return from the Swiss embassy.78  Mahmoody provides detailed accounts of 
her husband’s violence and death threats; she recalls that her “body felt like one huge bruise.”79  She 
fears for her life: “the severe beating intensified the risks that lay ahead; my injuries were proof that 
Moody was, indeed, crazy enough to kill me—kill us—if anything set off his anger.”80  When Betty 
and Mahtob try to resist this abuse, Bozorg’s attacks become animalistic: he scratches and bites 
them.81  
Bozorg’s abuse is an instantiation of the domestic abuses Betty fears from Iran’s Islamic 
government.  A note on the book’s copyright page explains that NWMD “is a true story.  The 
characters are authentic, the events real.  But the names and identifying details of certain individuals 
have been disguised in order to protect them and their families against the possibility of arrest and 
execution by the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”82  Mahmoody rips her IUD from her 
cervix because she fears execution should an Iranian doctor or official find it.83  Thus Daughter 
                                                          
75 Mahmoody and Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter, 40. 
 
76 Ibid., 57. 
 
77 Ibid., 58. 
 
78 Ibid., 66-67. 
 
79 Ibid., 99-101, 185-7. 
 
80 Ibid., 102. 
 
81 Ibid., 197-9. 
 
82 Ibid. copyright page.  See also Milani, Words, Not Swords on the fraught verifiability of such accounts – which 
becomes all the more problematic when those narratives are they’re ahistorical and/or just incorrect, but are read as 
factual and authoritative. 
 
83 Mahmoody and Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter, 230. 
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implies that the domestic terrorism of Muslim masculinity enacts intimate violence on the vulnerable 
bodies of women.  This violence, Mahmoody frequently reminds her readers, is both religiously 
justified and permissible – evidence of the excessive and fanatical nature of (her depiction of) Islam.   
Excessive and violent religiosity invades Mahmoody’s domestic sphere throughout the film; 
the material culture of Islam is everywhere linked with state-sanctioned violence and militarization.  
The car that takes them from the airport passes intimidating military vehicles on the way to Bozorg’s 
family home.  Cacophonous calls to prayer resound through the house.  Soldiers kiss the Qur’an on 
the television she watches; the pasdar (religious police) menace her when she fails to cover properly 
in public.  Bozorg’s nephew chides her, explaining "you must not to be careless!  Every single hair 
that is not covered is like a dagger that you aim at the heart of our martyrs."  Calls to prayer within 
the home disturb the Mahmoody marital bed.  When Betty good-naturedly tries to cajole him into 
ignoring an early morning call, Bozorg responds angrily: "What's the matter with you?  I'm with my 
family.  They're sayyeds.  Do you know what that means?  They're direct descendants of 
Mohammed.  They deserve a little respect.  Of course, to the sophisticated American that all must 
seem so incredibly primitive."84  As Bozorg imprisons and abuses his wife, “he seems to do so in the 
name of Islam as when he slaps her face, boasting, ‘I'm a Muslim!’”85  When Betty pleads to return to 
America for the sake of their child, Bozorg insists that "Islam's the greatest gift I can give my 
child."86  The film intersperses Betty’s final flight out of Tehran with menacing images of Ayatollah 
Khomeini.    The message is clear: the audience should understand that Bozorg, Iran, and Muslim 
masculinity are intimately connected through an excessive, overwhelming, and incomprehensible 
mode of religiosity.87 
                                                          
84 This is an unusually nuanced moment for the film, but the moment’s nuance is negated by Bozorg’s own early 
characterization of family as primitive. 
 
85 Jack G. Shaheen, “Hollywood’s Muslim Arabs,” Muslim World 90, no. 1/2 (Spring 2000): 22. 
 
86 Here again Mahmoody implies that American and Muslim identities are mutually exclusive. 
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The pulp nonfiction version of Daughter is more explicit about linking violent masculinity 
and excessive religiosity.  Mahmoody “marveled at the power their society and their religion held 
over” Iranians.88  Bozorg’s family condones and even facilitates his abuses, “clad in the self-righteous 
robes of fanaticism”89  When she wants to condemn religious regulations of women’s behavior and 
dress, Betty finds herself silenced: “I was ready to launch into a tirade against the oppression of 
women in Iran, but all around me hovered insolent, superior-looking men fingering their tassbeads 
and mumbling ‘Allahu akbar,’ as women wrapped in chadors sat in quiet subservience.”90  Betty fears 
the “Islamic noose around [her] neck,” lamenting that she is “married to a madman and trapped in a 
country where the laws decreed that he was my absolute master.”91  In these ways, Mahmoody’s 
narrative constructs Muslim masculinity as domestic terrorism, enacting intimate violence authorized 
by excessive religiosity. 
 
Fag 
 
The “monster-terrorist” Puar and Rai theorize is also a “fag,” represented by a sort of “failed 
heterosexuality.”92  The excessive and violent religiosity of the domestic terrorist is also sexualized as 
perverse, pitted against what Puar and Rai call an “aggressive heterosexual [American] patriotism.”93  
“Terrorist masculinities,” Puar proposes, are “failed and perverse”; rhetorics of monstrous terrorism 
                                                          
87 Muslims are literally incomprehensible throughout the film – the Persian and Arabic dialogue is unsubtitled.  Cf. 
Shaheen, “Hollywood’s Muslim Arabs”:  “The editing implies that the offensive actions of Muslims towards 
American women and the behavior of Iran's late Ayatollah are clearly connected.” 
 
88 Mahmoody and Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter, 5. 
 
89 Ibid., 57. 
 
90 Ibid., 34. 
 
91 Ibid., 181, 67. 
 
92 Puar and Rai, “Monster, Terrorist, Fag.” 124. Puar moreover notes historical linkages b/w periods of national 
crisis and pathologization of sexuality (2007 xiii).  In the case of Gilbert’s Not Without My Daughter, both the Iran 
hostage crisis and the first Gulf War serve as context for the film.  
 
93 Puar and Rai, “Monster, Terrorist, Fag,” 117. 
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render “Muslim masculinity …simultaneously pathologically excessive and yet repressive…virile yet 
emasculated, monstrous yet flaccid.”94  Thus the domestic terrorism of Muslim masculinity is at once 
lascivious and impotent.   
Mahmoody confesses that she initially found her husband’s racialized foreignness exotic and 
desirable.95  Bozorg “was a gentle lover, caring for my pleasure as much as his own.  I had never 
experienced such a strong physical attraction.  We could not seem to get close enough to each other.  
All night long we slept in an embrace.”96  When they arrive in Iran, however, Bozorg’s sexuality 
becomes monstrous.97  Even after captivity and violence mar their relationship, Bozorg occasionally 
still solicits sex from Betty.  But these overtures are infrequent and sporadic, and Mahmoody is at 
great pains to convey how distasteful she finds her husband’s advances.  “During the next several 
minutes [of intercourse] it was all I could do to keep from vomiting, but somehow I managed to 
convey enjoyment.  I hate him!  I hate him!  I repeated to myself all through the horrid act.”98  
Mahmoody accommodates her husband’s repellant desires to facilitate her escape attempts.  “Sex 
with Moody was merely one of many ugly experiences I knew I would have to endure in order to 
fight for freedom.”99  As her plans solidify to escape Iran and her husband, their sexual activities 
occur on a more frequent basis: “it was necessary for me to feign affection.”100  Yet Mahmoody 
notes that this “feigned affection” heightens her anxiety about becoming pregnant “by a man [she] 
                                                          
94 Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, xxv. 
 
95 Cf. de Hart, “Not Without My Daughter: On Parental Abduction, Orientalism, and Maternal Melodrama,” 55.   
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loathed.”101  She later classified these “horrid act[s]” as instances of marital rape.102 It is also possible 
to read the detailed and extensive narratives of domestic abuse as having sexual connotations: 
Mahmoody refers to her husband’s “sadistic fantasies,” and beating-as-penetration is an established 
storytelling trope.103  The monstrosity of Bozorg’s sexuality marks these events as “perverse” 
instantiations of Muslim male sexuality.104 
Mahmoody portrays Bozorg’s monstrous sexuality as conforming to broader 
Iranian/Muslim culture.  Those sympathetic with her plight warn her that those who promise to 
smuggle foreigners out of Iran often rape and murder the people they’ve been hired to help.105  Betty 
eventually dismisses these concerns, as she “had already been robbed, kidnapped, and raped” by her 
own husband.106  In her interactions with other Iranian men, Betty finds herself molested by a 
“particularly pungent Iranian” bus driver107; she and her friend Alice are both groped by Iranian taxi 
drivers.108  The film and pulp nonfiction versions of Daughter also portray Mahtob at risk of an 
omnipresent, threating Muslim sexuality.  In the book, Betty worries that her daughter will be taken 
and sold into underage marriage by the Kurdish family hosting them, and in the film, a friend warns 
her that Bozorg’s family is "from the provinces.  They're more fanatical than most.  Some consider a 
girl of nine ready for marriage.  Child brides are not unknown." 109 Here again we see connections 
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drawn between sexual predation and religious fanaticism, also evidenced in repeated reports of the 
pasdar  (Iranian religious/military police) kidnapping, raping, and execute women, as well as men 
from other Muslim countries (notably Iraq and Afghanistan) raping and murdering Iranian girls.110  
The cumulative effect of these anecdotes is to construct Muslim masculinity as sexually predatory, 
lascivious, and abusive.111   
But in keeping with Puar’s analysis, the rapacious sexual desire of Muslim masculinity is 
rendered impotent in Daughter – primarily through Betty’s own American sexual exceptionalism, as I 
will explore in the following section.  In the film, constant calls to prayer disrupt the Mahmoody 
marital bed; Bozorg turns vicious when Betty tries to lure him into staying.  In the book, 
Mahmoody’s descriptions of their conjugal relations are unflinchingly denigrating.  Her accounts of 
their sexual encounters emphasize that sex between her and her husband is infrequent, brief, and 
dissatisfying: “several minutes,” during which Betty struggles not to vomit; a “few minutes of 
passion” she endures to lure her husband into complacency .112  Even in the United States, the 
Mahmoodys faced marital troubles while Bozorg was unemployed; Betty reports that they went five 
months without even kissing.113  The birth of his daughter further emasculated him: “‘Why is she a 
girl’ was the accusation he had meant to level at me.  His Islamic manhood wounded at the arrival of 
a firstborn daughter, he left us on our own that night, when he should have been at our side.  That 
was not the kind of manhood I wanted.”114  In Iran, Mahmoody forces herself to make sexual overtures in 
an attempt to make peace, but Bozorg refuses her – again implying a failed and flaccid masculinity: 
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“On those nights that Moody chose to stay with me, we slept in the same bed, but he was distant.  A 
few times, desperately fighting for freedom, I edged close to him and put my head on his shoulder, 
nearly retching with the effort.  But Moody was uninterested anyway.  He groaned and turned over, 
away from me.”115  The clearest construction of Bozorg’s impotence is Mahmoody’s use of 
contraception without her husband’s knowledge.  She has an IUD inserted without his knowledge, 
and after she removes it out of fear of execution, she smuggles oral contraceptives out of Bozorg’s 
medical supplies.116  Though he threatens to take another wife to provide him sons, these threats 
amount to nothing.117  Severe infant deformities among Bozorg’s extended family bear further 
testament to the thwarted virility of his Muslim masculinity: his niece and nephew, having prayed for 
a son, must go on a religious pilgrimage every year of their lives – even though the hoped-for son 
was born with brain damage and his feet twisted backwards.118  Mahmoody remarks on several 
occasions about the prevalence of infant deformity in Tehran.  Without evidence, she attributes said 
deformities to “inbreeding” and “intermarriage.”119  In these ways, Mahmoody renders Muslim 
sexuality simultaneously impotent and horrifying.   
This understanding of Muslim sexuality as simultaneously excessive and impotent 
contributes to Mahmoody’s construction of Muslim masculinity as monstrous, terrorist, and sexually 
perverse – marking the targets of that sexuality as imperiled and in need of rescue.  In addition, as 
Diaz argues in his review of Terrorist Assemblages, such a construction of hypersexualized Muslim 
masculinity “negates and disavows the multiple ways that the United States itself limits particular 
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sexualities and sexual practices within its border.”120 Mahmoody relegates sexual violence and abuse 
to a foreign, racialized, and religiously fanatical sphere. 
Mahmoody’s construction of Muslim masculinity as domestic terrorism corresponds with 
Puar and Rai’s concept of the monster-terrorist-fag.  Daughter portrays monstrosity as uncanny and 
racialized, terrorism as violent and religiously excessive, and sexual deviance as paradoxically 
lascivious and impotent.  Mahmoody’s characterization of Muslim men as monsters-terrorists-fags 
corresponds with “stagings of US nationalism via a praxis of sexual othering, one that 
exceptionalizes [American sexual] identities…vis-à-vis Orientalist constructions of ‘Muslim 
sexuality.’”121  As we proceed, I next explore the construction of Betty Mahmoody’s own American 
sexual exceptionalism that takes shape through the characterization of Muslim masculinity as 
domestic terrorism. 
 
Body Fashioning Freedom: Betty Mahmoody’s Sexual Exceptionalism 
 
In sharp contrast to her monster-terrorist-fag of a husband, Betty Mahmoody constructs self as 
sexually exceptional throughout Daughter.  In this section, I will first engage sexual exceptionalism as 
Puar theorizes the concept in Terrorist Assemblages.  I will then examine Mahmoody’s rhetoric of 
American sexual exceptionalism throughout Daughter, which I suggest is mostly clearly demonstrated 
through her attempts to protect and liberate the product of that exceptionalism, her daughter.  
Finally, I will problematize this exceptionalist rhetoric, noting in particular the ways her arguments 
for exceptionalism bolster Mahmoody’s indictment of exogamy.  Daughter articulates and authorizes 
American religious intolerance of Islam by insinuating that Muslim men are sexually perverse.  At the 
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121 Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 4.  Note that American sexual exceptionalism as it functioned during the 1980s to early 
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same time, the narrativization condemns exogamy by suggesting that Muslims are excessively 
religious.   
 
Defining Sexual Exceptionalism 
 
In Terrorist Assemblages, Jasbir Puar argues that exceptionalism “paradoxically signals distinction from 
(to be unlike, dissimilar) as well as excellence (imminence, superiority).”122  She maintains that 
discourses of sexual exceptionalism produce the United States as “an exceptional nation-state,” one 
whose policies and moralities emerge as somehow unique and universally applicable.123  Sexual 
exceptionalism may be read as a discourse of “moral superiority,”124 but such a reading must account 
both for conflation of morality with a conservative Christian sexual ethic and for the permission the 
state grants itself to enforce or suspend that morality during a perceived (but ultimately false) “state 
of exception.”125 
Discourses of American sexual exceptionalism produce and require an Other: what Puar 
calls “terrorist bodies” – the bodies of Muslim men marked as monstrous, terrorist, and sexually 
perverse.  Thus rhetorics of American sexual exceptionalism construct themselves as “liberated,” in 
opposition to a “perverse” and monolithic Muslim sexuality.126 Puar suggests that sexual 
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126 Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, xxiv; see also Diaz, “Transnational Queer Theory and Unfolding Terrorisms,” 537.  
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exceptionalism defines this singular Muslim sexuality through “discourses of sexual repression,” 
American sexual exceptionalism understands “Muslim sexuality” as necessarily repressive and 
repressed.127  This ideology of sexual exceptionalism moreover also serves to mask internal American 
“policing of the boundaries of acceptable gender, race, and class formations,” which is to say that the 
construction of “Muslim sexuality” as repressive—in opposition to “American sexuality” as 
“liberated”—obscures the ways in which American heteronormativity constructs and compels 
certain raced, classed, and gendered attitudes, assumptions, and behaviors.128 I also include the 
mutually reinforcing regulation of religion and sexuality as key to American sexual exceptionalist 
discourses.129  Inasmuch as American heteronormativity developed within and depends on a 
normalized Protestant sexual ethic, sexual exceptionalism likewise constructs and compels 
religiously-informed attitudes, assumptions, and behaviors among contemporary Americans. 
Identifying the Muslim man as monster-terrorist-fag is crucial to the construction of 
America as sexually exceptional.  “Sexual deviancy is linked to the process of discerning, othering, 
and quarantining terrorist bodies, but these racially and sexually perverse figures also labor in the 
service of disciplining and normalizing subjects worthy of rehabilitation away from these bodies.”130 In 
Daughter, Mahmoody’s construction of herself as sexually exceptional (and her daughter as a product 
of that exceptionalism) produces her husband (and Muslim men) as monster-terrorist-fag.  But, as 
Puar explains, such exceptionalist rhetoric further disciplines and normalizes American sexuality as 
something distinct and precious, in need of protection or rehabilitation from the perverse and 
racialized sexuality of Muslim masculinity.  In this way, Daughter’s dual construction of Muslim 
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masculinity as domestic terrorism and American femininity as sexually exceptional articulates and 
authorizes both anti-Muslim religious intolerance and sexually regulatory scripts against exogamy.131   
 
Betty Mahmoody’s American Sexual Exceptionalism 
 
Mahmoody’s “authorial self-mythologizing” does not limit discourses of exceptionalism to explicitly 
sexual behaviors.132  Rather, the author filters her entire experience in Iran through Muslim 
masculinity’s attempts to constrain her exceptionalism.133  Mahmoody emphasizes her own heroic 
agency by touting her remarkable resolve in the face of beatings and marital rape, as well as her 
ability to protect and redeem the product of her contact with the monstrous sexuality of Muslim 
masculinity – that is, her daughter Mahtob.  Mahmoody presents her daughter as the final and most 
compelling evidence of her own exceptionalism.  Despite her half-monstrous parentage, Mahtob 
emerges from captivity and abuse as resolutely and exceptionally American as her mother.   
The character Mahmoody constructs for herself is rooted in a deeply embodied, private 
(which is to say apolitical), and individualistic heroic agency.  Mahmoody establishes this heroic 
agency by narrating her own courageous resolution in the face of domestic abuse and marital rape; 
she provides the most graphic example of this resolve in the narration of removing her intrauterine 
contraceptive device (IUD).   She constructs this heroic degree of agency in contrast to Tehran, 
                                                          
131 On exceptionalism as regulatory script, see Ibid., 2. 
 
132 Milani, Words, Not Swords, 218. 
 
133 Mahmoody’s frequent and vicious invectives against covering provide ample evidence of this point.  The film 
makes this explicit as Betty Mahmoody’s character challenges her husband: "to cover them up and hide them away – 
are they so afraid of women's sexuality or what?"  (It is worth noting that the film briefly introduces complexity 
around covering through Mahmoody’s response: "No, no, no.  That's not the reason.  Iranian women like to wear 
the chador.  It's a mark of respect."  However, this complexity is ultimately negated by Bozorg’s abuses.)  
Scholarship on popular culture and Islam flooded with conversations about covering; for an excellent analysis of 
multivalent function of covering in Islam, see Homa Hoodfar, “The Veil in Their Minds and on Our Heads: Veiling 
Practices and Muslim Women,” in Women, Gender, Religion: A Reader, ed. Elizabeth Anne Castelli and Rosamond C. 
Rodman (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 420–446.  On the appropriation and commodification of the material 
culture of covering by western feminists, see Ellen McLarney, “The Burqa in Vogue: Fashioning Afghanistan,” 
Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 5, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 1–23, 120; Charles Hirschkind and Saba Mahmood, 
“Feminism, the Taliban, and Politics of Counter-Insurgency,” Anthropological Quarterly 75, no. 2 (2002): 339–354; and 
Lila Abu-Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism 
and Its Others,” American Anthropologist 104, no. 3 (2002): 783–790. 
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which she characterizes as a dangerously hypersexualized environment.  She emphasizes her privacy, 
individualism, and agency, which readers are led to infer is inherent to all “normal Americans.”  
Mahmoody’s privacy, individualism, and agency operate despite the seeming impotence of the 
American government, and stand in stark relief to her depiction of Iran as a hyperpoliticized 
religious state. 
Mahmoody consistently narrates her determination in response to domestic abuse (which, as 
I argue above, can be read as carrying sexual connotations) and marital rape.  One page after her 
husband threatens to kill her, Mahmoody is resolute about her ability to save herself and her 
daughter:   
I was sick, enervated, depressed, losing my tenuous hold on reality.  Moody seemed satisfied 
that I was cornered, confident that I would not, could not, stand up and fight for my 
freedom… Before I knew it, the seasons—time itself—would merge into nothingness.  The 
longer we remained here, the easier it would be to acquiesce…Even if I had the will, who 
had the way to help us? I wondered.  Was there anyone who could get me and my child out 
of this nightmare?  Gradually, despite the haze brought about by my illness and the drugs 
Moody was giving me, the answer came to me.  No one could help.  Only I could get us out of 
this.134 
 
Despite beatings, isolation, and the prescription medication her husband provided her that 
exacerbated her “haze,”135 Mahmoody is confident in her ability to free herself and her daughter 
from captivity in Iran. This resolution becomes a refrain throughout the book.  Despite insomnia 
and fatigue, Mahmoody refuses the medications her husband offers her.  She affirms that “my spirits 
brightened when I took myself off Moody’s medication and steeled my will to the perilous task ahead 
of me.”136  The author consistently employs this dual rhetorical form, which emphasizes both the 
direness of her circumstances and the tenacity of her indomitable spirit.  After a particularly severe 
beating she incurred while trying to prevent her husband from removing her daughter from their 
                                                          
134 Mahmoody and Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter, 72 (emphasis added). 
 
135 It is worth noting that Bozorg was providing this medication at her request and in no way, even by Mahmoody’s 
own admission, was he forcing her to take it. 
 
136 Ibid., 81 (emphasis added). 
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apartment, Mahmoody insists “I wanted to scream in agony from the pain in my back that was 
accentuated by the effort of standing on tiptoe [to see out her daughter from the window], but I could 
not give in to my own hurt now.”137  And again, after her husband has forcibly removed her daughter 
from their apartment, Mahmoody is resolute: “Darkness encompassed me now and I wrestled with 
my faith.  Somehow I had to muster courage and resolve.”138 
Mahmoody couples these frequent affirmations of her own determination with statements 
highlighting her sexual commodification of her body.  That she is willing and able to trade her 
“affections” to lure her abusive husband into complacency again functions to emphasize her sexual 
exceptionalism.  “During the next several minutes it was all I could do to keep from vomiting, but 
somehow I managed to convey enjoyment.  I hate him!  I hate him!  I repeated to myself all through 
the horrid act.  But when it was over, I whispered, ‘I love you!’  Taraf!! [empty courtesy]”139  
Mahmoody narrates her ability to endure and even “convey enjoyment” during a sexual exchange 
she finds detestable, demonstrating the lengths to which she is willing to go to secure freedom for 
herself and her daughter.  She explicitly describes sexual interactions with her husband as exchanges, 
his bodily pleasure for her liberty.  “Sex with Moody was merely one of many ugly experiences I 
knew I would have to endure in order to fight for freedom.”140  Indeed, Mahmoody insists that she is 
using her body to create her own path to escape.  After manufacturing a reconciliation, she initiates a 
sexual encounter with her husband.  “During the few minutes of passion that followed I was able to 
dissociate myself from the present.  At that moment my body was simply a tool that I would use, if I had to, 
to fashion freedom.”141  Narrating instances of what Mahmoody describes as marital rape in terms of 
                                                          
137  Mahmoody and Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter., 199 (emphasis added). 
 
138 Ibid., 208 (emphasis added). 
 
139 Ibid., 83. 
 
140 Ibid. 84, (emphasis added). 
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commodification —the exchange of sex for freedom—emasculates Bozorg and allows Mahmoody 
to reclaim her sexual agency, once more reaffirming her sexual exceptionalism.  Mahmoody’s ability 
to resist the sexual control of her husband and of the Islamic Republic of Iran are presented as 
exemplary and, given Mahmoody’s frequent references to her own nationality, as somehow inherent 
to her Americanness.  
Mahmoody provides the most graphic description of her sexual exceptionalism by narrating 
the removal of her intrauterine contraceptive device, or IUD.  While still in the United States, the 
author and her husband experienced many months of domestic discord after Bozorg was suspended 
under suspicion of malpractice.  Following their reconciliation, Mahmoody had an IUD implanted 
without Bozorg’s knowledge.  Her covert use of contraception functions both to further emasculate 
her husband and to instantiate her own sexual agency.  Once trapped in Iran, however, the IUD 
causes Mahmoody to fear for her life.142  She records that her husband warned her that using 
“preventing conception against the husband’s wishes…was a capital offense.”143 
It was disconcerting to know that I carried within my body, unbeknownst to Moody, an 
IUD that could jeopardize my life.  Would they really execute a woman for practicing birth 
control?  I knew the answer to that.  In this country men could and would do anything to 
women.144  
 
                                                          
142 Her fear seems to be based in a misunderstanding of Iranian public policy under the Ayatollah Khomeini; see 
Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi, Peter McDonald, and Meimanat Hosseini-Chavoshi, The Fertility Transition in Iran: 
Revolution and Reproduction (New York: Springer, 2009), 2, 24-25, 134, 230, 255.  According to Abbasi-Shavazi, 
McDonald, and Hosseini-Chavoshi, directly after the revolution, Khomeini adopted pronatalist attitudes relative to 
his country’s conflict with Iraq (2).  However, “the government did not formulate a specific pronatalist policy.” The 
national family planning program instituted under the Shah was suspended following the revolution.  Though “the 
Islamic government did not implement any explicit policies to increase the population,” contraceptives became less 
widely available.  Thus Mahmoody’s conviction that contraceptives were illegal and grounds for execution in Iran 
prove irrefutably (and gruesomely, as seen above) false. 
 
143 Again, this is false.  Chapter 1, Article 10 of the 1979 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran states that 
“since the family is the fundamental unit of Islamic society, all laws, regulations, and pertinent programs must tend 
to facilitate the formation of a family, and to safeguard its sanctity and the stability of family relations on the basis of 
the law and the ethics of Islam.”  (http://www.ivansahar.com/general-principles-of-iranian-constitution.htm)  The 
1979 IRI constitution includes no explicit condemnation of contraception.  It is conceivable, however, that Bozorg 
Mahmoody might have misrepresented his country’s position on contraception to his wife.   
 
144 Mahmoody and Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter, 134. 
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The IUD thus functions both as material evidence of Mahmoody’s sexual agency and an object of 
anxiety in the context of domestic terrorism.  “What if Moody found out about [the IUD]?  What if 
Moody beat me so badly that I required treatment and some Iranian doctor found it?  If Moody did 
not kill me, then the government might.”145  Here again, the IUD is evidence of Mahmoody’s sexual 
exceptionalism and cause for concern, underscoring the severity of the dangers she faces.  That 
danger reinforces her construction of Islam and Iran as monstrously sexually repressive.  Her 
concern for her life finally moves the author to remove the IUD herself.   
During one of those days of anguish my fear centered upon one detail.  Thrusting my fingers 
inside my body, I searched for the wisp of copper wire attached to my IUD.  I found it, and 
hesitated for a moment.  What if I began to hemorrhage?  I was locked inside without a 
telephone.  What if I bled to death? 
 
At that moment I no longer cared whether I lived or died.  I tugged at the wire and cried out 
in pain, but the IUD remained fixed in place.  I tried several more times, pulling harder, 
wincing from increasing pain.  Still, it would not come loose.  Finally I grabbed a pair of 
tweezers from my manicure set and clamped them onto the wire.  With a slow, steady 
pressure that brought cries of agony from my lips, I finally succeeded.  Suddenly, there in my 
hand was the bit of plastic and copper wire that could condemn me to death.146 
 
Mahmoody’s vivid narration of a relatively straightforward medical procedure dramatizes both the 
danger she thinks herself facing and her professedly remarkable strength of will.  In this context, the 
removal of the IUD becomes a melodramatized test of resolve.  Her determination to rescue her 
daughter from her husband finally outweighs her professed fear of hemorrhaging.  The incident can 
itself be read in the context of rape: the Islamic Republic of Iran forces Mahmoody to sexually 
violate herself to save her life and that of her daughter.  Moreover, the juxtaposition of this heroic 
act with a practice deemed banal in the United States (birth control) renders the “Muslim sexuality” 
of Iran repressive and gruesome in contrast to America’s allegedly “modern” and “liberated” 
sexuality.  That the author would go to such lengths to protect herself—only to brave her sister-in-
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law’s wrath to steal oral contraceptives a short time after—garishly illustrates Mahmoody’s American 
sexual exceptionalism in the face of a purportedly life-threatening “Muslim sexuality.”147   
Mahmoody’s repeated references to the controlling nature of the Islamic government of Iranian 
contrast sharply with the banal bodily freedoms the author enjoyed in the United States.  Through 
this graphic act of sexual resistance, Mahmoody here again embodies American sexual 
exceptionalism. 
I argued above that Mahmoody constructs Tehran as a hypersexualized masculine 
environment.  She recounts being molested by public transportation workers on two separate 
occasions and witnessing the molestation of an American friend on another occasion.  Her 
husband’s niece informs her that “they do that to foreign women,” but Mahmoody refuses to report 
the incidents so that she can retain her mobility.148  (Note the emphasis on foreign women, the 
implication being that America’s liberated sexuality must be read as lasciviousness in such a 
“repressed” context as Iran.)  Mahmoody forbears these molestations to escape the family home.  
This mode of sexual exchange echoes her interactions with her husband, as I note above.  It also 
foreshadows the extreme risks Mahmoody purports to take in escaping Iran.  When friends warn her 
about the “terrible and sinister smugglers of northwest Iran” (the same smugglers who ultimately 
secure her freedom), the author avows that “they could pose no dangers more frightful than those 
threatened by my husband.  I had already been robbed, kidnapped, and raped.”149  Mahmoody’s 
accounts of her bravery in moving throughout greater Tehran further underscore her American 
sexual exceptionalism by emphasizing the repressiveness of “Muslim sexuality.”        
It is worth noting that Mahmoody does not present her American exceptionalism as a 
byproduct of her government’s might.  Indeed, she laments that her government cannot come to her 
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aid.  Rather, Mahmoody’s American-ness throughout Daughter seems to be almost biological, an 
inborn resistance to oppression and excessive religiosity to which her husband’s Iranian-ness 
(depicted as excessive religiosity, violence, and sexual predation) acts as a foil.  Her grief in having 
“overestimated the power of my government in dealing with a fanatical foreign power” recalls 
popular media depictions of the Iran hostage crisis (1979-1981), which set private American citizens 
against a singular “militant Islam.”150  Mahmoody’s self-characterization is professedly individualistic 
and apolitical, something inherent to her nationality but separate from the acting government.151  
Daughter includes frequent asides puzzling over how one “normal” woman could stumble 
into such dire straits: “how could an otherwise average American woman find herself in such an 
improbable predicament?”152  (Here again notice Mahmoody’s frequent allusions to her own 
nationality contrasted with the improbable hardships she faces in Iran.)  Mahmoody’s emphasis on 
her relative normalcy underscores her extraordinary resolve in overcoming such daunting and 
foreign circumstances while reifying her husband, his family, his country, and his religion as abnormal, 
in binary opposition to her American normalcy.  Mahmoody’s narrative also pits her individual 
privacy against Iranian/Muslim attempts to control her (American) body.153  The author’s 
construction of herself as “an otherwise average American woman” designates a demonstrably 
private, individual sexual exceptionalism – making that exceptionalism independent of the historically 
relative power of a particular governmental regime.   
Sexual exceptionalism rather emerges in Mahmoody’s narrative as a quality inherent to 
American identity.  Finally, constructing herself as a private citizen exacerbates the degree of 
                                                          
150 Ibid., 127.  See also McAlister, “Iran, Islam, and the Terrorist Threat, 1979 - 1989,” 146-7. 
 
151 On the “depoliticization of the individual” in captivity narratives, cf. McAlister, specifically regarding the Iran 
hostage crisis.  Ibid. 145 
 
152 Mahmoody and Hoffer, Not Without My Daughter, 386. 
 
153 McAlister, “Iran, Islam, and the Terrorist Threat, 1979 - 1989,” 146-7. 
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violation the author alleges.  Americans have commonly identified “‘the sexual’ as properly the 
domain of personal privacy and individual ownership and thus the ultimate site of violation.”154  By 
locating her violation in the private—which is to say domestic—sphere, Mahmoody increases the 
affective efficacy of her narrative while establishing her American sexual exceptionalism as 
necessarily individualistic and (professedly, if not practically) apolitical. 
Mahmoody’s American sexual exceptionalism is finally evident in her ability to rescue her 
daughter from Iranian captivity, and in the person of that daughter herself.  The author confesses 
that she will risk almost anything to get herself and Mahtob out of Iran, but Mahmoody is unwilling 
to submit to her husband’s tyrannical rule.  “Could I submit to life in Iran in order to keep Mahtob 
out of danger?” Mahmoody asks rhetorically.  Her answer: “Hardly.”155  But the author confesses 
that she will—indeed, has—stopped at nothing else to ensure her daughter’s safety.  Indeed, 
Mahmoody reveals in the penultimate chapters that she only consented to visit Iran to forestall a 
seemingly inevitable divorce, which she feared would result in Bozorg stealing Mahtob away to Iran 
permanently.  “The real reason I took Mahtob to Iran was this: I was damned if I did, but Mahtob 
was damned if I didn’t.”156  Mahmoody explains that she risked her freedom and possibly her life to 
bring Mahtob to Iran for a visit, in the hopes of dissuading her husband from relocating there 
permanently with their daughter.  When his abuse and captivity dash those hopes, she braves “the 
most dangerous” escape route from Iran through Turkey.157 
 Mahtob herself finally instantiates Mahmoody’s own American sexual exceptionalism.  
Though earlier the author worried about her daughter assimilating to Iranian/Muslim subservience, 
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Mahtob ultimately reveals herself to be as resolute as her mother.  “I saw in the eyes of my six-year-
old daughter a growing sense of determination, and I knew instantly that Moody had not beaten her 
into submission.  Her spirit was bent, but not broken.  She was not a dutiful Iranian child: she was my 
resolute American daughter.”158  Mahtob’s youth only heightens this sense of resolution. Indeed, 
Mahmoody’s daughter avows that while she “hate[s] Daddy for making us do this,” “I can do anything 
I have to do to go to America.”159 Mahtob serves as the product and proof of Mahmoody’s American 
sexual exceptionalism – as well as damning evidence of the dangers of exogamy – specifically the 
mixing of incompatible religious and national cultures. 
 
Mahmoody’s Jeremiad Against Exogamy 
 
Mahmoody’s rhetorical self-construction as sexually exceptional serves two purposes.  First, 
American sexual exceptionalism reifies the production of a singularly repressive (and religiously 
excessive) Muslim sexuality.  Second, the author’s narration of herself as sexually exceptional 
authorizes her invective against exogamy – specifically against the combination of seemingly 
incompatible religio-national cultures.   
Puar reads such discourses of exceptionalism in terms of transnational secularist discourses.  
Terrorist Assemblages suggests that “exceptionalism serves as a strategic and effective means of 
furthering violence against postcolonial populations by legitimizing secularism as the key ethical 
standard of communities in the global north.”160   Puar is by no means alone in emphasizing the role 
of secularism in postcolonial violences: Talal Asad, Charles Hirschkind and Saba Mahmood, Charles 
Taylor, and William Cavanaugh have all made similar arguments.161  Of these, however, Puar is alone 
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161 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 
Hirschkind and Mahmood, “Feminism, the Taliban, and Politics of Counter-Insurgency,” Charles Taylor, “Sex & 
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in noting the role of sexual exceptionalism in shaping transnational secularist policies.162  She insists 
that “it is precisely these secularist values that make the United States more ‘progressive,’ and what 
arguably makes the country’s population more deserving of biopolitical preservation than ethnic and religious 
minorities within and outside its borders.”163  Unlike Charles Taylor and Pellegrini and Jakobsen (whom I 
discussed in my introduction), Puar does not acknowledge the normalized Protestant sexual ethic 
embedded in these transnational discourses of secularism.  However, Puar’s point regarding the 
religiously and racially informed impulse toward biopolitical preservation of white middle-class 
politically moderate Christians is well-made. 
I read Not Without My Daughter as an active participant in an (arguably unconscious) effort to 
preserve and protect America’s sexual exceptionalism at the expense of ethic and religious minorities 
– that is, as an invective against exogamy.  As Chan-Malik notes in “Chadors, Feminists, Terror,” 
Daughter is “perhaps the most well-known American story of a woman suffering under Islamic 
Terror, a cautionary tale of the dangers of cultural and religious mixing and the rampant misogyny of 
‘fundamentalist Islam.’”164 
Betty deHart highlights Mahmoody’s anti-exogamy rhetoric in her 2001 “Not Without My 
Daughter: On Parental Abduction, Orientalism, and Maternal Melodrama.”  DeHart identifies 
NWMD as paramount in a popular publication trend, one produced by “orientalist discourse on 
mixed marriages.”165  She attributes the genre’s appeal to western animosity toward Islam and to the 
                                                          
Christianity: : How Has the Moral Landscape Changed?,” Commonweal 134, no. 16 (2007): 12 – 18, William T. 
Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict (Oxford University Press, 
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162 Pellegrini and Jakobsen do, however, note role of normalized Protestant sexual ethic in formation of specifically 
American secularism.  See Janet R. Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini, “Introduction,” in Secularisms, ed. Janet R. Jakobsen 
and Ann Pellegrini (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 1–38. 
 
163 Diaz, “Transnational Queer Theory and Unfolding Terrorisms,” 535, (emphasis added). 
 
164 Chan-Malik, “Chadors, Feminists, Terror: The Racial Politics of U.S. Media Representations of the 1979 Iranian 
Women’s Movement,” 134, (emphasis added). 
 
165 de Hart, “Not Without My Daughter: On Parental Abduction, Orientalism, and Maternal Melodrama,” 51. 
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articulation of “western superiority.”166  In addition, deHart insists that Mahmoody’s exceptionalist 
rhetoric constructs white American women as “the most liberated and superior group of women on 
earth.”167  The author further argues that tales of contact between white women and “the oriental 
male” effectively racialize the female protagonist, who must redeem (“de-racialize”) herself through 
“self-sacrificing conduct in helping the child return to its own, i.e. western, society.”168  Thus we may 
read Daughter not only as a tale of captivity, but of atonement. Betty Mahmoody narrates her 
repentance of exogamy and is redeemed through the exceptional and heroic rescue of her child.   
While for the most part I concur with deHart’s reading of Daughter, she fails to acknowledge 
Mahmoody’s subtle construction of her own secularized religiosity as at once “normal” and 
universally applicable.  This construction is consistent throughout the book, though Mahmoody only 
identifies herself as Protestant (specifically as Free Methodist) once.169  Her universalizing tendencies 
are evident in the elision of her Christian god with “the Moslem Allah.”170  Her normalizing 
tendencies are most evident in the sharp narrative disparity between descriptions of the loud, 
disruptive, rote prayers of her Muslim in-laws and her private, improvised, heartfelt entreaties that 
her God return her and her daughter to America.  A more secularized Christian ethic emerges in 
Mahmoody’s consistent indictments of Islam: too political, too loud, too material (especially with 
regard to clothing – see chador), too practice-based, too ecstatic, too irrational – altogether too 
much. 171  Islam, in short, instantiates bad religion for Mahmoody, and her readers are encouraged to 
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read Daughter similarly.  Mahmoody’s sexually exceptional discourse reifies Islam as irretrievably 
foreign and its adherents unsuitable for sexual congress. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Not Without My Daughter’s Islamophobic rhetoric produces Bozorg Mahmoody as a domestic terrorist 
(a monster-terrorist-fag, to be specific) and Betty Mahmoody as a paragon of American sexual 
exceptionalism.  These parallel discourses operate to set perverse, repressive, racialized, religiously-
excessive Muslim sexuality against liberated and secular American sexuality.  In short, Daughter 
deploys language of American sexual exceptionalism to marginalize Islam as essentially un-American.  
Betty Mahmoody uses racialized American sexual norms, which as I argued in my introduction are 
informed by conservative Christian ethic, to articulate and authorize anti-Muslim religious 
intolerance, while deploying anti-Muslim sentiment to discourage exogamy. 
Such exceptionalist language is problematic for several reasons.  In addition to facilitating 
religious and sexual intolerance in contemporary America, discourses that pit American sexual 
exceptionalism against a singular “Muslim sexuality” collapse the practices, moralities, and beliefs of 
millions of people into a terrifyingly perverse entity easily dismissed as foreign. These discourses also 
portray Islam as condoning domestic abuse and marital rape without confronting the extensive 
prevalence of both phenomena within American households irrespective of religious identification.   
Books like Not Without My Daughter perpetuate orientalist attitudes toward the countries and 
peoples of the Middle East and Central Asia.172  Such works capitalize on very real violences toward 
                                                          
172 Milani notes that while “no book about Iran has achieved the phenomenal success of Not Without My Daughter,” 
American audiences have received Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books as Daughter’s “sophisticated successor.”  
Reading Lolita in Tehran is Azar Nafisi’s memoir of resistance during her time in the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
Though scholars have criticized Nafisi’s work as orientalist and neocolonialist, the book has enjoyed wild popularity 
– it spent more than 100 weeks on the New York Times Best Seller list.  Milani, Words, Not Swords, 217-8.  
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women under oppressive regimes, Islamic or otherwise.173  Mahmoody’s valorization of her own 
exceptionalism occludes not only the efforts of Iranian women (and men) who worked to secure her 
escape, but the much greater and more dangerous efforts toward a freer Iran made by decades of 
Iranians.174  Such rhetoric also precludes the possibilities of Muslim women’s “negative freedom” or 
conservative agency, as argued by Saba Mahmood.175  The foreclosure of both modes of agency—
resistance and submission—reinforces a “missionary discourse” toward “poor Muslim women,” 
insisting that Muslim women require saving from their (monster-terrorist-fag) male counterparts.176  
Such exceptionalist discourses moreover work “to suggest that, in contrast to [presumably white 
mainstream Christian] women in the United States, Muslim women are, at the end of the day, 
unsavable.”177 
Were Daughter an isolated incident, a single memoir of questionable facticity, we as scholars 
might be able to dismiss it as irrelevant.  But Daughter represents much larger and more alarming 
trends: the overwhelming proliferation of pulp nonfiction and documentary accounts of women’s 
Muslim captivity; and the mobilization of such narratives to justify otherwise objectionable and 
markedly militaristic foreign policies – many of which endanger and impoverish the lives of the very 
women they purport to save.  The rhetorics of domestic terrorism and American sexual 
exceptionalism serve to constitute one another, and in this interdependence, they demonstrate (as 
                                                          
173 On this point, see the criticisms of the CIA-controlled Northern Alliance by Revolutionary Association of the 
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Diaz has suggested) “constant mobilization of sexuality as a policing mechanism that justifies state 
violence” – and, more insidiously, articulate and authorize religious and sexual intolerance.178 
 
 
                                                          
178 Diaz, “Transnational Queer Theory and Unfolding Terrorisms,” 537. 
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Play Me Backwards: Feminist Complicity in the Satanic Panic 
 
You don’t have to play me backwards1 
To get the meaning of my verse 
You don’t have to die and go to hell 
To feel the devil’s curse 
 
I’ll stand before your altar 
And tell everything I know 
I’ve come to claim my childhood 
At the chapel of baby Rose 
 
Joan Baez (1992) 
 
 
 
Scholars have widely credited Michelle Smith’s accounts of satanic ritual abuse as shaping and even 
inciting America’s “Satanic Panic.”2  Michelle Pazder, née Proby, aka Michelle Smith, first met with 
Dr. Lawrence Pazder in 1973 to discuss “problems that were rooted in her family background and 
upbringing.”3  They renewed their therapeutic relationship in 1977 when Smith became depressed 
                                                          
1 Baez’s “Play Me Backwards” is a presumably fictional account of satanic ritual abuse.   The title of the song refers 
to “backmasking,” the suspected practice of rock bands hiding nefarious subliminal messages that fans (often 
assumed to be impressionable adolescents) could reveal by playing songs or whole albums in reverse.  See James 
Richardson, “Satanism in the Courts: From Murder to Heavy Metal,” in The Satanism Scare, ed. Joel Best, David G. 
Bromley, and James T. Richardson, Social Institutions and Social Change (New York: A. de Gruyter, 1991), 212, 
213, 215.  For more on public Christianity’s conceptualization of popular music, and particularly heavy metal, as 
dangerous, see Jason Bivins, Religion of Fear: The Politics of Horror in Conservative Evangelicalism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 89-128. 
 
2 “Satanic Panic” refers to a period of widespread popular anxiety about demonic influences infiltrating childcare 
facilities, schools, the entertainment industry, and all levels of government.  The Satanic Panic began in North 
America during the 1980s with the publication and dissemination of Michelle Remembers and eventually spread to the 
United Kingdom and much of northern Europe.  At its height, this period of public anxiety encompassed 
suspicions of an international conspiracy involving wealthy and powerful figures who were abducting and abusing 
children for demonic sacrifices, prostitution, and pornography.  The Satanic Panic faltered in the mid-1990s, in part 
due to an FBI report that found no such evidence of ritual abuse or occult activity.  See Jeffrey S. Victor, Satanic 
Panic: The Creation of a Contemporary Legend (Open Court Publishing, 1993). 
 
3 Michelle Smith and Lawrence Pazder, Michelle Remembers (Pocket, 1989), 5.  Smith’s maiden name was Proby, and 
having married her former therapist, she is now Michelle Pazder.  For the sake of continuity, I refer to her as Smith 
throughout this chapter.  Despite the wide disaccreditation of  Michelle Remembers, for the sake of narrative flow I 
have also omitted the word “allegedly” when referring to the events recounted in this book.   
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and physically ill after suffering a miscarriage.4  Smith’s general practitioner contacted Pazder with 
his concerns about the Smith’s “extremely severe and persistent” grief and a possible “psychogenic 
aspect” to her extensive hemorrhaging.5  During her first visits with Pazder, Smith expressed 
frustration: 
There’s still something bothering me… I still feel blocked.  We talk about the things I think 
are the problems, and then I go home and spend half the night…wishing I could…I know 
there’s something I want to tell you, but I don’t know what it is!  I know there’s something 
there…and it’s important – I know it’s important!6   
 
Smith struggled for weeks to access the “something” she wanted to tell Pazder.  Finally, she arrived 
at Pazder’s office, clad all in black, and for the first time, lay down on his couch.7  After fidgeting and 
staring for several minutes, Smith’s eyes widened into a look of “frozen terror.”8  She lay supine 
“locked in fear” for more than an hour, until Pazder reassured her that she could tell him about what 
was frightening her.9   
Both agreed that unconventional methods were required to access this hidden, terrifying set 
of memories.  They agreed to meet almost daily and to tape record their interactions so that Pazder 
could focus on “be[ing] totally there with [Smith], completely available to [her].”10  This was 
important, Pazder insisted: “you can’t go back all alone… you’ve got to have someone you trust go 
with you, someone you know it’s safe with.”  Smith concurred: “I think I’m going to need you… It’s 
safe with you.  I feel safe with you.  But it’s so horrible…”11  During their next meeting, Pazder “sat 
                                                          
4 Ibid., 5. 
 
5 Ibid., 4. 
 
6 Ibid., 9 (original emphasis). 
 
7 Ibid., 11. 
 
8 Ibid. 
 
9 Ibid., 12. 
 
10 Ibid., 13. 
 
11 Ibid. 
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quietly” with his hand on her head while Smith screamed for twenty-five minutes.12  And then she 
began to remember.   
Under Pazder’s ministrations, Smith accessed memories of trauma and abuse that Pazder 
identified as satanic.13  In 1980, Smith and Pazder published these recollections in a “lurid, 
disturbing, and unforgettable” pulp nonfiction volume entitled Michelle Remembers.14  Though now 
widely discredited, the book served as evidence in police seminars on alleged occult activity, senate 
testimony on the growing presence of “evil” in the United States, and the longest and most 
expensive criminal trial in US history of its time.  Michelle Remembers and its authors had a direct and 
lasting influence on American law enforcement, juridical proceedings, psychological and psychiatric 
treatments, and news reporting during the 1980s and early 1990s.  New religious movement scholars 
and sociologists of religion have gone so far as to identify Michelle Remembers as the catalyst for the 
decade-long, transnational period of moral anxiety commonly referred to as the Satanic Panic. 
The Satanic Panic evidenced widespread popular fears about a centuries-long conspiracy of 
devil worshippers dedicated to the eventual destruction of organized government on a global scale.  
The machinations of these satanists allegedly manifested in animal mutilations, encouragement of 
adolescent fascinations with the occult, and perhaps most disturbingly, religiously motivated child 
sexual abuse.  A vocal minority of journalists and therapists challenged these allegations and met 
with public suspicion and ridicule.15  But following an eight-year federal investigation that cost 
                                                          
12 Ibid.,  13. 
 
13 Smith and Pazder, Michelle Remembers, 77.  In describing the targets of accusations regarding ritual abuse 
throughout this chapter, I refer to these as satanists with a lowercase s.  These satanists, of which no evidence exists, 
should not be confused with Satanists, members of the Church of Satan or the Temple of Set. 
 
14 Gareth Medway, Lure of the Sinister: The Unnatural History of Satanism (New York University Press, 2001), 176. 
 
15 Nathan and Snedeker in particular describe the challenges of early criticism toward satanic ritual abuse allegations.  
As they note, “there was a time when publicly expressing skepticism about small children being ceremonially raped 
and tortured by organized groups was…practically an indictable stance.  We can testify to this: in the late 1980s, 
[Nathan] had the police at her door , on a maliciously false report of child maltreatment, after publishing an article 
suggesting the innocence of a day-care teacher convicted of ritual abuse.”  Debbie Nathan and Michael Snedeker, 
Satan’s Silence: Ritual Abuse and the Making of a Modern American Witch Hunt (iUniverse, 2001), ix. 
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taxpayers $750,000, federal investigator Kenneth V. Lanning found no evidence to corroborate 
claims of what became known as satanic ritual abuse, or SRA.16  By then, however, the Satanic Panic 
had already caused significant damage.   
Rhetorics of satanic ritual abuse—shaped by Michelle Remembers and disseminated by the 
authors themselves and the genre they inspired—shifted accusations of child sexual abuse from the 
American households into the realm of the supernatural during the 1980s and early 1990s. Popular 
attributions of child sexual abuse to a fantastical and wholly imaginary international satanic 
conspiracy effectively removed that abuse beyond the domestic boundaries of normative American 
sexuality.   
While I have discussed public understandings (and often misunderstandings) of minority 
religions throughout this dissertation, this chapter is unique in that the mode of religiosity most 
frequently discussed—that is, satanism—does not actually exist. There are, of course, Americans 
who identify as Satanists, members of the Church of Satan, the Temple of Set, and others influenced 
by the Satanic Bible.17  There are those who practice witchcraft, usually identified as Neopagans or 
Witches, but these are earth-reverent and feminist modes of religiosity, actively opposed to the 
harming of living things.18  There is no credible evidence to suggest that any group of Americans has 
ever practiced Satanism in the ways described by Pazder and Smith, or by the child-witnesses in the 
                                                          
16 Lawrence Wright, Remembering Satan (Random House Digital, Inc., 1995), 8, and Nathan and Snedeker, Satan’s 
Silence, 1.  See also Kenneth V. Lanning, Satanic Ritual Abuse (National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime: 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1992). 
 
17 Anton LaVey, The Satanic Bible (HarperCollins, 1976).  Anton Szander LaVey founded the Church of Satan in 
1966.  Members emphasize the sanctity of human desire and animal instinct.  Michael Aquino, formerly a member 
of the Church of Satan, founded the Temple of Set in 1975.  Setians espouse elements of western esotericism; their 
practice is generally more formal and ritualized than that of Satanists.  See James R. Lewis and Jesper Aagaard 
Petersen, The Encyclopedic Sourcebook of Satanism (Prometheus Books, 2008). 
 
18 Neopaganisms, Goddess worship, and other modes of feminist spirituality became popular in North America 
during the 1970s.  See in particular Margot Adler, Drawing Down the Moon: Witches, Druids, Goddess-Worshippers, and 
Other Pagans in America (Penguin, 2006), Helen A. Berger, Evan A. Leach, and Leigh S. Shaffer, Voices from the Pagan 
Census: A National Survey of Witches and Neo-pagans in the United States (Univ of South Carolina Press, 2003), and 
Starhawk, The Spiral Dance: A Rebirth of the Ancient Religion of the Goddess: 10th Anniversary Edition (HarperCollins, 
2011). 
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McMartin trial and the adult women who recovered memories of childhood satanic ritual abuse, 
whom I will discuss later in this chapter.19   
This is to say that the specter of satanism that haunts this case study is just that: a specter, an 
imaginary entity that reverses and defiles familiar religious practices, instantiating Americans' fears 
about child abuse, changing gender roles, and increasing religious difference.  But in calling this 
satanism imaginary, I do not dismiss it as inconsequential.  The American public's fear of an 
international conspiracy of devil worshippers preying on American children was very real and had 
substantial and lasting material consequences.  In addition to the cost and duration of the nearly one 
hundred trials that followed allegations of satanic ritual abuse, people lost their jobs on the basis of 
such suspicions. American citizens were imprisoned, sometimes for years, on the basis of such 
accusations.20  Religious minorities were harassed, and aspersions cast—sometimes by feminist 
activists—on feminist modes of religiosity.21  In referring to an imaginary satanism, then, I gesture 
only toward the absence of evidence for the kinds of practices discussed in accounts of satanic ritual 
abuse. 
I am particularly concerned with feminist tensions in the dissemination of the satanic ritual 
abuse moral panic – specifically the extent to which feminists employed the religious language and 
symbols of the Satanic Panic to promote activism against child sexual abuse. 22   Sharply diverging 
                                                          
19 Lanning, Satanic Ritual Abuse. 
 
20 In the Kern County child abuse cases, for example, at least 36 people were convicted and imprisoned on 
children’s accusations of satanic ritual abuse.  Thirty four were released upon appeal; two of the convicted died in 
prison.  Maggie Jones, “Who Was Abused?,” The New York Times, September 19, 2004, sec. Magazine, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/19/magazine/19KIDSL.html.   
 
21 Temple of Set founder Michael Aquino was a particular target of popular speculation and police suspicion during 
this time.  He and his wife Lilith were accused of child abuse during the late 1980s; the charges were later dropped 
for lack of evidence.  See “Devil Worship: Exposing Satan’s Underground,” The Geraldo Rivera Show (NBC, October 
22, 1998). 
 
22 As I noted in my introduction, “moral panic’ refers to an intense public reaction to an issue or group perceived to 
threat a culture’s social order.  On this issue, see in particular Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation 
of the Mods and Rockers (Taylor & Francis, 2011) and Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: The Social 
Construction of Deviance, 2nd ed. (Chichester, U.K.; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009). 
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from feminist anti-abuse campaigns of the 1970s, feminist anti-SRA advocates located incest and 
child sexual abuse not in the home, but in the religious and sexual machinations of satanists.  These 
feminists invested extraordinary amounts of effort to spread awareness of the threat of satanic ritual 
abuse and the psychological diagnoses that often accompanied such abuse: multiple personality 
disorder and repressed memory syndrome.  Ironically, these feminists’ efforts promoted diagnoses 
that infantilized adult women abuse survivors, occluded domestic child sexual abuse (the victims of 
which were and are largely female), criminalized the (again, largely female) daycare workers who 
facilitated an unprecedented influx of mothers into the workforce, and cast aspersion on an 
emphatically feminist mode of emerging spirituality – religious witchcraft.  Thus I argue that feminist 
anti-satanic ritual abuse activism, directly informed by Michelle Remembers and its authors, both 
reinforced popular suspicions regarding religious minorities’ sexual predation and restricted 
American women’s religious and sexual freedoms. 
In this chapter, I present Michelle Remembers as the earliest evidence of and a direct catalyst for 
widespread accusations of satanic ritual abuse in the United States throughout the 1980s and into the 
early 1990s.  I shall first introduce and contextualize Michelle Remembers, paying particular attention to 
the text’s infantilization of Smith and construction of child abuse as a distinctly religious 
phenomenon, as well as to the relative paucity of sexual elements in the abuse Smith remembers.  
Next, I shall explore feminist responses to the book. I note the ways in which some feminists, in an 
attempt to combat child sexual abuse, used the religious language of satanic ritual abuse to relegated 
such abuses beyond the American domestic sphere, as acts foreign to and beyond the boundaries of 
normative American sexuality.  I shall also examine the rampant sexualization of satanic ritual abuse 
in these feminist discourses.  Finally, I shall problematize the feminist complicity in articulating and 
authorizing satanic ritual abuse accusations, demonstrating the extent to which feminist anti-SRA 
efforts complicated American women’s participation in the workforce and in feminist modes of 
religiosity. 
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“You Can’t Go Back All Alone:” Michelle’s Memories of Ritual Abuse 
 
In her sessions with Pazder from the summer of 1976 until late November 1977, Michelle Smith 
recounted being terrorized and abused by a group of shadowy figures that “sound[e]d to [her] like 
witches.”23  Several days a week, often for five to six hours a day, Smith narrated gruesome and 
sometimes impossible incidents of abuse.  She related being beaten, thrown in the air, sodomized, 
restrained, forcibly contorted, smeared with filth, and made to assist in infanticide-by-crucifix and 
the murder of an imaginary friend.24 Months into counseling, Pazder identified Smith’s molestors as 
satanists, and specifically as members of the Church of Satan.25  Following this identification, Smith’s 
memories took on a decidedly demonic cast.    
Michelle Remembers was the earliest instance of satanic ritual abuse memoirs, a genre that 
became extremely popular and influential in the decade following the book’s publication.  Michelle 
Remembers shaped the satanic ritual abuse memoir in several key ways: most notably in the 
construction of child abuse as a supernatural religious phenomenon rather than a problem endemic 
to American households; the insistence on therapists as necessary for uncovering such abuse and the 
subsequent infantilization of the analysand-survivor; and the connection drawn between satanic 
ritual abuse and child sexual abuse (though this last is far less pronounced in Michelle Remembers than 
in subsequent satanic ritual abuse narratives).  These elements would markedly inspire and shape the 
allegations of satanic ritual abuse that emerged throughout the United States and beyond in the 
1980s and into the early 1990s.   
                                                          
23 Smith and Pazder, Michelle Remembers, 47.   
 
24 Ibid., 97. 
 
25 Ibid., 116-7.  As I observed earlier, there is no evidence to support Smith and Pazder’s allegations of satanic ritual 
abuse.  Indeed, Church of Satan founder and high priest Anton LaVey threatened the authors with a lawsuit for 
libel following the publication of Michelle Remembers.  Pazder withdrew the allegation.  Medway, Lure of the Sinister, 
175 and Mary de Young, The Day Care Ritual Abuse Moral Panic (McFarland, 2004), 24-5.  It’s also worth noting that 
the events Smith remembered took place in 1954.  LaVey did not found the Church of Satan until 1966.  
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Child advocates from the mid-1960s through the 1970s had located child abuse as an 
emphatically domestic and all too common concern, but the extraordinary abuses Michelle Smith 
recounted occurred predominantly at the hands of strangers, almost exclusively in unfamiliar and 
often sacrilegious settings, and held fantastical religious significance for her, her therapist, and the 
perpetrators of the alleged abuse.  In her earlier sessions with Pazder, Smith detailed her parents’ 
“stormy” and abusive marriage.26  Her father “erupted in drunken rages” and frequently disappeared 
for “long periods.”27  Her mother was “sharply impatient” with Smith and “disconcerted” by her 
daughter’s affection.28  Smith’s “world fell apart when she was fourteen,” following her mother’s 
sudden death.29  Her father left Smith in the care of her maternal grandparents, who sent her to a 
Roman Catholic boarding school.30  Smith would not convert to Catholicism for more than a decade 
(during her later sessions with Pazder), and she “fe[lt] like an outsider” at the boarding school.31  
While at university, she “began to realize that with a violent, alcoholic father in her past and a 
passive, somewhat distant mother, she ran the risk of falling into unwholesome patterns and 
repeating their problems.”32  It was at this point that she sought Pazder’s psychiatric counsel for the 
                                                          
26 Smith and Pazder, Michelle Remembers, 6. 
 
27 Ibid. 
 
28 Ibid., 6-7. 
 
29 Ibid., 7. 
 
30 Ibid.  The text fails to account for the whereabouts of Smith’s two sisters, Charyl and Tertia, both of whom have 
disavowed the author’s memories.   See Denna Allen and Janet Midwinter, “Michelle Remembers: The Debunking 
of a Myth,” The Mail on Sunday, September 30, 1990 and Paul Grescoe, “Things That Go Bump in Victoria,” 
Maclean’s, October 27, 1980. 
 
31 Smith and Pazder, Michelle Remembers, 7-8.  This is according to Smith’s account.  Her father claims that all three 
Proby daughters were confirmed, and that Michelle “went to church every Sunday with her mother and sisters.” 
Allen and Midwinter, “Michelle Remembers: The Debunking of a Myth.” 
 
32 Smith and Pazder, Michelle Remembers, 7-8. 
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first time.33  The two met once a week for the next four years; Smith and Pazder presumably ended 
their therapeutic relationship several months before Smith miscarried and resumed their sessions.34 
Though her mother was present and complicit in this subsequently remembered abuse, the 
account that emerged over the next eighteen months presented a decidedly eerie portrait of violence 
and coercion.  Smith’s alleged abusers were mostly unknown to her.  She first identified a shadowy 
man named Malachi, who choked and hit her, improbably tossing her upside down and spinning her 
around in the air.35  Her mother was absent during this first remembered incident, though Smith 
remembered other “people” watching and laughing as Malachi abused her.36  She next remembered 
being naked with a group of “some women,” one of whom kissed Smith and “st[uck] her tongue in 
[Smith’s] mouth…like a snake.”37  Smith reiterated that this woman who kissed her was “not a 
mommy.”38  
Later, Smith recounted sneaking through a room full of strangers copulating; here again, she 
was insistent about trying to locate her mother: “you see, my inside always tried to find my mom... 
Because I knew…when I found my mom…it’d be okay.”39  Pazder clarified: “Michelle reasoned that 
if they’d hurt her, [her as-yet unidentified assailants] might have also hurt her mother and that 
                                                          
33 Ibid. 
 
34 Ibid., 8.  The text is consistent with regard to the timing of events.  The narrative implies that Smith had been out 
of psychotherapy for some time when started meeting with Pazder again, but the timeline provided contradicts that 
implication.  Smith and Pazder met for four years starting in 1973; their sessions lasted at least until mid-1976.  
Given this timeline, Smith was out of therapy for only a few months when she miscarried.  It is also worth noting 
that nowhere in the text do the authors mention their romantic relationship.  After the sessions related in Michelle 
Remembers, Smith and Pazder divorced their spouses to marry each other.  See Allen and Midwinter, “Michelle 
Remembers: The Debunking of a Myth.” 
 
35 Smith and Pazder, Michelle Remembers, 17-19. 
 
36 Ibid., 17-18, 20. 
 
37 Ibid., 25. 
 
38 Ibid. 
 
39 Ibid., 34-35. 
 199  
perhaps her mother was in trouble too.”40  When Smith finally located her mother, her mother had 
become improbably monstrous. Smith found a humanoid “lump” under her mother’s skirt.  This 
lump had “red shoes!” and bled when Smith smashed it with a bottle.41  After Smith destroyed the 
lump under her mother’s skirt, Smith’s mother mocked her, struck her, and recoiled from her, 
insisting that Smith be taken “out of [her mother’s] sight!”42   
Smith conveyed a consistent anxiety about her mother’s rejection throughout her counseling 
sessions.  Throughout these recollections, her mother kept trying to get rid of Smith: by locking her 
in a car with a dead woman dressed as her mother, which “Malachi” intentionally crashed43; in a 
bizarre rebirthing ceremony, after which her mother revealed that “she never wanted me…she wasn’t 
a mother anymore…she didn’t love me, that there wasn’t any part of me that was a part of her” 44; 
and by giving Michelle to the devil, who celebrated his power over Michelle in doggerel verse45:   
 There is no mother who’ll always care. 
 There’s only me to burn and scare. 
 There is no mother who walks on the earth. 
 There is no mother that gives birth. 
 There is no mother whose name is right. 
 There’s only me with my fiery light.46 
 
Her mother’s attempt to give Smith away ultimately fails.  Satan rejects Smith for making the sign of 
the cross at an inopportune moment and insists her mother take her back: 
 You have to live with this ugly little one! 
 Until you can bring me a dutiful son.47 
                                                          
40 Ibid., 35. 
 
41 Ibid., 37-38, 40.  
 
42 Ibid., 39. 
 
43 Ibid., 54-5. 
 
44 Ibid., 91-2. 
 
45 Ibid., 108. 
 
46 Ibid., 227.  At Ibid., 239., Pazder insists that Smith (and their readers) not dismiss the doggerel as insignificant, 
citing Hannah Arendt’s theory regarding the banality of evil.   
 
 200  
 It’s your mistake, you’ll have to pay. 
 I give her back.  You can’t give her away.48 
 
Smith’s abuse cannot be termed domestic, despite the alleged presence and complicity of her mother.  
That mother is herself rendered foreign and monstrous.   
With the exception of “Malachi” and the devil, Smith never named her other assailants, 
though she identified a few by their roles (e.g. the satanic “nurse” who attended Smith during her 
post-car crash hospitalization).49  Indeed, most abusive incidents featured a “new and different group 
of people who were going to hurt her.”50 Notably, with the exception of Satan and Malachi, Smith’s 
abusers are overwhelmingly female.51  “It’s like the men are losing power,” Smith explained.52  While 
“Malachi” led the strange rites that required Smith’s abuse, women filled most of the ceremonial 
roles, often inflicted abuse, and were solely responsible for supervising Smith. 
The perpetrators of the abuse Smith alleges were usually female, often fantastical, and 
occasionally the Father of Lies himself.  “These people aren’t people,” Smith insisted.  “People who 
do things like that are monsters.”53 As such, the abuse Michelle Smith remembered diverges 
drastically from accounts provided by child protection advocates in the 1960s and 1970s, but maps 
directly onto the abuses frequently alleged by satanic ritual abuse victims during the 1980s’ Satanic 
Panic.  
                                                          
47 Smith and Pazder, Michelle Remembers., 6. 
 
48 Ibid., 282.   
 
49 Ibid., 78. 
 
50 Ibid., 60-1. 
 
51 Ibid., 111.  
 
52 Ibid., 111. 
 
53 Ibid., 179. 
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Likewise, the locations of Smith’s alleged abuse are unfamiliar to her. Her memories begin in 
a small room in an unknown house.54  She is moved to a “room with green walls,” to a strange car, 
and then to a hospital after Malachi deliberately crashed the car.55  Smith was forced to stay with her 
“nurse” after being released from the hospital.56  She allegedly participated in an eighty-one day ritual 
with hundreds of strangers in the Ross Bay Cemetery in Victoria, BC,57 and her captors also 
confined her in an old grave in the same cemetery.58  Smith recalled being beaten and forcibly 
manipulated in a round room that “looked like a church, except [she] never saw a church with a great 
big bed.”59  As with the identities of her abusers, the locations of Smith’s alleged abuse are unfamiliar 
and occasionally fantastic, in sharp contrast to most available reports of child abuse from the 1960s 
and 1970s.60 
Moreover, Smith’s abuse seemed motivated not by systemic gendered inequalities played out 
on small domestic stage, but by a Grand Guignol religious melodrama in which international satanic 
conspirators warred for control of Smith’s soul and the very Earth.61  Smith’s memories evince 
conviction both in her abusers’ wicked satanic motivations and actions and in the ontological reality 
and importance of a (distinctly Roman Catholic) Christian theology. 
                                                          
54 Ibid., 24-25, 32. 
 
55 Ibid., 61, 54-5, 60-61. 
 
56 Ibid., 101. 
 
57 Ibid., 242. 
 
58 Ibid., 88-9 (photo inserts). 
 
59 Ibid., 103. 
 
60 As Medway notes, it seems unlikely that an eighty-one day ritual held in a public cemetery surrounded by 
residential neighborhoods would go unnoticed by the surrounding community.  See Medway, Lure of the Sinister, 176. 
 
61 Grand Guignol refers to a theatrical display of graphic, amoral horror.  The theatricality of SRA accounts 
emphasizes distance between satanic ritual abuse accusations and domestic child sexual abuse.  See Mary de Young, 
“Breeders for Satan: Toward a Sociology of Sexual Trauma Tales,” Journal of American Culture 19, no. 2 (1996): 115 
and Louise Armstrong, Rocking the Cradle of Sexual Politics: What Happened When Women Said Incest (Women’s Press, 
1996), 250-1.  
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Smith did not identify the first incidents of abuse as explicitly satanic, though her captors 
muttered that “they’d show God” while they sodomized her and smeared her with filth.62  Smith 
thought that there were “possibly thirteen” people who participated in this first incidence of abuse.63  
She recalled observing many adults engaging in “ritual sex, apparently,” and the abuse and ritual sex 
led Smith to conclude that her captors “sound[ed] to [her] like witches.”64  She worried about 
revealing these memories to Pazder, because Pazder was a Roman Catholic and “witches are against 
the church.”65  At this point in her sessions, Smith was still uncertain about her captors’ identities: 
“maybe they weren’t witches or anything, but they were doing some funny things… All the things 
they did to me – they did them for a reason.”66  Smith remained convinced of the deliberate nature 
of the abuse; the elaborate ritualism and grotesque severity of the abusive incidents reinforced her 
convictions.67  It was Pazder, though, who insisted that “Michelle’s tormentors…were not ordinary 
cultists.”68 
Though her memories included exhortations to “denounce God” and revere Lucifer, Smith 
did not independently identify her captors as satanists.  Months into their sessions, Pazder explained 
that this group had “carr[ied] out a calculated assault against all that [was] good in [Smith]” and that 
“the only group [he knew] about that fits [Smith’s] description is the Church of Satan.”69  Satanism 
                                                          
62 Smith and Pazder, Michelle Remembers., 26-7. 
 
63 Ibid., 29. 
 
64 Ibid., 36, 47. 
 
65 Ibid., 48. 
 
66 Ibid., 48. 
 
67 Ibid., 16, 51, 84.  The descriptions Smith provides regarding the symbolism of the colors of candles, ritual objects 
like the chalice, the robes, and physical correspondence to compass directions do not reflect Satanic or Setian ritual 
practice, though they do recall some Wiccan practices.  Adler, Drawing Down the Moon, 134-5.  Animal and fetus 
mutilation, such as that described by Smith and Pazder, do not comprise any part of Satanic, Setian, or Neopagan 
practice.  See Smith and Pazder, Michelle Remembers, 107, 109-10), contra Adler, Drawing Down the Moon, 54. 
 
68 Smith and Pazder, Michelle Remembers., 77 
 
69 Ibid., 116-7.   
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became the explanatory framework for Smith’s abuse: “for Michelle, it was a great relief to begin to 
see the pattern.”70  Once Pazder identified them as satanic, Michelle’s memories took on a decidedly 
satanic quality.  She recalled “defecating on the cross and the bible” and being abused in a room that 
looked like a church.71  In the final quarter of Smith’s account, the devil made a personal appearance.  
Emerging from a bonfire, Satan wrapped his tail around Smith’s neck and middle (Smith’s “body 
memories” of this contact would emerge as localized dermatitis two decades later).72  The Virgin 
Mary appeared and identified Smith’s assailant by name: “he is called Satan.”73  Her captors celebrate 
“the feast of the Beast” by sacrificing a virgin.74  Smith’s memories conclude with the recollection 
that Satan had sworn to return to earth in 1982.75 
The satanic activity Smith remembered is essentially an inverted Christianity – which is 
consistent with popular imaginings of Satanism, though not with the ceremonial practices of the 
Church of Satan.  Pazder and Smith draws conclusions about Smith’s abuse as inverted Christian 
practice early in the memoir: “rationally Michelle knew that Father Leo’s Mass was as different from 
the ritual of that awful night as, literally, white was from black.  Still, it was a ceremony, and the 
correspondences for Michelle afflicted her with deep visceral panic.”76 Her captors deny her access 
to and shun the crucifix in her hospital room.77  When Smith recounted that she was forced to eat 
ashes, Pazder noted that  
                                                          
70 Ibid., 116. 
 
71 Ibid., 116, 103. 
 
72 Ibid., 230, 254. 
 
73 Ibid., 232. 
 
74 Ibid., 242-3, 249. 
 
75 Ibid., 259. 
 
76 Ibid., 51. 
 
77 Ibid., 77. 
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if the ashes they tried to make her eat…were really the ashes of the woman who had been 
killed—the lump [that is, the humanoid growth under Smith’s mother’s skirt, which Smith 
smashed with a bottle]—[her captors] may have been trying to pass on, symbolically, the 
spirit of that person… In the Christian Holy Communion, there was great emphasis on 
consuming the body and blood of Christ.  Perhaps this business of the ashes had some 
relation to that, in a contrary sort of way.78 
 
Here again, the notion of an inverted sacrament mimics popular folklore about satanic practice, but 
not the practices of the Church of Satan.79 Smith and Pazder noted that her tormentors observe the 
Roman Catholic liturgical calendar in reverse.80  Her chief abuser, Malachi, used the crucifix Smith 
brandished against him to stab a baby.81  In discussing these incidents with the local parish priest, 
Pazder explained that Smith’s captors “were involved in something very definitely anti-Christian.”82  
Under hypnosis, Smith recalled a ritual in which her tormentors “sang like a priest does…but 
weird.”83  When Satan emerged from the flames during “the feast of the Beast,” he first drew the 
Christian cross in the air and crossed it out in mid-air, destroying it: “the fire billowed into the space 
where the other cross had been.”84  In these ways, Michelle Remembers establishes the religious 
elements of Smith’s ritual abuse as satanic, which is to say inverted Christian symbols and practices. 
Smith was allegedly both areligious and uncertain of Pazder’s religious affiliations when 
sessions began.85  Pazder emphasized Smith’s religious ignorance repeatedly, often coupling his 
assertions with her “discovery” of allegedly unfamiliar religious objects, like the crucifix and the 
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79 Phillips Stevens Jr., “Satanism: Where Are the Folklorists?,” in Contemporary Legend: A Reader, ed. G. Bennett 
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81 Ibid., 126. 
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Bible.  After being doused in blood, Smith unconsciously—but deliberately, Pazder insisted—
smeared the blood onto her tormentors in the shape of a cross: 
“When you were reliving it – do you know what your hands were doing while you were 
telling me about wiping the blood on them?” [Pazder asked.]  “No, I don’t understand what 
you mean.”  Dr. Pazder took her hands and helped her to an erect sitting position.  “Okay, 
now I want you to show me how you wiped it on them.  Show me again, now.”  
Michelle…hesitantly began to move her hands in front of her, up and down, side to side.  “I 
just…wiped it one them…like this…and this…” “What are you making on them?”  
“Making on them? I don’t know.  You mean…I don’t understand.  Oh, I see.  Crosses.” 
“Yes, crosses.”  “I didn’t realize I was making crosses them.”  “You were very clearly making 
crosses on all of them.”86  
 
As with his identification of her tormentors as satanists, Pazder here provided an explicitly religious 
framework through which Smith interpreted her memories.87  He insisted that because Smith came 
from as “harsh, devastated family [in which] there had been no religious observance whatsoever,” 
her impulse to make the sign of the cross on her captors must have “come from a very deep part of 
[Smith.]  It is a very symbolic and powerful thing to do,” he explained.88  The Satanists’ aversion to 
the crucifix, and Smith’s own unconscious religious sense, are what reveal the symbol’s 
significance.89  Thus in Michelle Remembers, Smith’s religious ignorance underscores the ontological 
potency of Christian, specifically Roman Catholic, symbols against forces of an ontological evil.90  
The inverted Christianity of her satanic tormentors ultimately proves no match for Smith’s 
innate religiosity.  Smith braided crosses into her own hair for protection, even though she was 
allegedly uncertain of what the symbol represented.91  Even Malachi, her primary abuser, cannot take 
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89 Smith and Pazder, Michelle Remembers., 104. 
 
90 Ibid., 118. 
 
91 Ibid., 142. 
 206  
the crucifix from Smith.92  Her satanic captors somehow neglected to remove a “white book” (the 
Bible) from Smith’s room, which Smith felt inexplicably drawn to.  “She really didn’t know that the 
book was or why it was important, except that it was white and [her captors’] world was black.  
[Smith] sensed that, like the crosses she had made, the white book would keep them away from 
her.”93  To prevent her abusers from burning the whole Bible, Smith “tore some pages out and 
stuffed them in her mouth.”94  When the Satanists burned the book, “all they got was the cover, not 
the insides.”95  Receiving an exorcism and baptism from her parish priest finally allowed Smith 
access to her most vivid and fantastic memories of ritual abuse during “the feast of the Beast.”96  
Smith was finally delivered from torment by visions of the Virgin Mary and Jesus.97  “Ma Mère” (i.e. 
the Virgin Mary) hides the memories of this abuse from Smith until she “can hear someone” 
(presumably Pazder).98  Smith and Pazder’s account of Satan’s insufficiencies against the ontological 
power of Christian symbols and figures establishes Smith’s abuse as irrefutably religious in nature. 
Smith’s memories also emphasize the role of the therapist as vital in accessing repressed 
trauma and demonstrate the extensive infantilization of the analysand that characterizes subsequent 
satanic ritual abuse accounts.  The Virgin Mary herself conveniently insisted upon the necessity for 
Smith to seek assistance in accessing these memories: “everybody needs to cry, but not alone.  Don’t 
cry about this alone,” “Ma Mère” exhorted Smith.99  Michelle Remembers insisted that this process was 
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nearly as arduous for Pazder as it was for Smith: he wept during her sessions; “he had entered her 
pain and was there inside it with her.”100  This moment of empathy was vital for Smith’s progress.  
“Dr. Pazder would conclude that it was this sharing of the pain—this manifest evidence of being 
cared for—that enabled Michelle to go on from there.”101  Pazder was emphatic on his crucial role in 
Smith’s recollection and recovery.  “You can’t go back alone,” he insisted.  “You’ve got to have 
someone you trust go with you, someone you know it’s safe with.”102  Smith concurred with his 
assessment: “I think I’m going to need you.”103  In her tape recorded monologues, Smith expanded 
on Pazder’s critical contribution to her recovery: “remember all those times I’ve begged you to help 
me put it together?  Well, it’s not just understanding it and putting things together that way.  I am 
beginning to realize that it is a much more literal request – help put me, my body, the parts of my 
body, my memories…back together.”104  Pazder recounted that the satanic “pattern” of Smith’s 
memories “had been apparent to [him] for some time, and he was pleased [when] Michelle be[gan] to 
recognize it.”105  As I noted above, Pazder—not Smith—identified the abuse as explicitly satanic, 
providing a Roman Catholic lens through which to make meaning of her experiences.  And when 
Smith expressed fraught ambivalence about their undertaking, Pazder “commanded her to continue” 
their sessions.106 
That Pazder felt empowered to “command” Smith in this way underscores the flagrant 
infantilization of his analysand – a mindset that dramatically shaped subsequent satanic ritual abuse, 
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multiple personality disorder (MPD, now known as Dissociative Identity Disorder), and repressed 
memory syndrome diagnoses and treatments.  Pazder exclusively referred to Smith by her first name 
throughout Michelle Remembers, whereas he was always “Dr. Pazder.”  During Smith’s initial bout with 
unidentified terror, Pazder held her hand and then placed his hand on her head while she 
screamed.107  Smith recounted her memories of abuse in a child’s voice, often with her head on 
Pazder’s shoulder or holding his hand: “there was no mistaking it: a girl of perhaps no more than 
five lay on the couch before him.”108   
Pazder explained that he “realized that the only way he could assist the child—and therefore 
the woman whom the child had become—was to allow her to relive the entire ghastly experience.”109  
Pazder gave Smith a doll as part of their work together, encouraging her to “embrace that little girl [i.e. 
herself]– that little girl who was so abandoned and wounded.”110  Pazder gave her his “old coat” to 
use as a blanket; Smith referred to it as her “comforter.”111 Pazder frequently thought of Smith as a 
girl or a child: “the child was having new experiences that were propelling her on.”112  Smith and 
Pazder had an emphatically hierarchical relationship in which Pazder behaved in loco parentis toward a 
27-year-old woman.113  Pazder’s infantilization of his analysand was pronounced, and this dynamic 
would shape subsequent accounts of and treatment schemes for satanic ritual abuse. 
Michelle Remembers’ most lasting influence on satanic ritual abuse accounts is also among the 
least pronounced in the book: the connection of satanic ritual abuse with child sexual abuse.  
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Scholars of satanic ritual abuse contest the extent to which the abuses Smith recounts were sexual.  
De Young observes that “Michelle had never remembered sexual abuse by her satanic captors,” 
which (de Young suggests) explains why Pazder’s original definition of satanic ritual abuse as 
“repeated physical, emotional, mental and spiritual assaults” omitted sexual elements.114    A number 
of others emphasize how lurid the descriptions of abuse throughout Michelle Remembers are.115  There 
are fewer than ten pages of Michelle Remembers that describe emphatically sexual assaults, and none of 
these incidents are as graphic as later accounts of satanic ritual abuse would be.  Ultimately, however, 
it is as inaccurate to claim that Smith and Pazder’s account is lurid or pornographic as it is to assert 
that Smith did not recount any explicitly sexual abuse.  However fantastic these memories were, they 
irrefutably contained sexual elements.  Malachi held her by her “neck and groin” while throwing her 
up into the air.116  She was kept naked against her will.117  Smith was allegedly kissed by an adult 
woman and raped and sodomized with “colorful sticks:” “they stuck those sticks not just in my 
mouth.  They stuck them everywhere I had an opening… They are putting ugly in me.”118  One 
incident left her bleeding “between her legs.”119  She was exposed to group “ritual sex, 
apparently.”120  During another incident, “a woman inserted something into her bottom.”121  The 
satanic “nurse” who supervised Smith in the hospital gave Smith enemas: “it’s such a terrible pain 
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down there…I felt like I’d lost control down there.”122  Smith was forced to “helplessly defecat[e]” 
on a crucifix and a Bible; “when Michelle saw that she had soiled them, she was horrified.”123  It is 
worth noting that the sexual abuse Smith remembers is perpetrated by strangers, and almost 
exclusively by women, in sharp contrast to the finding of child protection advocates but in keeping 
with 1980s satanic ritual abuse memories.124  The anal focus of Smith’s accounts likewise diverges 
from most domestic child sexual assault, but corresponds to later satanic ritual abuse accounts.125  
Though the sexual elements of the recounted abuse were by no means the most violent or most 
frequent, Michelle Remembers set the stage for the 1980s moral panic that indelibly connected satanic 
ritual abuse with child sexual abuse.   
Michelle Remembers articulated (and, according to new religious movement scholars and 
sociologists of religion, initiated) the satanic ritual abuse phenomenon, if not the entirety of 
repressed/recovered memory diagnoses.  In particular, the construction of child abuse as a 
supernatural religious phenomenon rather than a domestic problem, the insistence on therapists as 
necessary for uncovering such abuse and the subsequent infantilization of the analysand-survivor, 
and the connection drawn between satanic ritual abuse and child sexual abuse shaped popular 
imaginings of satanic ritual abuse.  The Satanic Panic would cast doubt and suspicion on non-
Christian religions (particularly indigenous traditions and new religious movements), locate child 
abuse in an international religious conspiracy rather than in domestic settings, and at once criminalize 
and infantilize women.  In the next section, I will explore the ways in which some feminists 
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contributed to and exacerbated this moral panic, to the detriment of American women’s sexual and 
religious freedoms.   
 
Curiously Accommodating Transformations:  
Feminist Anti-Satanic Ritual Abuse Deployments of Michelle Remembers  
 
It is perhaps not surprising that the trauma of one woman, raised in a Roman Catholic household, 
enrolled in a parochial school, and under the therapeutic guidance of a devoutly Roman Catholic 
man, would find expression in the language and symbols of Roman Catholic mysticism.126  The 
significance of Michelle Remembers lies in the fact that so many non-Catholics took this “Satanic 
phantasmagoria” as gospel.127 
Even before its publication, Michelle Remembers caught the attention of an ostensibly secular 
public.  Pazder and Smith secured a $100,000 advance for the book and an additional $242,000 for 
the paperback rights.128  People Magazine promoted Michelle Remembers in a pre-publication feature 
story; The National Enquirer printed an abridged version of the story.129  The book was a Literary 
Guild and Doubleday Book Club Alternate selection, and there was talk of a movie deal.130 Publisher’s 
Weekly noted that Michelle Remembers’ publisher, Pocket Books, planned for a 100,000 volume first 
printing, designated a $75,000 promotional/advertising budget for Smith and Pazder’s demonic tell-
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all, and scheduled a book tour for the authors – as Publisher’s Weekly suggested, “code words for ‘this 
will be big.’”131   
As media scholar Barbara Fister notes, “clearly, the climate seemed right for [Michelle 
Remembers], and whether the events it depicted actually happened or not was less important than the 
fact that it was a story that would appeal to many readers.”132  The book’s international popularity 
was no coincidence.   Pazder and Smith travelled across North American to promote their work, 
appearing on television talk shows (including The Oprah Winfrey Show, Donahue, Geraldo, and 20/20) 
and giving radio interviews.133  Maclean’s, a popular Canadian magazine, published a scathing article 
shortly after the publication of Michelle Remembers, in which Smith’s father and sisters challenged and 
denounced Smith’s memories.134 But this attempt to debunk Smith and Pazder’s work had little 
impact on the book’s growing popularity.135  Michelle Remembers would eventually sell hundreds of 
thousands of copies, despite the absence of independent verification for any of Smith’s memories or 
the international satanic conspiracy she alleged.136 
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Indeed, the publication of Michelle Remembers conferred “the immediate status of ‘experts’ in 
this horrific form of child abuse that Pazder, in a 1981 meeting of the American Psychiatric 
Association, was the first to call ‘ritual abuse.’”137  In the course of their promotional tour, Smith and 
Pazder popularized “ritual abuse” as a concern among psychologists and psychiatrists, law 
enforcement officers, child protection advocates, and popular news media audiences throughout 
North America.138 Suddenly, signs of satanic “ritual abuse” began cropping up all over the country.   
Scholars are nearly unanimous in identifying Michelle Remembers as the spark that lit the 
torches Americans would carry against their imaginary satanic foes, but the book resonated 
differently among diverse interest groups.139   And as journalists and renown satanic ritual abuse 
skeptics Debbie Nathan and Michael Snedeker note, “like any grand social panic, the ritual child-
abuse scare of the 1980s and 1990s did not spring full-blown from one incident.”140  Scholars of this 
moral panic have identified a number of diffuse factors that contributed to the transnational 
dissemination of Satanic Panic: the emergence of confessional Satanists, most notably those 
associated with Anton LaVey’s Church of Satan and its breakaway counterpart, Michael Aquino’s 
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Temple of Set141; the consolidation and increased visibility of conservative evangelical Christianities, 
which detected an ontological Satan at work in the present world142; child protection activists, 
mobilized in the 1960s and 1970s by an increased awareness of the prevalence of domestic child 
abuse; public identification with Michelle Smith’s memories of ritual abuse, resulting in a number of 
similar (though more sexually explicit) satanic ritual abuse “survivor” accounts143; a growing 
therapeutic industry that sprung up around diagnoses of “repressed memories” of satanic ritual 
abuse, again similar to Smith’s;  anti-cult activism redirecting its focus, energy, and resources toward 
combatting this imagined Satanism; mass media reporting on the phenomenon (most notably 
20/20’s “The Devil Worshippers” and Geraldo’s “Satan’s Underground,” which reached almost 
twenty millions viewers in a single broadcast)144; workshops and training sessions, many of which 
drew on Michelle Remembers, which educated social workers, law enforcement officers, and 
psychotherapists on the phenomenon; and second-wave feminism’s investment in disrupting the 
systemic inequalities that contributed to child sexual abuse.145 
It is a remarkable phenomenon that could inspire cooperation among psychotherapists, anti-
cult activists, conservative evangelicals, law enforcement officials, and second-wave feminists.  The 
threat of satanic ritual abuse did just that.146 For the purposes of this chapter, I am most interested in 
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the ways second-wave feminist investments in protecting children from sexual abuse served to 
disseminate the Satanic Panic.  Religious studies scholar Kelly Jo Jarrett has identified two main 
“waves” of feminist thought and activism regarding satanic ritual abuse during the 1980s and early 
1990s.  The earlier surfaced as anxieties about satanic ritual abuse occurring in daycare facilities 
(earliest and most notably the McMartin Preschool trial); the latter as numerous diagnoses of adult 
women as survivors of satanic ritual abuse.  Michelle Remembers and its authors directly informed 
activists in both “waves” of feminist involvement.   
In this section, I detail the ways in which Michelle Remembers shaped and directed feminist 
anti-SRA activism.  I contextualize second-wave feminist investments in child protectionism and 
suggest that these investments demonstrate feminist complicity in spreading the satanic ritual abuse 
moral panic.  I engage popular anxieties surrounding satanic ritual abuse as evidenced in daycare 
investigations and satanic ritual abuse survivor diagnoses.  Given the popularity of Michelle Remembers 
and its authors’ active involvement in promoting both concerns about the prevalence of satanic ritual 
abuse and the reality of “repressed memories” of such abuses, it follows that both the investigations 
of childcare facilities and the diagnoses of SRA survivors would follow the book’s precedent.  
Indeed, in both instances we see the projection of abuse onto external (and suspiciously religious) 
rather than domestic actors, an emphasis on the need for therapeutic intervention, and frequent 
parallels drawn between satanic ritual abuse and child sexual abuse.  I focus particularly on the irony 
in feminist efforts ultimately limiting conditions of possibility for American women’s sexual and 
religious freedoms.   
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Feminist Investments In Preventing Child Sexual Abuse 
 
There are two key factors to consider when examining feminist complicity in the satanic ritual abuse 
moral panic.147  The first is pre-existing feminist commitments in increasing awareness of and 
preventing child sexual abuse, which activists had shown to be a matter of grave concern in the latter 
half of the twentieth century.  The second is feminists’ contributions toward the sexualization of 
satanic ritual abuse.   
There is much in survivors’ accounts of satanic ritual abuse that would have concerned 
America’s second-wave feminists.  As folklorist Bill Ellis notes in 2000 Raising the Devil: Satanism, New 
Religions, and the Media, “the satanic religion described [in Michelle Remembers] is one that privileges 
males [and] allows the degradation of women and abuse of children.”148  In particular, many feminist 
activists who had been involved in anti-violence efforts in the 1970s attempted to combat incest and 
child abuse the early 1980s, “bringing with them a wealth of political organizing experience and well 
developed critiques of how the family, religion, gender, and sex function as sites and agents of social 
control.”149  These feminists forged connections between the child abuse and anti-violence 
movements and produced a grass-roots incest survivor movement.150   
Kelly Jo Jarrett argues that the child protectionist angle of the emerging satanic ritual abuse 
coalition “represented an opportunity to extend the feminist struggle against battering, rape, and 
incest with a reduced risk of engendering anti-feminist backlash.”151  Feminist alliances with anti-
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satanic ritual abuse advocates also provided opportunities for public support and popular 
momentum for these anti-violence issues at time when the Reagan administration had drastically 
reduced funding for domestic abuse prevention.152  
While many feminists had abandoned traditional religion, a number took often fantastic and 
supernatural allegations of satanic ritual abuse very seriously.  As Jarrett notes: 
satanic ritual abuse allegations were incredible and bizarre, but then, so was the level of 
violence against women and children that the feminist anti-violence movement had helped 
bring to light.  For feminist satanic ritual abuse proponents, satanic ritual abuse represented 
an extreme expression of the physical and sexual abuses perpetrated upon so many women 
and children in American society.153  
 
Scholars largely concur that feminist efforts toward ending historical denial of child abuse “may have 
paved the way for belief in ritual abuse as well,” though some qualify that “the centrality of 
[feminism’s] role is difficult to specify.”154  Tracing feminist involvement in disseminating the satanic 
ritual abuse moral panic is, of course, complicated by the fact that feminism has from its inception 
been extremely diverse.  Nathan and Snedeker argue that anti-pornography and “victimology” 
feminists contributed most directly both to the dissemination of satanic ritual abuse and the 
sexualization of the phenomenon.155 
Feminists incontrovertibly contributed to the sexualization of satanic ritual abuse allegations.  
As Nathan and Snedeker note, “incorporating claims of physical and sexual abuse with concerns 
over missing children, child pornography, and emerging allegations of Satanism, satanic ritual abuse 
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seemed to provide a plausible explanation for the apparent rise in sex abuse cases.”156  Nathan and 
Snedeker suggest that feminists anti-violence activists “were particularly susceptible to sex-abuse 
conspiracy theories.”157  The willingness of feminist anti-violence advocates to credit allegations of 
sexualized satanic ritual abuse might follow from feminist efforts in the mid-to-late 1970s to 
emphasize the threat of domestic child sexual abuse.158  Such feminists were particularly concerned 
at the prevalence of adult male abusers and girl-child victims.159  As sociologist Mary de Young 
explains, “noting the stark asymmetry in gender in its perpetration and victimology, the feminist 
ideology redefined sexual abuse in terms of male dominance and contextualized it within the 
routinized, culturally sanctioned interactions between men and women, parents and children, fathers 
and daughters.”160  Feminist activists against child sexual abuse were particularly adamant in their 
insistence on treating incest and other child sexual abuse victims, previously silenced, as “credible 
witnesses to their own victimization.”161   
While Pazder’s initial definition of “ritual abuse” omitted the sexual aspects of Smith’s 
memories, the concept underwent a “curiously accommodating transformation” in conversation with 
emergent accounts of satanic ritual abuse.162  As I noted earlier, the sexual elements of Smith’s 
alleged satanic ritual abuse were neither the most lurid nor the most frequent modes of abuse.163  But 
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the literary genre inspired by Smith’s memoirs unfailing recounted extensive and disturbing incidents 
of sexual assault.  De Young observes that “in the linguistic economy of the moral panic [SRA 
accusations] soon would spark, ritual abuse became synonymous with sexual abuse – but not with 
the ‘ordinary’ kind of sexual abuse that occurs within families.  With its ceremonial trappings, 
costumes and rites, ritual abuse was something altogether different.”164  Pazder quickly modified his 
definition of “ritual abuse” to incorporate this extraordinary prevalence of supernatural child sexual 
abuse.  “Sensing the Zeitgeist, perhaps, Pazder now tagged ‘sexual’ to his list of ritually abusive 
assaults.”165  This emphasis on believing sexual abuse survivors would play heavily into investigations 
of satanic ritual abuse allegations in daycare facilities.   
 
Demonizing Daycare166 
 
During the early 1980s, most investigations of satanic ritual abuse stemmed from alleged sexual 
molestation in daycare facilities.167  An unprecedented influx of mothers into the workforce gave rise 
to this new cultural phenomenon – a generation of women raised by stay-at-home mothers elected 
or needed to entrust the care of their children to unknown and often unregulated childcare 
facilities.168  In part, the increase of working women, and particularly working mothers, can be 
attributed to feminist activism, but double-digit inflation and plummeting median incomes for young 
families also contributed to this dramatic surge.169  Sociologists of religion Stuart Wright and David 
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Bromley have both argued that satanic ritual abuse allegations against daycare workers may be 
attributed to parental, and particularly maternal, anxieties about leaving their children in the care of 
strangers.  Wright proposes that “the conflict between family economic needs and maternal 
responsibility for the socialization of children produced understandable tension.”170  Bromley goes 
further:  
The satanic subversion narrative gives human shape to the sense of danger and vulnerability, 
in this case the tension between family and economy, that individuals experience.  
Allegations of satanic cults infiltrating childcare facilities coincided closely with a sharp 
increase in the number of women with young children in the labor force who faced a 
pressing need for reliable daycare.  The individuals making the initial allegations of satanic 
subversion were family members who entrusted their children to daycare facilities about 
which they had significant reservations and apprehensions.171 
 
These anxieties manifested, in part, as accusations of sexual misconduct lodged against daycare 
employees.  Pazder defined Smith’s experiences as “ritual abuse” during the American Psychiatric 
Association’s national meeting in 1981 as “‘repeated physical, emotional, mental and spiritual 
assaults’ that are carried out through the ‘systematic use of symbols, ceremonies, and machinations 
designed and orchestrated to attain malevolent effects.’”172  During Michelle Remembers’ extensive 
promotional tour, Pazder and Smith had popularized the “ritual abuse” diagnosis in training 
seminars for law enforcement officers, child protection advocates, psychologists and psychiatrists.173   
De Young notes that Pazder and Smith “consult[ed] on the suspected cases of day care ritual 
abuse that began cropping up like pernicious weeds in the wake of the publication of the book,” 
fostering anxiety about a massive satanic conspiracy bent on abusing children for nefarious 
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purposes.174  These concerns spread broadly: by 1987, Pazder claimed to that he had consulted on 
more than a thousand satanic ritual abuse cases and was currently spending a full third of his time on 
such cases.175 In a 1990 interview on the aftermath of the book’s publication, Robert Hicks of the 
US Justice Department noted that “before Michelle Remembers there were no [s]atanic prosecutions 
involving children.  Now the myth [was] everywhere.”176   
The most familiar and certainly most expensive and arduous investigation into daycare 
employee misconduct was the McMartin daycare trial.  In August 1983, Judy Johnson alleged that 
Raymond Buckey, an employee at the McMartin Preschool in Manhattan Beach, California, had 
sodomized her son.177  Her insistent allegations incited an inquiry at the school.  Local police opened 
an investigation of the preschool in September 1983.  Over the course of a years-long investigation, 
seven current and former employees of the McMartin preschool—including the owner, Virginia 
McMartin, her daughter Peggy McMartin Buckey, and her husband Raymond Buckey—were charged 
with 52 counts of felony child abuse.178  As de Young relates, the children’s interviews included tales 
of  
the ritualistic ingestion of feces, urine, blood, semen, and human flesh; the disinterment  and 
mutilation of corpses; the sacrifices of infants; and the orgies with their day care providers, 
costumed as devils and witches, in the classrooms, in tunnels under the center, and in car 
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washes, airplanes, mansions, cemeteries, hotels, ranches, gourmet food stores, local gyms, 
churches, and hot air balloons.179 
 
Investigators identified three hundred and sixty-nine current or past enrollees in the McMartin 
preschool as victims of abuse over the course of the previous two decades.180   
The case received national attention in February 1984.  At this point, Lawrence Pazder and 
Michelle Smith involved themselves in the investigations.181  “The role of the devil as agent provocateur 
was not introduced until [1984],” sociologist Mary de Young observes.  “Enter Lawrence Pazder.”182  
Pazder, as well as Smith and several other satanic ritual abuse “survivors,” consulted with therapists 
and parents of children enrolled in the McMartin preschool as well as the law enforcement officers 
and district attorneys investigating the case.183  Police reports show that Pazder was convinced of a 
massive international satanic conspiracy: “anybody could be involved in this plot,” Pazder insisted, 
“including teachers, doctors, movie stars, merchants, even…members of the Anaheim Angels 
baseball team.”184  By this point, Pazder’s definition of satanic ritual abuse incorporated sexual 
elements, corroborating Judy Johnson’s initial claims.185  The McMartin case’s initial prosecutor, 
Glenn E. Stevens, argued that Smith and Pazder’s involvement in the investigation influenced the 
testimony of child witnesses. 186  
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Perhaps even more than its authors, Michelle Remembers directly influenced the investigation 
and prosecution of the McMartin daycare trial.  Police investigators and prosecutors used the book 
as a checklist for confirming the satanic/ritualistic nature of the alleged abuse.187  The satanic ritual 
abuse survival genre inspired by Michelle Remembers further informed the investigation.  As de Young 
emphasizes, “with its preoccupation with diabolical cults, monastic institutions, subterranean spaces, 
live burials and secret rooms, double lives, possession, rape, madness and death, this genre of 
literature lent clinical authority to the accounts of young children during the day care ritual abuse 
moral panic.”188  The genre was further disseminated and popularized through television talk shows, 
radio programs, and tabloids, all of which contributed to a growing sense of panic among those 
invested in the protection of children.189 
These imaginary Satanists supposedly preyed on children for a number of reasons: 
indoctrination; ritual sacrifice; cannibalism; torture; and sexual defilement of the innocent – all of 
which had been detailed in Michelle Remembers and which Pazder and Smith had insisted were 
occurring right under the noses of parents and other child protection advocates.190  The children of 
the McMartin preschool accused their teachers of these ghastly and sexually depraved acts.  Three 
and four year olds testified to having been molested during satanic rituals, forced to participate in 
animal mutilations, even taking part in infanticides.191  McMartin became the first of more than one 
hundred cases in which children alleged coercion into “devil worship, open graves, cannibalism, 
airplane trips, nude photography, being urinated or defecated on, and murdering babies.”192   
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Despite bizarre and sometimes impossible allegations, some feminists and child protection 
advocates rallied behind the McMartin prosecution.193  The children’s claims of abuse “resonate[d] 
with concerns many contemporary feminists [had] about violence against women, and about 
authorities’ traditional disbelief when women reported sexual assaults.”194  Skepticism regarding the 
reality of these abuses became tantamount to participating in the abuse itself.195  Feminist anti-satanic 
ritual abuse activists collaborated with McMartin parents to insist that the American public “believe 
the children” – under the assumption that children would not fabricate testimony or lie about their 
experiences of such ghastly abuses.196 
Except it appears that the children did lie – or rather, were coerced into making elaborate 
claims about satanic ritual abuse through suggestive interviewing techniques.  The alleged child 
victims in the McMartin case accused their former teachers of unthinkable horrors, which scholars 
now believe to be the product not of satanic sexual predation but of coercive interviewing 
techniques on the part of McMartin investigators.  Lead investigator (and former child protection 
advocate for the National Organization of Women) Kee MacFarlane, the McMartin parents, and 
other child advocates involved in the case became convinced of satanic influences following their 
meetings with Pazder.197  De Young maintains that Pazder’s emphasis on the prevalence and severity 
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of satanic ritual abuse “colonized [the] imaginations” of McMartin parents and investigators alike.198  
Following their interactions with Pazder and Smith,  
all of the interrogators, including the parents, began asking the children different kinds of 
questions, sometimes using devil puppets as props, and comparing answers against checklists 
of satanic rituals, roles, ceremonies and holidays put together by New Christian Right 
crusaders.  With the ‘ultimate evil’ of ritual abuse as the rudder of their imagination, anything 
the children revealed was deemed plausible.199 
 
According to Nathan and Snedeker, McMartin investigators and parents, convinced as they were of 
satanic ritual abuse’s reality and severity, “whether consciously or unconsciously, fashioned a 
subculture of fanatical belief that enveloped their children and demanded their total participation.”200  
The children’s “elaborately detailed satanic ritual abuse accounts” were “elicited over repeated and 
suggestive interviews by social workers now convinced of a satanic influence in the case.”201  As de 
Young explained, during the proceedings, prosecutors argued that the children’s accounts be taken at 
face value “because children cannot imagine what they have not experienced.”202  The defense 
argued that the children’s testimony might have been shaped by popular culture, parental influences, 
and interviewing techniques.203   
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McMartin, McMartin Buckey, and Buckey all vehemently denied having abused the children in their 
care.204   
The trial lasted twenty-eight months, heard 124 witnesses, reviewed 900 pieced of evidence, 
produced 64,000 pages of transcripts, and ultimately ruled on sixty-five charges of child sexual abuse 
(reduced from 100 after some parents refused to let their children testify).205  On January 18, 1990, 
the jury for the People v. Buckey returned its verdict: Peggy McMartin Buckey was acquitted of all 
charges; Raymond Buckey was acquitted of 29 of the 52 charges laid against him, with the jury 
deadlocked on the remained thirteen charges.206  Buckey was retried on eight of the remaining 
charges, but the jury deadlocked again.  De Young explains that “with the words, ‘All right, that’s it,” 
the judge dismissed all charges against Raymond Buckey.”207  After six years and fifteen million 
dollars, the longest and most expensive criminal trial of its time had ended.208    
But the damage was already done.  The McMartin trial had popularized and defined satanic 
ritual abuse, and, as de Young argues, “in doing so, gave the ensuing moral panic its content.”209  
Hundreds of daycare workers, a majority of them low-paid women unrelated to the children in their 
care,210  
joined a growing population…of people whose lives were shattered by allegations of ritual 
sex abuse.  The lucky ones were tried and acquitted, or if not indicted, only bankrupted by 
legal fees.  Others were fired from their jobs, run out of their communities, or had their 
children taken away from them.  Dozens more, including the El Paso, North Carolina, and 
Austin defendants [of similar satanic ritual abuse daycare cases], were convicted and 
imprisoned for crimes whose only substantiation was words.211 
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Though it is difficult to pinpoint the extent to which feminist activism factored in this moral panic, 
feminists engaged in anti-satanic ritual abuse child protectionism efforts inarguably contributed both 
to the dissemination of satanic ritual abuse as a child-specific threat and to the sexualization of the 
phenomenon.212  Ultimately, the daycare portion of America’s Satanic Panic was an important 
element in what became “a veritable industry [that] developed around the effort to demonstrate the 
existence of ritual abuse.”213 
 
Diagnostic Demonologies 
 
While feminist anti-satanic ritual abuse activism in the early 1980s largely focused on identifying 
incidences of ritual abuse in daycare facilities, the late 1980s and early 1990s saw a shift toward the 
popularization (some would say creation) of psychiatric diagnoses and treatment of satanic ritual 
abuse-related mental illnesses, including repressed/recovered memory syndrome and multiple 
personality disorder (MPD-SRA).214  Feminist activism constituted a significant portion of the energy 
behind what became a passionate nation-wide effort to spread belief in ritual abuse.215  Nathan and 
Snedeker note that by the mid-1980s, satanic ritual abuse accusations were being made “not by 
children but by adults receiving psychotherapy who, as a result of pressure and suggestion by their 
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therapists and from self-help books, were remembering family-based childhood ritual abuse they 
supposedly had forgotten for years.”216 
Sociological studies of the satanic ritual abuse survivor phenomenon reveal that survivors are 
predominantly white women whose average age range is in the mid-forties.217  While almost 90% of 
satanic ritual abuse survivors surveyed attended college, studies indicate a lower-than-average 
participation in white-collar occupations.218  Several scholars have suggested that satanic ritual abuse 
survivors become increasingly socially dysfunctional (experiencing depression or isolation) following 
their diagnoses, which may also contribute to a high incidence of marital problems.219  Most satanic 
ritual abuse survivors engage in therapy sessions more than once a week; medical insurance usually 
does not cover these treatments.220  An extraordinarily high proportion of satanic ritual abuse 
survivors (86%) have also been diagnosed with MPD; and the average number of multiple 
personalities per diagnosed individual is one hundred.221  Most significantly, the majority of satanic 
ritual abuse survivors (87.5%) had no memories of ritual abuse prior to therapeutic intervention.222  
By the end of the 1980s, then, psychiatric hospitals and mental healthcare providers had 
begun to capitalize on the massive proliferation of recovered memory diagnoses.223  A minority of 
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mental health professionals was responsible for this escalation of satanic ritual abuse-related 
diagnoses: between 11- 13% of surveyed therapists had direct experience with even one case of 
alleged satanic abuse.224   An even smaller number accounted for a huge proportion of reported 
cases: two percent of therapists surveyed had seen hundreds of cases each.225  Therapists who 
reported cases of satanic ritual abuse “were especially likely to have attended special workshops 
dealing with ways to identify and treat ritual abuse and repressed memories.”226  Therapists who 
reported satanic ritual abuse cases were also more likely to diagnose clients with “controversial 
maladies” like Multiple Personality Disorder.227  Significantly, “memories of satanic blood rituals 
only emerge[d] after a patient ha[d] been involved in the process of recovering memories for an 
extended period of time.”228  This is to say that very few women identified themselves as satanic 
ritual abuse survivors without therapeutic intervention.   
Social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists helped satanic ritual abuse survivors recover 
memories of abuse using contentious techniques.  Here again, satanic ritual abuse-awareness 
seminars encouraged therapists in the use of such techniques.  As Stuart Wright notes: “by putting 
patients in an altered state of consciousness, some therapists believed they were uncovering 
repressed memories of ritual abuse, usually involving family members.  Some of these patients were 
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confined involuntarily for extended periods of time and heavily sedated by powerful drugs.”229  Over 
and above the ethics of so traumatic a treatment course, psychologists Bette Bottoms and Suzanne 
Davis note in their 1997 “The Creation of Satanic Ritual Abuse” that the techniques these satanic 
ritual abuse seminars promoted—“suggestive ‘memory recovery’ techniques such as hypnotic age 
regression” (such as Pazder used in therapy described in Michelle Remembers)—“can produce false 
memories and iatrogenic symptoms in clients.”230  Despite the complete absence of corroborative 
evidence for recovered memories of satanic ritual abuse, very few therapists challenged clients’ 
allegations of satanic abuse. 231  Satanic ritual abuse claims, then, emerged almost exclusively in 
therapeutic contexts, and were often elicited using controversial techniques since proven to produce 
false memories and treatment-related illnesses like increased social anxiety, depression, and 
isolation.232   
The repressed/recovered memory industry was initiated and energized by Lawrence Pazder’s 
work with Michelle Smith.  In numerous public appearances, Pazder and Smith publicized the core 
diagnosis in Michelle Remembers, the idea that “the trauma of ritual abuse allegedly experienced early in 
life was so severe that memories of it had been deeply repressed” and were only accessible through 
extensive therapeutic intervention.233  Wright observes that “this pioneering account was significant 
because it incorporated virtually all the charges that would become popular among anti-Satanists in 
the eighties—Satanic worship, ritual child abuse, blood sacrifices, murder, cannibalism—and thus 
effectively shaped the whole occult survivor genre.”234  Michelle Remembers thus became a “milestone 
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publication,” a model through which middle-aged, middle class white women in therapy came to 
identify themselves as satanic ritual abuse survivors.235  As Bottoms and Davis assert, “only after the 
[SRA] phenomenon was well known (after seminal accounts such as Michelle Remembers) did many 
individuals…decide that they too suffered from [satanic ritual abuse].”236  By reading Michelle 
Remembers, or (more likely) seeking treatment with therapists who had attended satanic ritual abuse 
seminars directly influenced by Pazder and Smith’s work, thousands of American women came to 
identify themselves as survivors of satanic ritual abuse. 
Pazder and Smith’s work created the paradigm for satanic ritual abuse symptoms and 
traumas; therapists who specialized in satanic ritual abuse diagnoses and treatments acted as a 
“conduit of information” for this paradigm, passing the model along to other therapists and thus 
other patients.237  The American Psychiatric Association published the third volume of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DMS-III) in 1984 and for the first time, the 
DSM included Psychogenic Amnesia (Repressed/Recovered Memories) and Multiple Personality 
Disorder (MPD) as recognizable diagnoses and additional criteria for diagnosing multiplicity 
pursuant to satanic abuse (MPD-SRA).238  In the wake of Michelle Remembers and DMS-III, “cult-
survivor stories proliferated, as did the survivors themselves.”239 
Many feminists emphatically defended the credibility of these survivor accounts.  As 
psychologists Bottoms and Davis indicate, “the women's movement swept the abuse of women and 
children into the public eye, enabling real victims to gain deserved public belief and recognition… 
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[A]t the same time, it may have paved the way for belief in ritual abuse as well.”240  The DSM-III 
validated women’s claims of repressed/recovered memories of ritual abuse; feminist support for 
these claims’ credibility echoed earlier decades’ impetus to “believe the victim.”  Gender studies 
scholar Barbara Fister suggests that  
one of the compelling arguments for believing in ritual abuse (despite its sensational and 
incredible elements) was that the evidence was typically presented as actual, first-hand 
experience.  To doubt the victim’s account was to participate in the abuse… Anything short 
of uncritical acceptance could be interpreted as betrayal of an entire class of victims.241 
  
First-hand accounts of satanic ritual abuse were given further credibility by such popular psychology 
handbooks as Bass and Davis’ best-selling The Courage to Heal, which strongly discouraged skepticism 
toward recovered memories.  “Be willing to believe the unbelievable… No one fantasizes abuse… 
Believe the survivor,” such texts exhorted therapists and self-identified survivors alike.242 
The Courage to Heal included “an influential section on ritual abuse,” including selections from 
Michelle Remembers.243  Despite inconsistencies of satanic ritual abuse accusations with earlier scholarly 
findings on child sexual abuse—most notably the frequency with which women were accused as 
satanic ritual abuse perpetrators—some feminists rallied to defend survivors in a political drama of 
feminism against religion writ large.244   
The feminist support for anti-satanic ritual abuse activism was not without cause.  Kelly Jo 
Jarrett suggests that “recovered memories spread so far and so fast throughout American society 
because patriarchal family structures and male-dominated society are sexually traumatic for a great 
many children and adult women” in contemporary American culture.245  Jarrett and other scholars of 
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the American satanic ritual abuse moral panic have suggested that Michelle Remembers and the satanic 
ritual abuse allegations which followed its publication held metaphorical, if not verifiable, truth for 
survivors.246  Jarrett also rightly points out that, with conservative evangelicals, second-wave 
American feminists are often left “holding the bag” for the Satanic Panic, when (as I discussed 
above) a range of factors contributed to the panic’s broad dissemination.  However, as Bottoms and 
Davis correctly assert, “feminist support of a culture in which questioning adult survivors’ stories in 
anathema must be placed on the list of factors contributing to the spread of belief in ritual abuse.”247 
Therapeutic suggestion leading to false memories of satanic ritual abuse created further 
complications as well.  The victimization and infantilization of women are chief among these 
complications. 248  As reporter Louisa Thomas asserts, “requiring women to assume the role of 
‘victim,’ a person who is perpetually in recovery, has been criticized for being disempowering as well 
as being a suppression of women’s rights to sexual, psychological, and economic freedom.”249  
Therapists encouraged women to speak in child-voices, to identify as “adult children,” and to locate 
their identities in early (and often completely fabricated) experiences of abuse.250  As a result, 
marriages were destroyed, families torn apart, and often the women in therapy became less able to 
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function socially than they had been before beginning treatment.251  As Wright observes, “Tragically, 
patients were victimized by their therapists, suffering unnecessarily from false or implanted 
memories of incest, murder, cannibalism, and sexual abuse.  Scores of patients accused parents of 
being Satanists and ritually abusing them in ceremonies of initiation or blood sacrifice.”252  In this 
way, the deleterious consequences to satanic ritual abuse-related psychological diagnoses negated the 
metaphorical truth and psychological benefits to women articulating their discontentment in the 
language of satanic ritual abuse. 
In this section, I have demonstrated the role Michelle Remembers and its authors played in 
popularizing discourses of satanic ritual abuse.  I have emphasized in particular the extent to which 
feminist anti-satanic ritual abuse activists were complicit in the dissemination of America’s Satanic 
Panic.  In the final section of this chapter, I shall briefly problematize feminist complicity in 
spreading this moral panic.  I suggest that feminist participation in anti-satanic ritual abuse activism 
reinforced notions of American sexual exceptionalism, ultimately constraining American women’s 
sexual and religious freedoms.   
 
Feminist Complicity in Moral Panic 
 
Second-wave feminist activism energized attempts to combat child sexual abuse during the 1970s 
and 1980s.  However, feminists’ willingness to mobilize discourses of satanic ritual abuse contributed 
to the dissemination of a religio-sexual moral panic during the 1980s and early 1990s.  Feminist 
complicity in the exclusion of child sexual abuse from the domestic sphere reified notions of 
American sexual exceptionalism.  Feminists’ willingness to locate child sexual abuse in a religiously 
and sexually predatory satanic conspiracy rather than in “good old American” homes worked 
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ironically to constrain the sexual and religious freedoms of American women in the 1980s and early 
1990s.   
Unlike their conservative evangelical counterparts, feminist anti-satanic ritual abuse activists 
tended to downplay the satanic element of ritual abuse allegations.253  As Barbara Fister observes, 
many anti-satanic ritual abuse feminists “were uncomfortable with the religious interpretation of the 
conflict and…were quick to drop the ‘satanic’ from the name of the problem and from its 
etiology.”254  De Young and Jarrett both note feminists’ willingness to emphasize the sexual elements 
of satanic ritual abuse while minimizing the supernatural aspects.  As de Young observes, “ritual 
abuse, childsavers started saying as if they had meant to all along, is not always an expression of a 
satanic belief system, but is more often an act of sexual perversity.”255   
De Young rightly notes the extensive involvement of feminist investments in anti-satanic 
ritual abuse activism.  I take issue, however, with her insistence that the language of sexual perversity 
necessarily secularized the public rhetoric surrounding ritual abuse.256  De Young contends that the 
feminist language of child sexual abuse was more familiar and more meaningful to the American 
public than the religious language of satanic intent.  The author does note the role of the New 
Christian Right in tying public concerns about vulnerable children to demonic predation, but is 
largely dismissive of the role religious language and symbolism played in disseminating the Satanic 
Panic.257  In particular, I suspect de Young grossly underestimates the American public’s indignation 
at the inversion of recognizably Christian symbolism and practice.  As Jarrett argues, the religiosity of 
satanic ritual abuse allegations was not merely significant to evangelical anti-SRA activists, and the 
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efficacy of Satanic Panic rhetoric cannot be exclusively attributed to Americans’ sentimentality about 
children.  Indeed, as Armstrong has argued, feminist activism against child sexual abuse during the 
1970s was largely ineffective – it was the introduction of a satanic (which is to say inverted religious) 
element that the public began to attend to child sexual abuse accusations.  I assert that the efficacy of 
feminist anti-SRA rhetoric depended in no small part on a judicious mobilization of prejudice against 
minority religions and particularly on the persistent public suspicion of religious outsiders’ sexual 
predation.258  To fail to account for the role religious intolerance played in the efficacy of SRA 
rhetoric’s appeal to the American public is to misunderstand this phenomenon.259 
Contrary to de Young, Jarrett emphasizes the crucial role religion played in facilitating 
feminist alliances with other anti-SRA activists, most notably conservative evangelicals.  Jarrett 
argues that feminist activists colluded with evangelicals concerned about the phenomenon of satanic 
ritual abuse through a “politics of substitution.” As she explains:  
The politics of substitution obscured the conservative and fundamentalist Christian 
influence in the satanic panic by rendering their investments in religious and moral crusades 
against religious pluralism and sexual deviance invisible.  The politics of substitution enabled 
feminist and progressive activists to join hands with conservatives in the struggle to ‘protect 
children’ from satanic ritual abuse, suppressing the differences between them by deflecting 
attention away from feminist analyses of sexual violence and sexual abuse as an instrument 
of social control perpetuated by gender roles and power relations of the traditional family.260 
 
This is to say that feminist activists disregarded conservative evangelicals’ attempts to discourage 
religious diversity, gender equality, and sexual difference, as well as evangelical rhetoric about satanic 
ritual abuse’s demonic origins.  Feminist activists joined the efforts of decidedly anti-feminist 
conservative evangelicals in attempts to stop satanic ritual abuse.   
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Jarrett theorizes that focusing on the abuse rather than its satanic etiology allowed feminist 
activists to enter into such contradictory and ultimately deleterious conservative alliances.  Despite a 
seeming feminist indifference to religious rhetoric, Jarrett insists that the religious aspects of the 
Satanic Panic were crucial to the widespread acceptance of this social anxiety.261  She is adamant 
about the role religion played in perpetuating the moral panic, a point disputed or disregarded by 
most scholars of the phenomenon.262    
I concur with Jarrett’s emphasis on how deeply mainstream American religiosity shaped the 
Americans’ concerns about satanic ritual abuse.  I contend, however, that Jarrett’s analysis does not 
place sufficient weight on the extent to which religion, and specifically religious intolerance, played in 
disseminating the Satanic Panic.  As I have established throughout this dissertation, minority 
religions—lived or imagined—are frequently the targets of sexual suspicion.  The American public 
expects sexual misconduct from religious minorities.263  Feminist anti-SRA rhetoric capitalized on the 
persistence and prevalence of the American conviction that religious nonconformity accompanies 
sexual transgression.  In doing so, feminist participation in disseminating the Satanic Panic both 
fostered suspicion of non-Christian religions—particularly religious witchcraft and other emergent 
feminist spiritualities—and limited American women’s sexual options, most specifically American 
women’s ability both to mother children and participate in the workforce.   
Moral panics require folk devils; the role of folk devil is often filled by the religious 
outsider.264  Sociologists Goode and Ben-Yehuda moreover emphasize the role sexuality plays in the 
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construction of moral panics.265  I suggest that in instances where the folk devil is a religious 
outsider, moral panics are informed and fuelled by anxieties about that folk devil’s religio-sexual 
predation.266  As Nathan and Snedeker note, “the United States has a long tradition of demonizing 
unconventional religions by condemning them as politically subversive, brutal, authoritarian, sexually 
immoral, and endowed with supernatural powers.”267  Intentionally or not, anti-SRA feminist activists 
exploited popular anxieties about the sexually transgressive nature of religious minorities in their 
attempts to fight child sexual abuse.  In this way, feminist complicity in the satanic ritual abuse moral 
panic mobilized and reinforced discourses of American sexual exceptionalism. 
 
Sexual Exceptionalism 
 
As I have argued throughout this dissertation, “sexual exceptionalism” removes and protects 
American normative sexuality from culpability for sexual wrongdoing.  In particular, I have 
suggested that American sexual exceptionalism identifies nationally systemic problems, like child 
sexual abuse, as the sole purview of outsiders – particularly religious outsiders. 268  American sexual 
exceptionalism presents normative American sexuality as both unique to Americans and intuitively 
enacted by all those who share Americans’ “common values.”  As Puar argues in her 2007 Terrorist 
Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (2007), discourses of sexual exceptionalism produce the 
United States as “an exceptional nation-state,” one whose policies and moralities emerge as 
somehow unique and universal.269  American sexual exceptionalism vaunts the moral superiority of 
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normative American sexuality and condemns those who fail to conform to normative identities and 
practices.   
The Satanic Panic America experienced during the 1980s and early 1990s instantiates 
rhetorics of American sexual exceptionalism.  Discourses of American sexual exceptionalism 
produce and require an Other: in the context of a moral panic, the folk demon (here, imaginary 
satanists) emerges as predatory and perverse, particularly toward children.270  In the context of moral 
panics, rhetorics of American sexual exceptionalism (“good sex”) inform and authorize 
condemnation of the folk demon’s imagined predatory perversity (satanic ritual abuse).  American 
sexual exceptionalism at once condemns and marginalizes these imagined sexual transgressions.  
Such rhetorics exculpate the American body politic by insisting that such sexual misdeeds are 
horrifying and (more importantly) fundamentally other-than normative American sexuality.   
In the context of the moral panic in question, American sexual exceptionalism offered 
normative American sexuality as moral, decent, and restrained in comparison to the monstrous 
licentiousness of the imaginary satanists.  Construction of non- or rather anti-Christian religion as 
necessarily perverse and predatory distracted from the larger problem: the sexual abuse of American 
children.  At the same time, the literal demonization of non-Christian religions deployed a 
normalized conservative Christian sexual ethic, which suspects religious outsiders of sexual 
predation.  
This is to say that discourses of American sexual exceptionalism are necessarily protectionist 
discourses.  This rhetoric informs and authorizes actions during a state of exception (moral panic) to 
protect vulnerable citizens (women and children coerced and duped by dangerous religions).  But 
rhetorics of American sexual exceptionalism ultimately function to confirm and protect the 
exceptional nature of normative American sexuality.  Such discourses locate sexual abuse and 
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predation outside the American mainstream, rendering (for example) child sexual abuse visible in 
imaginary and horrific contexts while obscuring the lamentable prevalence of child sexual abuse in 
mainstream domestic settings.  Discourses of American sexual exceptionalism authorize good/real 
Americans to regulate and condemn religious outsiders for sexual transgression while obscuring or 
ignoring the sexual crimes happening in their own homes and families.  American sexual 
exceptionalism purports to protect vulnerable citizens from extraordinary (here, religious) predators 
while occluding the domestic abuses of those same vulnerable populations.   
In short, American sexual exceptionalism is a protectionist discourse that protects no one 
and nothing, short of the discourse and its assumptions about a particular vision of America.  At the 
same time, American sexual exceptionalism informs and authorizes intolerant rhetoric and actions 
on the grounds of protecting vulnerable Americans from the sexual predation of religious outsiders.  
American sexual exceptionalism accuses religious outsiders of sexual deviancy for the purpose of 
“discerning, othering, and quarantining” folk demons.271  Such exceptionalist rhetoric further 
disciplines and normalizes American sexuality—informed as it is by a conservative Christian sexual 
ethic—as something distinct and precious, in need of protection or rehabilitation from the perverse 
sexuality of imaginary religious predators.   
Aligning child sexual abuse with anti-Christian religious practice lent further credence to 
satanic ritual abuse accusations while inadvertently reifying American sexual exceptionalism.  I noted 
above that many feminists were drawn to anti-satanic ritual abuse activism through early efforts to 
fight the sexual abuse of women and children.  As de Young explains:  
When the feminist movement encouraged survivors of rape to speak out, bear witness, and 
break their silence, a woman’s tale of rape finally entered public discourse.  Its emplotment 
was, and is, profoundly political.  It describes rape as an act of violence so common to the 
everyday lives of women that the pervasive fear it creates affirms those cultural ideologies 
that have historically functioned to keep women in their place.  In making manifest the 
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relationship between biography and history, the personal and the political, this women’s rape 
tale set the agenda for a whole generation of sexual politics.272 
   
De Young here notes the profoundly political nature of women’s testimonies to surviving sexual 
assault.  But she also observes that “sexual trauma tales can sustain the status quo by simply 
reiterating, without critique, the dominant cultural discourse about sex and gender.”273  Satanic ritual 
abuse allegations function in just this way: by placing the sexual abuse of women and children 
outside normative American sexuality, rendering it demonic and outside the boundaries of American 
domesticity. 
During the Satanic Panic, de Young argue that “ritual abuse became synonymous with sexual 
abuse – but not with the ‘ordinary’ kind of sexual abuse that occurs within families.  With its 
ceremonial trappings, costumes and rites, ritual abuse was something altogether different.”274  While 
the abuse feminist activists rendered visible in the 1970s was undoubtedly regrettable, it was also 
incredibly common: “in the moral economy of the 1980s, sexual abuse was horrible, shameful – but 
ritual abuse was evil.  And evil acts require evil actors.”275  Satanic ritual abuse perpetrators were not 
family members or trusted friends, but members of a powerful and malicious religious conspiracy.  
The abusive acts themselves were more horrific than domestic incest and child sexual abuse:  
The fondling and oral-genital contact that are the preferred acts of sexual abuse almost pale 
in comparison to the rape and sodomy that supposedly are the preferred acts of ritual abuse.  
The idiosyncratic practices to heighten the abusers’ arousal in sexual abuse almost fade to 
insignificance in contrast to the infant sacrifices, blood-drinking and cannibalism that are the 
alleged rituals of ritual abuse.  And the bribes, coercions, and manipulations that keep sexual 
abuse secret simply cannot hold a candle to the death threats, brainwashing, forced drug 
ingestation and induction of multiple personalities that are said to guarantee the silence of 
ritually abused children.276   
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In every way, satanic ritual abuse abuses exceeded and eclipsed the prevalent horrors of domestic 
sexual abuse.  Anti-incest activist Louise Armstrong elaborates: “[satanic ritual abuse] was a truly epic 
distraction from the humdrum business of ordinary men allowed to molest children in the normal, 
routine course of events.  In fact, as dialogues, speculation, and passion zoomed over that was 
variously called satanic, cult, or ritual (or ritualized or ritualistic) abuse, incest plain and simple was 
left behind to eat dust.”277  Or, Armstrong suggests, “you could also look at it this way: The 
tormenting and raping of children by ordinary familial human agency just hadn’t been bad enough.”278 
The media circus surrounding satanic ritual abuse allegations emerging from daycare facilities 
and therapists’ couches made child sexual abuse visible.  But the extreme and supernatural (not to 
mention unverifiable) nature of these accusations configured the root problem—sexual abuse of 
children—foreign and aberrant, fundamentally other-than American sexuality and American 
domesticity.  Locating child sexual abuse in the supernatural robs these stories of important forms of 
political content and efficacy, reinforcing dominant cultural ideologies about the inevitability of 
women’s sexual victimization and removing all commentary about the social causes of that 
victimization.279  Satanic ritual abuse accusations placed child sexual abuse outside normative 
American sexuality, voiding these stories of any disruptive or subversive potential.280 As de Young 
notes: 
For all their horror, [these stories] are conservative and preservative.  Their depiction of 
female victimization and helplessness so resoundingly resonates with dominant cultural 
ideologies that the stories, themselves, are pitiable yet provocative tales about the 
inevitability of sexual violence in the lives of females.  As hegemonic tales, they offer no 
solutions, map out no trajectory for social change.  They can only be listened to, not acted 
upon.281 
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I would qualify de Young’s assessment here, as I have argued in this chapter that stories about 
satanic ritual abuse can be and have been acted upon.  However, de Young’s basic assertion is 
correct.  Public responses to satanic ritual abuse accusations did little to prevent the root problem: 
the prevalence of child sexual abuse.  At the same time, lurid accounts of supernatural violence 
against women and children reinforced hierarchical gendered assumptions about women’s inherent 
vulnerability and limited the conditions of religious possibility in late 20th century America.  In this 
way tales of satanic ritual abuse are preservative and conservative.  Stories like Michelle Remembers 
protect and maintain normative American sexuality as exceptional—as inherently moral, exemplary, 
and worthy of emulation—while consigning child sexual assault to supernatural and nefarious 
enemies of the American public.   
Notably, the Satanic Panic began to decelerate at roughly the same time middle-class 
women’s satanic ritual abuse accusations began to prompt lawsuits against their similarly middle-
class, presumably Satan-worshipping, family members.282  That the Satanic Panic faltered at roughly 
the same point it began to indict white American middle-class families is further evidence of the 
extent to which these protectionist discourses bolstered an ideology of American sexual 
exceptionalism.283  Indeed, locating child sexual abuse in predatory marginal religions effectively 
absolved mainstream Americans of their responsibility for this systemic social problem while 
confirming the superior morality of normative American sexuality.284 
 
Constraining Freedoms 
 
In addition to reifying the ideology of American sexual exceptionalism, feminist anti-satanic ritual 
abuse activism also served to constrain American women’s sexual and religious freedoms.  Notably, 
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the satanic ritual abuse moral panic fostered psychiatric diagnoses that placed the onus of child 
sexual abuse on supernatural assailants rather than domestic care-givers, criminalized daycare 
workers (the majority of whom were female) who facilitated an unprecedented influx of mothers 
into the workforce, and cast aspersions on a demonstrably feminist mode of spirituality – religious 
witchcraft. 
As active participants in efforts to disseminate the satanic ritual abuse moral panic, feminist 
activists helped place the blame for child sexual assault on imaginary satanists rather than on 
domestic childcare providers.  During an eight-year inquiry into satanic ritual abuse accusations, 
federal investigator Kenneth V. Lanning failed to produce any substantive evidence of an 
international satanic conspiracy set on abusing children for religious or sexual purposes.  He 
moreover expressed concern that state and federal focus on these extraordinary allegations shifted 
vital attention and resources from domestic incidents of abuse.  “I’m greatly concerned that this 
issue is distorting the issue of child sexual abuse and is going to cause serious problems for this 
movement down the road and affect the credibility of victims,” Lanning said.  “I’m also extremely 
concerned because I believe, all across this country, people are getting away with molesting kids 
because we can’t prove they’re satanic devil-worshippers.”285  Indeed, publicity surrounding false 
satanic ritual abuse claims did undermine the credibility of child witnesses and fostered skepticism 
among journalists, law enforcement officials, and jurors alike with regard to cases alleging child 
sexual abuse.286  Though child sexual abuse is regrettably common, its circumstances are neither 
supernatural nor demonstrably religious.  In direct contrast to satanic ritual abuse accusations, 
perpetrators of most child sexual abuse are male, usually family members, “and they do not seem to 
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need the help of satanists to inflict serious damage.”287  Feminist focus on child abuse in the context 
of satanic ritual abuse thus distracted from far more prevalent incidents of domestic abuses.288 
Feminist complicity in the satanic ritual abuse moral panic further limited American 
women’s sexual choices by criminalizing daycare workers, making it more difficult for women with 
children to enter the workforce.  I noted above that the 1980s saw an unprecedented influx of 
mothers into the American workforce and the institution of childcare facilities—largely staffed by 
working-class women—facilitated this influx.289  During the Satanic Panic, satanic ritual abuse 
accusations targeted precisely these women who made it possible for middle-class mothers to remain 
middle-class.290  As de Young notes, satanic ritual abuse claims further depoliticized allegations of 
child sexual abuse in identifying women as the primarily folk devils of the early Satanic Panic,   
thus weakening the link between sexual abuse and male dominance, and forging a new one 
between bizarre and sadistic sexual abuse and women as perpetrators.  [The satanic ritual 
abuse moral panic] loosened the embeddedness of sexual abuse within the routine and the 
familiar by mystifying its context with claims that children were being abused not only in 
their day care centers but in other unusual or unrecognizable places, during the course of 
meaningless rituals and incomprehensible ceremonies performed not only by their day care 
providers but by robed and hooded strangers.291   
 
Discourses of American sexual exceptionalism during the Satanic Panic located child sexual abuse 
outside the domestic sphere placed that abuse within public daycare facilities.  Anti-satanic ritual 
abuse feminist activists were complicit in the “arrest, trial by ordeal, and lifelong incarceration of 
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accused [working-class] women”; these feminists “have remained silent as convicted mothers and 
teachers are sent to prison.  Or some have admitted that a handful of defendants are probably 
innocent, but dismissed their fate as the inevitable casualties of a war in which the claims of truly 
abused youngsters cannot be threatened by talk of even one false accusation.”292  By contributing to 
the criminalization of (again, mostly female) daycare workers, allowing these workers to be 
demonized for social anxieties arising from women’s social mobility, feminist anti-satanic ritual abuse 
activists impeded American women’s sexual freedoms.293 
Finally, feminist complicity in disseminating the satanic ritual abuse moral panic constrained 
American women’s religious freedom by fostering suspicion toward an emergent mode of feminist 
spirituality – that is, religious witchcraft.  Witchcraft emerged in the 1960s and 1970s as a response to 
more established, demonstrably patriarchal religious traditions.  During the 1980s, public rhetoric 
surrounding the Satanic Panic often elided the imaginary satanisms with the lived practices of 
religious witches, Wiccans, and other Neopagans.294   The latter groups bore little resemblance to the 
much-feared satanic folk devil, and practitioners took some pains to distance themselves from the 
“public hysteria about abductions, sacrifices, and mutilated babies” – as well as from avowed 
religious Satanists, such as members of the Church of Satan and the Temple of Set.295  Yet law 
enforcement officers, jurors, and media pundits seldom bothered to differentiate between the 
groups.296  Failure to distinguish between the imaginary “satanic witches” supposedly conspiring 
against American children and progressive feminist religious practice effectively constrained 
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American women’s religious freedom during the 1980s and early 1990s; witches today still face 
public suspicion and confusion about their ties to the “baby-eating Satanists.”297 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have interrogated feminist tensions in the dissemination of the satanic ritual 
abuse (satanic ritual abuse) moral panic – specifically the extent to which feminist efforts foreclosed 
conditions of possibility for American women in the 1980s and early 1990s.  I used the public 
reception and mobilization of the satanic ritual abuse memoir Michelle Remembers to demonstrate the 
ways in which feminist satanic ritual abuse advocates located incest and child sexual abuse not in the 
home, but in the religious and sexual machinations of Satanists.  Such feminists invested 
extraordinary amounts of effort to spread awareness of the threat of satanic ritual abuse and the 
psychological diagnoses that often accompanied it: multiple personality disorder and repressed 
memory syndrome.  Ironically, these feminists’ efforts reified diagnoses that infantilized women 
abuse victims, occluded domestic child sexual abuse (the victims of which were and are largely 
female), criminalized the (largely female) daycare workers who facilitated an unprecedented influx of 
mothers into the workforce, and cast aspersion on an emphatically feminist mode of emerging 
spirituality, religious witchcraft.  Thus I have argued that feminist anti-satanic ritual abuse activism 
both reinforced American sexual exceptionalism and restricted American women’s religious and 
sexual freedoms. 
The rough decade between 1980 and the early 1990s comprises an important moment in 
contemporary American history: one in which lawmakers of a presumably secular state expressed 
concerns about the embodied influences of evil on American citizens; in which reputable 
mainstream journalists reported on the dangers of creative material (including music, books, and 
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games that encouraged the players to imagine themselves in fantastic situations and surroundings); in 
which the American public was actively and articulately afraid of the devil, who emerged during this 
time period as a threat to Americans, rather than merely to Christians.  This period is important to 
understanding late 20th century American culture, as moral panics provide crucial insights into a 
culture’s values and commitments – particularly with regard to that culture’s sexual norms.298  But 
this period is also important to American religious studies, though scholars outside the subfields of 
sociology of religion and new religious movements have largely ignored the phenomenon.   
The Satanic Panic, despite its fatuous rhyming moniker and often scarcely credible events, 
deserves closer scrutiny within the field of American religions.  Many American religious historians 
have devoted significant energy toward chronicling the rise of the New Christian Right, but most 
ignore that the public rhetoric of conservative evangelicalism during the 1980s included consistent 
fear-mongering about demonic influences at work in contemporary America.299  The significance of 
the Satanic Panic is not limited to the study of American evangelicalism, however.  As I have shown, 
public figures during this decade consistently used religious symbolism and language in public sphere 
discourse.  Such rhetoric and symbols shaped court cases, social work, psychology, and feminist 
activism.  
Of my three case studies, this chapter best exemplifies the traditional “moral panic,” defined 
in time and space, forgotten, ignored, or dismissed once public hysteria died down.  But as I argued 
in my introduction, this narrativization is also indicative of a broader, endemic response to religious 
difference in American public sphere: the casting of sexual aspersions on a minority religion—or in 
this case, an imagined mode of minority religiosity—to resolve public anxieties about violations of 
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normative sexuality and the willingness of the American body politic to address sexual misconduct 
occurring outside the American home.   
 
 
 
 
Conclusion: Good Neighbors 
 
He will not go behind his father’s saying, 
And he likes having thought of it so well 
He says again, “Good fences make good neighbors.” 
 
Robert Frost 
“Mending Wall” 
 
 
September 2000 
In Dallas, forty-four former students of gurukulas, boarding schools operated by the International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness, file a federal lawsuit alleging decades of abuse at the hands of 
instructors.  From 1972 – 1990, many American members of ISKCON (colloquially known as “Hare 
Krishnas”) left their children in the indifferent care of fellow devotees less suited to public 
proselytization and fundraising.  The plaintiffs testify that physical, emotional, and sexual abuse was 
widespread and common at these educational institutions.  The abuses they allege are severe: their 
attorney, Windle Turley, describes incidents as “the most unthinkable abuse and maltreatment of 
little children which we have seen.  It includes rape, sexual abuse, physical torture and emotional 
terror of children as young as three years of age.”1  Though federal attempts to prosecute ISKCON 
under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) will fail, by the end of 
these proceedings ISKCON will agree to a $9.5 million settlement to compensate 535 former 
gurukuli abuse survivors.2   
                                                          
1 Peter Brandt, “Holy Abuse,” Salon, July 2, 2001, http://www.salon.com/2001/07/02/krishna/.  
 
2 E. Burke Rochford, Jr.  “The Hare Krishna Movement: Beginnings, Change, and Transformation,” in Introduction to 
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Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), 36.  
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* * * 
Religious studies scholarship on ISKCON frankly acknowledges these abuses and the Society’s 
efforts toward making amends.3  Despite state and federal legal proceedings against ISKCON, there 
has been little public awareness of or popular outcry against this minority religious community.  
There have been no public exposés about the evils of ISKCON on major news programs.   Oprah 
did not visit Alachua, Florida.4  Despite relatively narrow strictures for members’ dress, sexual 
practices, and diet, no public figure called ISKCON “the American Taliban.”5  At no point did state 
officials propose that ISKCON theology perpetuates and mandates the victimization of children.  
Krishna Consciousness is by no means mainstream American religion, but neither does the 
American public equate ISKCON with gendered exploitation, abuse, or sexual impropriety in ways 
comparable to the rhetoric regarding FLDS or even Islam.  Why should this be so? 
Gurukulas separated children as young as three and four years of age from their families and 
familiar domestic settings, to an even greater extent than the daycare facilities that received so much 
public scrutiny during the Satanic Panic.  ISKCON theologically prizes celibacy over procreative 
binary monogamy, making its members sexually nonconformist in degrees arguably comparable to 
the plural marriages of Mormon fundamentalists.  As with Islam, a great many members of 
ISKCON are racial or ethnic minorities within the United States.  Nevertheless, the International 
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Society for Krishna Consciousness met with a far less acrimonious public response to substantiated 
allegations of sexual abuse than did the communities which comprise my case studies.   
The simplest explanation for these discrepancies is that the schools in question no longer 
exist.  Though some Krishna temples run day schools, the last gurukula in the United States closed in 
1996.  But ultimately this explanation is unsatisfying in its facility.   
That ISKCON has become less foreign-seeming to the American mainstream might provide 
some insight.6  “Hare Krishnas” met with much suspicion and abuse when the movement emerged 
in the mid-1960s, but as American ISKCON enters its sixth decade, much of its shock value seems 
to have faded.  We might attribute the lack of popular response regarding ISKCON’s sexual abuse 
and scandal to a relative indifference bred by familiarity with this once “exotic” movement. 
The “mainstreaming” of Krishna Consciousness might also be traced to a demographic shift 
in membership: whereas devotees in the 1960s and 1970s were primarily young middle-to-upper 
class white converts, today’s Krishnas are most often of transnational Asian descent.  It is perhaps 
not unreasonable to suspect that the American public is less outraged by—or even interested in—
abuses perpetrated against non-white children.   
The absence of exoticism surrounding ISKCON has also made “Hare Krishnas” less 
frequent targets of popular culture lampooning.  The absence of a well-marketed pulp nonfiction 
narrative to popularize and corroborate public suspicions of religious difference might also have 
contributed to the lack of response to these reported abuses.   
Whatever the cause(s) of Americans’ public disinterest in ISKCON’s sex scandal, the 
indifference itself serves as evidence of the movement’s relative innocuousness in the nation’s 
understanding of religion.  ISKCON has become a “good neighbor,” in ways FLDS, Islam, and 
satanism have not and might never.   
                                                          
6 Eileen Barker, “Perspective: What Are We Studying?,”  Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions 
8.1 (July 2004): 99. 
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* * *  
In this dissertation, I have argued that public rhetoric about minority religions demonstrates the ways 
notions of normative sexuality have shaped and constrained popular understandings of American 
religion since the early 1980s.  I engaged several popular narratives that portray minority religions 
(Islam, Mormonism, and witchcraft) as predatory, coercing or duping vulnerable American women 
and children into religious nonconformity and sexual transgression.  In these narratives, normative 
sexuality—understood as binary, marital, moderately procreative, and heterosexual—marks the 
boundaries of acceptable American religiosity and the limits of American religious tolerance.  At the 
same time, a popular intuitive sense of “good” sex (and its regulation) authorizes the surveillance and 
regulation of minority religious practices without violating Americans’ professed commitment to 
religious pluralism and freedom.  In this way, public rhetoric discourages religious nonconformity 
while encouraging normative sexual practices.  This strategy’s efficacy lies in its claim to protect 
America’s most vulnerable citizens, women and children.   
As I have shown, normative American sexuality constructs and compels certain raced, 
classed, and gendered attitudes, assumptions, and behaviors.7 Narratives like Under the Banner of 
Heaven, Not Without My Daughter, and Michelle Remembers identify the people and problems of religious 
minorities as somehow outside contemporary American culture – as though women and children 
were not abused in other contexts; as though such abuse were the product of peculiar theologies 
rather than broader systemic inequalities. 
This kind of intolerant rhetoric authorizes real Americans, in their common sense, to regulate 
and condemn religious outsiders for sexual transgressions (real or imagined) while masking or 
ignoring the sexual crimes happening in their own homes and families.  Authors like Jon Krakauer, 
Betty Mahmoody, and Michelle Smith and Lawrence Pazder identify minority religions as legitimate 
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targets of intolerance—and the women and children of marginal religions as especially vulnerable 
populations—while ignoring more mundane incidents of abuse.   
I have presented three case studies—Jon Krakauer’s Under the Banner of Heaven (2003), Betty 
Mahmoody’s Not Without My Daughter (1987), and Michelle Smith and Lawrence Pazder’s Michelle 
Remembers (1980)—as paradigmatic of religiously intolerant discourse.  Krakauer’s work elides 
Mormon fundamentalist identity with the practice of polygamy, and directly informed the 2008 raid 
of the FLDS Yearning for Zion ranch, which resulted in the largest state custodial detention of 
children in U.S. history and further isolated and alienated abuse victims within the community while 
failing to prevent systemic abuses of women and children.  Mahmoody essentialized Muslim 
masculinity as a frustrated sexual predation that oppresses and abuses women, thus fostering public 
anti-Muslim sentiment and isolating American Muslim women.  Finally, Smith and Pazder’s work 
served as a direct catalyst for the Satanic Ritual Abuse moral panic of the 1980s and early 1990.  In 
particular, feminist anti-abuse activists responding to Michelle Remembers played a pivotal role in the 
literal demonization of minority religions and childcare providers during this period.   
Religious intolerance does not exist in a vacuum – it capitalizes on other systemic 
inequalities.  By locating the abuse of women and children in America’s religious margins, these 
rhetorics encourage normative practices without violating a professed national commitment to 
religious freedom or holding the nation accountable for the domestic and far more prevalent abuses 
of women and children.  Paradoxically, this rhetoric often work to constrain Americans’ religious 
and sexual freedoms while doing little to prevent violence against women and children.   
Such discourse promotes intolerant rhetoric and actions on the grounds of protecting and 
saving vulnerable Americans from the sexual predation of religious outsiders.  This rhetoric 
disciplines and normalizes American sexuality as something distinct and precious, in need of 
protection or rehabilitation from the perverse sexuality of imaginary religious predators.  This 
discourse—predicated on the need of the American body politic to protect and liberate its women 
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and children—ultimately protects no one and nothing except the boundaries of acceptable American 
religiosity and sexuality.   
The narrativizations that have constituted my case studies simultaneously condemn the 
abuse of women and children while doing little, if anything, to prevent or disrupt such violence.  The 
authors consistently recount tales of horrific sexual violence against women to demonstrate the 
barbarity of religious minorities, and ostensibly the need for commonsense Americans to intervene.   
But as I have demonstrated, narratives that exploit dominant cultural assumptions about sexual and 
gendered inequality are fundamentally conservative and preservative: such tales do little either to 
prevent the abuses they recount, or to protect the stories’ sentimentalized subjects. 8  At the same 
time, these exotic and damning portrayals of marginal religions exclude religious minorities from 
common sense and American values, constraining conditions of religious possibility and 
complicating the lived practices of American minority religions.   
Narratives like the ones I have critiqued are never just stories.  Such contributions to popular 
culture shape American religious landscape – compelling normative religious and sexual practices, 
eliding differences among minority religious communities to present said communities as equally 
foreign and threatening to truly American way of life.  These terrible stories, these atrocity tales, are 
ultimately deleterious both to mainstream Americans’ understandings of religious diversity and to 
members of minority religious communities.  Such tales, as de Young notes, make abuses seem 
inevitable and do little to prevent abuses.  Rather, atrocity tales confirm what we already “know” 
about minority religions, act as evidence for condemnation of difference, and compel normative 
religious and sexual practices.  These tales of abuse, horror, and woe do little to prevent abuse and 
victimization of the women and children of minority religious communities.  Such stories do, 
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however, inform the American public that suspicion of and discrimination against minority religious 
communities is necessary, justified, and inevitable.   
Public rhetoric that constructs minority religions as necessarily insidious, irrational, and 
perverse neither reflects the lived experience of many members of these minority religions nor 
protects the survivors or the potential targets of domestic and sexual abuses.  As scholars of 
American religions, then, we must attend to the consequences of narrativizing contact with social 
outsiders and take seriously the expressed desires, needs, and recounted experiences of religious 
minorities themselves.   
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APPENDIX: Robert Frost, “Mending Wall” (1975) 
 
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,  
That sends the frozen-ground-swell under it,  
And spills the upper boulders in the sun,  
And makes gaps even two can pass abreast.  
The work of hunters is another thing:  
I have come after them and made repair  
Where they have left not one stone on a stone,  
But they would have the rabbit out of hiding,  
To please the yelping dogs. The gaps I mean,  
No one has seen them made or heard them made,  
But at spring mending-time we find them there.  
I let my neighbor know beyond the hill;  
And on a day we meet to walk the line  
And set the wall between us once again.  
We keep the wall between us as we go.  
To each the boulders that have fallen to each.  
And some are loaves and some so nearly balls  
We have to use a spell to make them balance:  
“Stay where you are until our backs are turned!” 
We wear our fingers rough with handling them.  
Oh, just another kind of out-door game,  
One on a side. It comes to little more:  
There where it is we do not need the wall:  
He is all pine and I am apple orchard.  
My apple trees will never get across  
And eat the cones under his pines, I tell him.  
He only says, “Good fences make good neighbors.” 
Spring is the mischief in me, and I wonder  
If I could put a notion in his head:  
“Why do they make good neighbors? Isn't it  
Where there are cows?  
But here there are no cows.  
Before I built a wall I'd ask to know  
What I was walling in or walling out,  
And to whom I was like to give offence.  
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,  
That wants it down.” I could say “Elves” to him,  
But it's not elves exactly, and I'd rather  
He said it for himself. I see him there  
Bringing a stone grasped firmly by the top  
In each hand, like an old-stone savage armed.  
He moves in darkness as it seems to me  
Not of woods only and the shade of trees.  
He will not go behind his father's saying,  
And he likes having thought of it so well  
He says again, “Good fences make good neighbors.” 
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